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Abstract      
This thesis gives an overview of the research that has been conducted studying major risk-factors (size, 
value, profitability, momentum, investments) and Fama-French asset pricing models. Aim of this thesis 
is to study changes in major risk factors at the U.S. equity markets after the global financial crisis. The 
empirical part of this thesis uses three 120-month periods of daily data, focusing mainly on changes 
between the 120 months before and after the global financial crisis using the end of 2008 as a breakpoint 
for data. Also, the performance of the Fama-French five-factor model is evaluated in three different 
periods, revealing information on how the model works with various samples of data. 
Research set up follows mainly similar approach as in Fama and French asset-pricing studies by using 
portfolio sorts of different characteristics and portfolios that mimic risk factor returns. This thesis adds 
to the existing literature by evaluating three short periods of 120-months and comparing relative changes 
on these periods. The main focus is comparing risk-factor coefficients, risk factor return patterns, and 
performance of the Fama-French five-factor model in (01/1999 – 12/2008) data sample to (01/2009 – 
12/2018) data sample in the U.S. equity market. The third period is used to control and point the 
magnitude of changes after the financial crisis.  
Results of the empirical part of this thesis reveal significant differences in risk-factors after the financial 
crisis. Previously discovered risk-factor return patterns disappear in the period after the financial crisis. 
This change is significant as clear and strong patterns of risks factor effects in average returns can be seen 
in the first two periods. Regression tests reveal clear trends in risk-factors coefficients. Profitability factor 
obtains explanatory power (importance) coming to the present day as the value factor loses explanatory 
power. Size factor gains on small firms’ categories but loses on big-sized firms. Investment factor does 
not play a significant part in explaining returns in general in the period after the financial crisis. Fama-
French five-factor model performance is persistently highest in the period after the financial crisis 
supporting its usage on different applications. 
Main findings show enhanced importance of profitability factor. This signs of the increased importance 
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There have been significant changes in economic macro-environment in the last ten 
years. Changes include the global financial crisis, major changes in policy and long-
lasting period of low-interest rates. The motivation of this study is to examine how the 
global financial crisis and the following changes in the economy have affected the 
most well-known risk-factors in the United States (later the U.S.) equity markets. To 
effectively limit the study, the focus is mainly on the Fama-French five-factor model 
(later FF5) and four different sorts of stocks to study this issue. 
 
Financial markets have been outgoing major changes in the last ten years mainly 
because of the global financial crisis that happened around 2008. Regulators have 
noticed that equity markets need to be readjusted and regulated differently to 
effectively avoid such crises. The global financial crisis was a huge problem for the 
whole world economy resulting in low and negative rates of gross domestic growth 
and making the lives of millions of people harder. A so-called new era in the financial 
markets began after the global financial crisis and started the long reconstruction of 
financial markets. Changes introduced to markets are well visible today. This thesis 
examines how these changes in the financial markets have affected the most well-
known firm-level risk factors such as value, size, profitability, and investments. There 
is a huge number of identified risk factors in the global equity markets, but risk-factors 
are mainly overlapping with each other. Thus, this thesis limits the focus on the most 
well-known risk factors, and the empirical part tests the Fama-French five-factor 
model in three different periods of 120-months with differently sorted portfolios. 
This thesis adds to the existing literature by directly evaluating changes in risk-factor 
and Fama-French model performance on three relatively short periods. The main focus 
is on 120-months before and 120-month after the breakpoint which is the end of the 
year 2008. The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers investment bank happened on 9. 
September 2008 which really started the global effects of this crisis. The control 
period/period one (01/1989 – 12/1998) is used to control and point out the magnitude 
of changes between the period two (120-months before the breakpoint) and the period 
three (120-months after the breakpoint). Daily data is used in most of the tests which 
result in more accurate estimates of movements of risk-factors. Those adjustments 
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result in a different research approach than used in previous studies. Thus, this thesis 
adds important empirical evidence on the view of research on risk-factors, asset pricing 
models, and model applications. 
Two research questions are following: 
1. Effect of financial crisis on risk-factors on U.S. equity market 
2. Steadiness of performance of FF5 on three short periods 
The first research question is interested in the evaluation of the changes between the 
120-month periods in the risk-factors on the U.S. equity market. To find answers to 
this question wide literature review on the issue is conducted and main findings 
introduced in this thesis. The empirical part evaluates the return patterns on differently 
sorted portfolios that mimic effects that risk-factors should have on average returns. 
Focus is on what are the differences in the return patterns before and after the financial 
crisis. Also, multiple regressions are conducted with the Fama-French five-factor 
model which shows the changing trends around the risk-factors as the outcomes of the 
regression tests. Second research question evaluates the performance of the Fama-
French five-factor model in those regression test with different statistics. It has been 
shown that performance is high at in-sample data and out-sample data in the previous 
studies. This fact supports using this model to study questions related to risk-factors 
and asset pricing models. But there are no reported results on evaluating different 
periods on the in-sample data with the shorter periods on high frequently daily data. 
Different statics answers to question how steady the performance between periods is 
and can Fama-French five-factor model be reliably used on different asset pricing 
applications no matter the period. 
Hypotheses: 
1. There are significant changes in risk-factor after the financial crisis 
2. Performance of FF5 model is affected by different states on market 
3. Visible patterns on returns have changed because of the financial crisis 
4. There is flight to quality after the financial crisis 
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The hypotheses to be tested are built on what is expected to be the results based on the 
literature review and the new market environment. Hypothesis strongly supports 
answering the research questions and they are evaluated mostly in conclusions chapter. 
Research methods in this thesis include a literature review on previous empirical 
studies that study risk-factors and asset pricing models. On the field of risk-factors and 
asset pricing models, there is a large number of studies and this thesis is mainly 
focusing on the ground-breaking work by the authors Fama and French on the thirty-
year-long period. Also, many of the most important studies and discussion on the risk-
factors and models are brought up to back up the story. A short introduction to macro-
finance and recap what happened in the financial crisis is also provided at the 
beginning of this thesis to introduce the reader to the topic. The empirical part follows 
a similar set up as used in the Fama-French studies but using daily data and relatively 
much shorter periods. The empirical part will use returns of the 5x5 and 2x4x4 sorted 
portfolios on different characteristics and returns of risk-factor mimic portfolios to 
study research questions. The empirical part will report the results and statistics of 
every 321 regressions made to these different portfolio sorts. The analysis discusses 
the differences visible between three periods, focusing mainly on the changes before 
and after 2008. Anchoring hypotheses on earlier literature, using publicly available 
data similar as in Fama and French studies with a large number of observations, and 
four different portfolio sorts leads to robust research set up on this thesis confirming 
that findings of this thesis are not related to other than real changes in the risk factors, 
state variables and the U.S. equity markets in general. 
The empirical part of this thesis reveals that there are significant changes in risk-factors 
after the financial crisis. Those changes are higher in magnitude than changes between 
the control period and period two. Hypothesis one is strongly supported by the results 
shown in the evaluation of returns pattern between the periods and as the outcomes 
from regression tests revealing that risk factors have changed significantly after the 
global financial crisis starting around 2008. Hypothesis three that anticipates changes 
in risk factor return patterns is firmly accepted. Return patters show support to risk 
factor effects in the first two periods evaluated. Coming to the period after the financial 
crisis return patterns disappear in all cases, except for mild patterns in investment 
effect. Return dispersion is significantly lower in the last period than in the first two 
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periods. All average returns seem to be similar no matter the differences in firm 
characteristics. Results from two-variate sort portfolios show that the differentiation 
of firms in the period after the financial crisis with risk factors evaluated in this thesis 
(value, profitability, investments) won't show return patterns that are discovered in 
previous empirical studies. On three-variate sorts, profitability can generate return 
patterns as anticipated by previous studies. These sorts show that more profitable firms 
generate higher average returns in all periods supporting the importance of 
profitability. The size effect, higher average returns of small firms is visible only in 
the second period at two variate sorts. On three-variate sorts dividing firms only on 
two size categories shows the size effect also in the period after the financial crisis.  
There are clear trends in the risk factors shown by regression tests. Profitability factor 
gains explanatory power (importance) through the period increasing around five 
percentage in explanation power after the financial crisis. Value factor loses power 
through periods and decreases approximately the same amount in explanation power 
as profitability factor gains. Nearly suggesting shifts in power between these factors. 
Three-variate sorts confirm these findings and point out the increased importance of 
profitability factor in explaining the average returns on the equity market. Investment 
factor does not play an important part in explaining returns in general, excluding the 
extremely high and low investing firms and some expectations. Size factor gains 
explanatory power in small firms and decreases closer to zero in explaining returns of 
big firms. This signs of the increased illiquidity premium in markets after the financial 
crisis. Performance of FF5 in explaining average excess returns is persistently highest 
on the period after the financial crisis in all tests confirming the second hypothesis and 
supporting usage of FF5 in applications as it delivers high performance (around 95 %).  
Chapter two shortly introduces the macro-finance and recaps what happened during 
the global financial crisis and examines how the market has evolved in the last ten 
years. The third chapter introduces risk-factors, several interesting findings, and 
consensus understanding of the risk-factors on equity markets. The fourth chapter 
introduces the asset pricing models and precisely helps the reader to become familiar 
with the Fama-French asset pricing models. The fifth chapter is the empirical part of 
this study that presents outcomes of tests and other related information, analyzing the 
changes between different periods. The sixth chapter concludes. 
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2 FINANCIAL CRISIS AND CHANGES IN MACRO-ENVIRONMENT 
In this study, we are going to take focus on what kind of risk factors participants in 
U.S stock markets are willing to carry in different economic states of nature using the 
financial crisis and end of 2008 as a breakpoint. This chapter is a short introduction to 
the macro-finance and how it sees the pricing of assets at different market states. 
Macro-finance should help the reader to understand the situation this thesis is studying. 
The second part of this chapter is a short recap of what happened in the global financial 
crisis starting around 2008 and what changes have been introduced to the financial 
markets after the crisis. The thesis focuses on the changes that could be important in 
determining the changes in risk factors. 
2.1 Macro Finance 
It has been shown that different economic states of nature are correlated with stock 
prices. In good states of nature expected returns are low and in bad states expected 
returns are high. Those expected returns follow the longer anticipated state of the 
economy, called as business-cycles. (Fama & French, 1989) Fact is similar, but 
opposite with interest rates. In good times interest rates are high to slow down the 
economy and vice versa, interest rates are low in bad times to boost the economy. 
Macro-finance studies the link between asset prices and fluctuations in economic 
states. When studying different market states focus should not be concentrated on 
interest rates and consumption substitution, rather focus should be centralized on time-
varying risk premiums and markets ability to carry risk in different states of nature. 
Thus, many macro-finance models focus on the idea that markets can carry more risk 
in good times than in bad times. (Cochrane, 2017)    
Cochrane (2017) asses the question that seems to be simple; as equity premiums are 
much higher in the bad states of nature, why less amount of people are willing to hold 
stocks? However, the answer is not straightforward at all. The simple answer could be 
that stocks are risky, but that is not a complete answer. People are willing to carry risks 
in other areas of life, but why stocks are avoided in many cases? Answer must lie in 
somewhere that stocks carry different kind of risk, the risk that will hit at the worst 
times possible, and thus this risk is avoided. Times, when people avoid the risk of 
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stocks, is in the times of recession. Losing savings in the stock market at the same time 
as losing a job may introduce risk that most people are not willing to carry. This would 
be too much of a shock to consumption on most individuals as people on average prefer 
smooth stream of consumption. Thus, this fear results in the fact that stock prices are 
low and risk premiums high across asset classes in the bottoms of the recession. 
(Cochrane, 2017) 
Cochrane also points out an explanation that people come more risk-averse when there 
are no losses in good times, strengthening the recession effect on stock prices. 
Recessions seem to combine these two mindsets, fear and the increased risk-aversion 
that cause people to avoid stocks. Recessions are phenomena of markets lower 
capacity to carry risk, which results in increased risk-premiums and shift investors to 
change riskier assets to lower-risk assets. This shift is also called a flight to quality that 
happens during recessions. (Cochrane, 2017) Global financial crisis starting around 
2008 in the U.S. subprime markets launched a recession that lasted very long and 
introduced the new kind of era in the financial markets. 
2.2 Global Financial Crisis 
The global financial crisis started around 2008 at the subprime mortgage market in the 
U.S. with reckless actions of financial institutions and market participants. The 
definition and the common view of the financial crisis are that problems in financial 
markets rise to the level that they affect the whole economy due to lack of flows of 
credit to households and businesses and this disruption is affecting the real flows of 
goods and services (Ovanhouser, 2009, p.1). The crisis spread from the subprime 
mortgage markets to different areas of U.S. financial markets and later to the whole 
world economy through the financial institutions. Markets were unstable already in 
2008. And one starting point to the global spread of financial crisis can be seen the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 15. September 2008, which spread distrust widely 
all over the financial markets. Nobody knew which counterparties had bad instruments 
or derivates in their balance sheet. This led to a sharp price in short term interest rates. 
The global financial crisis started after a long period of success that had lasted sixteen 
years straight. Problems in financial markets had been effectively handled by central 
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banks, and major hits to the economy were avoided (Ovanhouser, 2009 pp. 1-2). This 
success supported the trust in the economy and likely aided loosen credit giving. 
Governments failed in the regulation of financial institutions, and this allowed them to 
build a house of cards that would collapse eventually. Government activities were also 
likely strengthening the impact of the crisis, as they run large deficits on the public 
sector and were heavily in debt coming to 2008. Grant and Wilson (2012) also point 
out Chinese government activities as one reason for the oversupply of easy credit. 
Chinese government kept buying U.S. treasury bonds and to hold their currency value 
low. This likely aided crisis to form. (Grant & Wilson, 2012 pp. 1-2) 
Central bankers and Federal Reserve (FED) were aware of problems in the subprime 
mortgage market, but those institutions could not anticipate that problems in subprime 
markets would widen to affect the whole financial system. Many losses occurring in 
markets during the crisis were caused by a similar setup as following; use of complex, 
speculative, and hard-to-value financial instruments that were bought with loan 
money. Then major financial institutions used different entities to remove those 
investments of their balance sheets. House of cards has been built on the markets that 
would collapse. Traditional tools to revive the economy from the crisis had been 
introduced by FED by lowering the interest rate and injecting the billions of cash to 
create liquidity in the markets to keep credit flowing. (Ovanhouser, 2009. pp 1-3) 
The global financial crisis has been a disaster for millions of people who have lost their 
jobs, homes and savings (Grant & Wilson, 2012 pp. 1-2). Social costs of the financial 
crisis were large enough to warrant that the new restrictions on the markets need to be 
designed to lower the possibility of reckless trading activities that could hit the whole 
financial system and the real economy. (Ovanhouser, 2009) 
2.3 New Rules in Financial Markets 
The financial crisis was a huge disaster for the whole economy, which led to many 
regulators question where the old rules in the markets still apply or whether there is a 
need to design new ones. Calomiris (2011) points out that a successful start of the 
reform of financial markets must begin with identifying the flaws in policy and 
regulation that have existed for a long period. These flaws must be addressed and 
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corrected if we want to avoid crises in the future. Government policies which allowed 
risk-taking activities of financial institutions were crucial in the development of the 
crisis. (Calomiris, 2011 pp. 73-91; Kaufman, Evanoff, Demirguc-Kunt, & Federal 
Reserve Bank, of Chicago, 2011) 
Financial and macroeconomic questions have been too far away from each for a long 
time. Policymakers have noticed the need to adjust politics to bring these two more 
close to each other and intersect possible problems with financial factors and the real 
economy. Although this task is not easy, the better policy requires better analysis, and 
this lags much behind. (Borio & Drehmann, 2009; Kaufman et al. 2011) Building a 
more robust global financial regulatory and supervisory framework would be a good 
start. This could be done by moving towards common rules and greater international 
co-operation between central banks and governments. Reducing complex regulatory 
settlements in the financial supervisory and enchanting role of central banks in 
macroprudential supervision. (Orphanides, 2011, pp. 305-314; Kaufman et al. 2011) 
2.3.1 Capital standards and liquidity 
Higher capital standards for financial institutions would help to avoid future crises, as 
the lack of capital was one root reason for the crisis. Reasonable increases in capital 
standards would decrease risks without undermining the ability of banks to provide 
financial services and credit. Increased capital requirements are an important step 
toward a more stable financial sector. (Baily & Elliott, 2011 pp. 59-71; Kaufman et al. 
2011) Liquidity problems did strengthen the impact of the crisis. After the Lehman 
Brothers bankruptcy financial institutions increased their cash reserves, which led 
equity markets to dry up. There was a possibility that the whole international monetary 
system would collapse, but that collapse was avoided by successful actions of 
governments and central banks in short-term crisis management. 
The globalisation of finance did widen domestic liquidity problems to the international 
context. International liquidity trusted on ad hoc actions by FED in 2008, and there 
were inadequacies in the normal management of international liquidity. FED acted as 
last resort loaner for international liquidity and prevented bank failures. The crisis 
would have been much worse if there weren’t these emergency provisions of 
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international liquidity by FED. To prevent future liquidity problems such as, Basel 
three programme was designed to regulate financial institutions minimum capital 
requirements, and it was the first internationally agreed program. (Allen, 2013) 
After the global financial crisis, there is a need for better management of possible 
rising crises. Financial crises in different periods have been giving hints of themselves 
before they really broke out. Governments and regulatory bodies should deal with 
systematic risk and sources of financial vulnerabilities before it reaches critical points. 
Meaning creating new stability and regulation surveillance in the markets. Financial 
Stability Board has taken this task, which requires the U.S to make strong political 
commitments to national and international financial stability regulation. (Kawai & 
Pomerleano, 2011 pp. 127-153; Kaufman et al. 2011) 
2.3.2 Changes in world economy 
The crisis had led to shifts on power at world economy. Kirshner (2014) argues there 
is a diffusion of the economic power of the U.S in the leader of the world economy 
and the dollar’s role in the world currency. The dollar will certainly stay first among 
equals, but its role will decrease from previous. Kirshner anticipates that there will be 
more pressure for adjustments, new macroeconomic vulnerabilities and state of mind 
that the U.S. is not free of crises after all. New constraints, frustrations and 
vulnerabilities will lead eventually to the reassessment of U.S engagement with the 
surrounding world. (Kirshner, 2014) These proposed adjustments and changes have 
been seen in the financial markets over the last ten years. Interest rates have been 
historically low for a long time, and central banks have been injecting huge amounts 
of money to financial markets to keep them stabilized. Regulation has taken a shift 
towards more regulated and supervised markets. There are capital requirements for 
banks, different reporting needs about holdings, and other kinds of adjustments. One 
hint about new policies in the starting point of crisis from the government side was the 
failure of Lehman Brothers. The government showed that even one of the biggest is 
not too big to fail to reduce the moral hazard problem. The aim of policy and regulation 
is towards reducing the reckless actions of financial institutions and to avoid future 
crises in financial markets that hit the whole real economy. 
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3 RISK FACTORS IN EQUITY MARKETS 
The global risk factor has a common structure among returns around different asset 
classes and markets. These return patterns are not really related to standard macro-
level factors. Risk factors can be intercepted as characteristics of an asset, the main 
drivers behind return premiums. Different characteristics, risks, carry different risk 
premiums. If assets are priced rationally, the return of an asset is the sum of exposures 
to different risk factors. Normally returns have something that we are not able to 
explain with common risk factors, and this fact motivates to seek out for new risk 
factors or sources that drive asset returns. There is a large number of identified risk 
factors on equity markets, but many risk factors are correlated with each other and 
follow the patterns of the most important risk factors. Most important risk factors to 
explain returns on equity markets can be identified as the market return, size, value, 
momentum, volatility, profitability and investments. In this chapter, these risk-factors 
are discussed alongside with anomaly returns patterns found in the equity markets. 
3.1 Market and Size 
The market risk factor is different from other risk factors discussed in this chapter. In 
the big picture, it is affecting in returns of all assets with the positive or negative 
correlation to return. In many cases, a negative correlation is preferred to gain 
diversification benefits and sometimes this is the opposite. Thus, it really does not tell 
us much on return differences, moreover how much the asset follows the average 
return on of the market. The market factor is more important in asset pricing models 
than in straight differentiation and pricing of assets. The market factor is the return 
from the market minus the risk-free rate, meaning the excess return market can 
generate in a given period compared to riskless investment. The market factor is 
included in almost all asset pricing models as market return tend to have high 
explanatory power in the return of stocks. Market factor has been accused of being 
biased because it really is not able to describe real market return. This is because there 
is no possible way to create a market portfolio that contains all the assets in the market 
and discovers their excess return compared to the risk-free rate. The factor is normally 
build using the market return from the same or similar market where the asset we want 
to explain is traded. Although of possible biases, the market factor is widely used and 
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leaving it out will significantly lower the explanatory power of asset pricing models. 
Asset pricing models are discussed in more detail in chapter four.  
In short terms, size effect means that small-sized firms have higher expected returns 
than big sized firms on average. Size is one of the main building blocks and an 
important factor in asset pricing models (Asness, Frazzini, Israel, Moskowitz, & 
Pedersen, 2018). Fama and French (1993) studied common risk factors in returns of 
stocks and bonds. They found that market factor, size, and book-to-market equity ratio 
(BE/ME) has high explanatory power of returns on U.S. stock market in cross-
sectional tests and size factor having explanatory power in univariate regressions 
suggesting the presence of risk factor. After these findings, size has been accused of 
being an unimportant risk factor. This is because size tends to follow other risk factors, 
have historically weak and time-varying performance that is not strong in tests to 
international markets. Another problem for this risk factor is also that size effect is 
most visible in microcap stocks that represent only a small percentage of U.S. stock 
market value. However, Asness et al. (2018) show that size matters much more than it 
was previously thought when asset quality is controlled. Previously accounted 
problems disappear when regressions control for quality or junk characteristics of the 
firm. This means sorting firms by their quality characteristics, which reveal the lost 
size premium, that is not only concentrated on microcaps, is stable and robust around 
equity markets and industries. (Asness et al. 2018) 
Size factors correlation to average returns is much clearer and more robust when 
controlling for quality characteristics of a firm. Quality is key and the most important 
factor when seeking for size premiums. Asness et al. find that large firms tend to be 
quality ones as small firms tend to be junk on average. Behavioural theories explain 
that small stocks have higher shorting costs and more disagreement in the market, 
which eventually leads them to be more likely overvalued than undervalued. But when 
quality is controlled, small quality stocks can outperform large quality stocks and same 
holds for junk stocks. Basic size effect suffers from size-quality composition effect, 
which has caused these problems to discover size effect before and controlling reveals 
and increases the size premium significantly. In their quality-based studies, Asness, 
Frazzini and Pedersen (2019) find that there is a higher price premium for quality in 
large stocks than for small stocks, which offers one explanation why small quality 
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stocks outperform large quality stocks on average. Size effect seems to be related 
positively to illiquidity and negatively to quality. Size seems to have both side relation 
to these characteristics, although liquidity and quality are not strongly related to each 
other. These findings support the size premium being illiquidity premium even though 
there is no further connection found. Measures of liquidity and illiquidity are 
correlated and lower the size premium when controlled in tests. However, smaller but 
still significant size premium remains in returns. Those finding put size on a more 
equal footing to other major risk factors in markets. (Asness et al. 2018) 
Main metrics to evaluate firm size is the total market capitalization which tells the 
market value of equity, enterprise value, the book value of assets or different 
characteristics that describe relative size, for example, turnover. 
3.2 Value and Quality 
Value effect means that value firms have higher expected returns on average than 
growth firms. Fama and French (1992) find that average returns on U.S. stocks are 
positively related to the ratio of the assets book value of equity to assets market value 
of equity. Fama and French (1998) find similar results of associated value premiums 
in international tests to major and emerging markets. Findings suggest that value 
stocks seem to have higher returns than growth stocks around the markets on average. 
Value stocks have high ratios of book-equity to market-equity, earnings per price and 
cash flow per price. High BE/ME called as value stocks provide higher average returns 
compared to stocks that have lower BE/ME that are called growth stocks. Capital asset 
pricing model fails to explain the value premium effect in 1963 – 2004 test period, and 
thus, it is seen as an anomaly based on CAPM. (Fama & French, 2006) This return 
difference is called value effect or value premium. 
To identify the value effect as a global risk factor, there needs to be a strong common 
pattern across asset classes and markets. Asness, Moskowitz & Pedersen (2013) show 
strong common structure among returns and significant return premium in value-based 
investment strategies. Value effect can only slightly be explained by macroeconomic 
variables such as business-cycle, consumption, and default risk. Main findings of 
Asness et. al was a co-movement pattern that is strong and holds in different asset 
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classes, markets, and robustness checks. They also discovered that different value 
strategies are correlated across markets which suggest value as a common global risk 
factor. What causes value effect is still somewhat of a puzzle in asset pricing studies. 
A small fraction of value effect can be explained by value effects negative relation to 
liquidity risk. (Asness et al, 2013) One explanation to negative liquidity risk relation 
is that when there are bad states on markets and everyone is selling due liquidity needs 
or risk management, value stocks are not affected as much as conventional or highly 
traded stocks. (Pedersen, 2009) This fact offers one explanation for higher returns of 
value stocks compared to growth stocks.  
Main metrics to evaluate the value effect of the stock is price-to-book ratio (P/B ratio) 
that is similar to BE/ME turned around as ME/BE ratio. P/B compares the current share 
price to book value per share. Higher the P/B ratio, higher is the market value of the 
firm’s equity compared to equity’s book value. Low P/B, among other ratios such as 
low P/E, can be seen as value stocks. High values of such ratios usually tell about the 
high growth prospects of a firm. This fact follows the naming of these two stock 
categories.  
Quality effect means simply that higher-quality firms have higher expected returns on 
average than lower-quality firms. Quality has no universally accepted definition such 
as value effect has on academic literature. Asness, Frazzini & Pedersen (2019) define 
quality as an asset characteristic that investors are willing to pay more all-else-equal. 
Quality stocks have characteristics such as safeness, profitability, growth opportunities 
and good management behind the stock. Investors are willing to pay more for firms 
with high-quality characteristics, but still, the explanatory power of quality and its 
characteristic is limited on tests. It still remains as a question in asset pricing is quality 
effect an independent risk factor or is there some other risk factor behind it, that could 
improve the explanatory power. (Asness et. al, 2019) 
To turn from value stocks to quality stocks, Novy-Marx (2013b) introduces the quality 
dimension of value. Quality investing is different from value investing. In quality 
investing, investors seek to find conventional firms with certain characteristics of 
quality and low price. Mainly quality and value strategies try to exploit similar goals, 
finding undervalued stocks in the equity markets. But value strategy exploits more of 
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waiting for cheap enough price to buy a certain asset. Noxy-Marx points out that if an 
investor wants to exploit the full potential of value effect, the quality characteristics of 
the asset should not be left unconsidered. In quality investing both characteristics of 
an asset are important, quality and the price. This is due to the simple fact that cheap 
and profitable firms outperform firms that only carry one of these characteristics. In 
empirical tests, quality investing seems to outperform traditional value investing in a 
time of crises when traditional value strategies suffer drawdowns. (Novy-Marx, 
2013b) Impact of quality can be seen as higher risk-adjusted returns from high-quality 
stocks. Excess return is consistent with the quality characteristics of stocks. Price of 
quality has varied around time, and in some states of nature, the market puts smaller 
or larger price premiums on quality characteristics of the firms. Cheap quality means 
that there are not as high price premiums associated with quality stocks. Large quality 
stocks seem also carry more price premium compared to smaller stocks creating size 
premium on small quality stocks. (Asness et al. 2019) 
Drivers of quality excess returns are still to discover. There are suggestions that (i) 
quality stocks carry more risk than lower-quality stocks or that (ii) quality stocks are 
undervalued, and lower quality stocks overvalued. Risk explanation is not consistent 
with movements we have seen on equity markets, more the opposite. Flight to quality 
seems to favour and benefit high-quality stocks in bad states of nature, meaning they 
perform well in times of crises which challenges a risk-based explanation of quality 
premiums. It was also discovered that analysts seem to undervalue high-quality stocks 
and overvalue lower quality when comparing analyst estimates to realized returns on 
equity markets. This evidence shows some support to the second explanation of biased 
market valuation of quality stocks. No matter the reason for this effect, there is strong 
and consistent abnormal returns of quality factor in all robustness tests. (Asness et al. 
2019) Findings of Novy-Marx and Asness et. al support the creation of the fourth 
hypothesis of this study; there is a flight to quality after the financial crisis. Looking 
for more support to this hypothesis, chapter five uses the global financial crisis as 
breakpoint to study changes in quality and other firm characteristics.  
Many different metrics can be used to measure asset quality, such as Piotroski’s (2000) 
F-Score that divides firms buy nine different quality characteristics. Each character is 
either a sign of good or low quality. Higher the score higher the quality of the asset. 
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Quality can also be studied, for example, by assets profitability, competitive 
advantages or accruals quality. As said before, there is no clear and universally 
accepted definition of what quality of asset really is. 
3.3 Cross-sectional and Time-series Momentum 
Momentum is a well-covered topic in academic literature. The simple idea behind 
momentum strategies is to build a portfolio that buys past winners and sells past losers. 
The investor holds this portfolio for three to twelve months to gain abnormal returns 
surrounding the momentum effect. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) show that past 
winners portfolio gains significantly higher abnormal returns than a portfolio that 
contains past losers. Momentum effect lasts for three to the twelve months from the 
portfolio construction. This effect will reverse in the long run, and half of the excess 
returns from the winner portfolio will disappear in the 24 months. It is easy to 
understand where the name momentum comes from, the effect is like a short-run trend 
in equity markets. Based on Jegadeesh and Titman findings effect is not due to 
systematic risk exposures of assets or lead-lag effects. The momentum effect is 
consistent with the explanation of underreaction and delayed price response from 
equity markets to new firm-specific information. Thus, the first hints of momentum 
effect can be traced back to Ball and Brown (1968) accounting-based study that 
showed that there is a delayed market response to new firm-level information 
available. Transactions from investors who exploit momentum strategies and buys past 
winners and sells past losers move prices temporarily more away from their 
fundamentals. This results in stock prices to overreact to new information and make 
the momentum effect stronger. One explanation to momentum effect is also that people 
overreact to new short-term information and underreact to long-term information. 
(Jegadeesh & Titman, 1993) 
Asness, Moskowitz and Pedersen (2013) discover that momentum strategies are 
correlated with other momentum strategies globally. There are only slight commons 
in momentum effect with movements in common macroeconomic variables such as 
consumption, business-cycle and default risk. Asness et al. find that value and 
momentum strategies are negatively correlated with each other, which can be 
explained by opposite exposures to liquidity risk. But liquidity risk only holds for 
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partial explanation to momentum effect, leaving much unexplained. Momentum effect 
has positive exposure to liquidity risk that can be due trades that follow momentum 
strategy, as these trades represent the most popular trades in the market and there is 
more price pressure on them in bad states (Pedersen, 2009). Daniel and Moskowitz 
(2016) show that momentum strategies suffer from panic states in the market when 
volatility is high, and past losers have high return premiums. When the market starts 
to reverse from bad state momentum strategies will crash. This is because momentum 
strategies sort past losers, which there are many after the downwards market 
movement. The momentum effect is particularly reversed during bad states on the 
market. (Daniel & Moskowitz, 2006) 
Thus, different market states affect the momentum effect. Cooper, Gutierrez Jr. and 
Hameed (2004) study whether momentum profits differ with market states. They found 
that profits from momentum strategies are greater following market gains by using 
lagged market returns to determine upwards and downwards markets. Short-run 
momentum effect excessively follows the market movements as a six-month 
momentum strategy in upwards market gains significant return around one percentage 
per month, and following downward markets strategy loses insignificant half 
percentage per month with robust tests. Long-run reversals from downward markets 
were also significant, although there was no initial momentum effect. This finding 
suggests that reversals are not solely due to corrections of prior momentum. Hence, 
the state of the market is a significant predictor of successfulness of momentum 
strategies. The profitability of momentum strategies increases as lagged market return 
increases. The conclusion is that asset pricing models need to incorporate market states 
in them. (Cooper et al. 2004) 
Time-series momentum differs from cross-sectional momentum as time-series 
momentum focuses on a single asset and its past performance on a short period. Cross-
sectional momentum focuses on assets that outperform their peers in the cross-
sectional setup at three to twelve months and will continue to outperform their peers 
in the next month. Moskowitz, Ooi, and Pedersen (2012) find significant time-series 
momentum in 58 different financial instruments such as equity indexes, currency and 
different futures. The momentum effect is not only tied to equity markets based on 
those findings. Time-series momentum means that past 12-month performance is a 
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strong and positive predictor of future performance considering a single asset on time-
series data. This effect is consistent across different asset classes and markets. The 
common time-series pattern is supported by a stronger correlation between time-series 
momentum strategies than the asset classes themselves. Similar behaviour and patterns 
from different markets and instruments can be found at the same time by competently 
different types of investors. Time-series momentum effect lasts around one year, and 
there is persistence in returns for up to 12 months with substantial abnormal returns. 
After this period effect reverses on longer time horizons. These results are consistent 
with sentiments theories of under and overreaction, and there is only small exposure 
to standard asset pricing factors. Time-series momentum seems to perform best during 
extreme market conditions on their empirical tests. (Moskowitz et al. 2012) 
Moskowitz et al. find that most of the time-series and cross-sectional momentum effect 
is driven by positive autocovariance to futures contracts. Time-series momentum 
captures the effect associated with cross-sectional setup, although they are built from 
a different set of securities. The finding indicates a strong correlation with these two 
momentum strategies even when they are applied to a competently different set of 
assets. This suggests that time-series momentum captures individual stock momentum. 
Time-series momentum effect is partly explained by trades of hedgers and speculators 
in the derivates markets. Speculators seem to load on average to time-series 
momentum and gain from it as long as the trend continues. Hedgers seem to take 
opposite sides on those trades and lose from time-series momentum effect. (Moskowitz 
et al. 2012) Thus, these finding on cross-sectional and time-series approach can be 
identified as part of the same phenomenon that results on some extend from the lagged 
market response, liquidity risk, and activities of market participants. 
There are no straightforward metrics to evaluate the momentum of an asset. 
Momentum can be found out by dividing assets in different quantiles and separating 
past winners from losers or as in time-series approach looking for a 12-month track 
record of the asset. The magnitude of momentum effect is the difference in returns 
between those winner and loser quantiles in three, six to twelve months. 
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3.4 Beta and Variance 
Beta means the coefficient and correlation of stock return against market return and 
beta one means that stock price moves perfectly hand-in-hand with the market. In the 
basics of capital asset pricing model lies the fact that high beta stocks should have 
higher returns compared to low beta stocks as they carry more risk and volatility. 
However, this is not the case always. The regression line is too flat, and the CAPM 
model fails to explain this variation between stocks with different levels of beta. 
Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) show that higher beta stocks have lower alpha than 
stocks with low beta. Alphas and Sharpe ratios lower systematically as asset beta 
increases and the phenomena is visible over the markets and asset classes. This 
suggests the global factor in returns. Frazzini and Pedersen create betting against beta 
factor to test this issue. BAB factor is used to create a portfolio that buys low beta 
assets with leverage and shorts the high beta assets. After this portfolio is leveraged 
back to the beta of one. BAB factor has significant risk-adjusted returns and is robust 
to several specifications in their empirical tests. (Frazzini & Pedersen, 2014) 
Frazzini and Pedersen provide an explanation to this effect since there are different 
constraints in the real-world investors. These constraints are, for example, margin 
requirements and constraints to use leverage to buy assets. This result investors that 
face constraints to bid up prices of high beta assets following the lower alpha of these 
high beta stocks. Results are consistent with these explanations, and it can be seen 
directly from equity markets that more constrained investors hold riskier stocks. When 
market states variate, dispersion of betas are significantly lower as funding liquidity 
risk is high in a time of crises. This results betas to be pushed towards one. (Frazzini 
& Pedersen, 2014) As market state will affect funding liquidity risk, it is safe to 
conclude that BAB factor and this beta phenomenon is affected by different market 
states, resulting in higher returns in good states and lower in times of crises. 
Cederburg and O’Doherty (2016) recommend that BAB factor and strategies 
exploding it should be viewed with caution. They show that accounting for time-series 
variation in betas and different state variables significantly reduces the return 
difference between high and low sorted beta portfolios. Using unconditional beta as in 
Frazzini and Pedersen study results in higher cap between beta sorted portfolios and 
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alpha is a biased estimate of a true alpha. Using conditional beta is motivated by a 
large dispersion of firm-level beta in different states on the market. Beta variation is a 
result of different market risk premiums, volatility, investment opportunities, leverage, 
and idiosyncratic risk that variate as a result of market states. Beta caps variate highly 
between 95% and 5% quantile portfolios as in different states cap between portfolios 
has been from 1.5 to 3.0. Conditional process models beta as lagged state variables 
and macroeconomic variables. Conditional beta results in much lower insignificant 
alphas between portfolios of high and low beta. When comparing this result to the 
unconditional case, it is easily seen that the betting against beta phenomena is largely 
erased after taking these changes into account. Testing multifactor models such as 
Fama and French (1993) three-factor model with conditional modelling support this 
evidence. (Cederburg & O’Doherty, 2016) 
Common knowledge is that market returns correspond negatively to variance shocks. 
This negative correlation between variables implies that the market is subject to 
variance risk. In times of high negative correlation between returns and variance, 
market returns are more predictable in short horizons with a variance risk premium. 
Pyun (2019) shows that market returns can be predicted in economically and 
statistically significant results in one-month periods, by using factor build from 
innovations to variance such as prices of options on equity indexes. Pyun argues that 
this factor can be used to predict different returns in short horizons that correlate highly 
with the equity market return. These findings are different from other factors as return 
predictability is normally weak in short periods (one to six months) using the common 
factors discussed before. The variance risk premium, however, can be used to predict 
short-horizon returns on equity and correlated markets at least in theory. (Pyun, 2019) 
Firm-level beta can be measured by regressing market return against stock return. 
Results are the estimate of alpha and beta of the firm. Stock beta is reported and used 
widely in financial markets and applications.  
3.5 Profitability and Asset Growth 
Profitability can be seen as a quality characteristic of a firm. Those effects are partly 
overlapping, but with profitability, more explanation power can be found on returns 
than with the quality factor. Fama and French (2006) find that after controlling for 
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other variables such as BE/ME and investments, more profitable firms have higher 
expected returns than unprofitable firms. Profitable firms are referred to as firms with 
higher expected earnings relative to book equity. Findings of Novy-Marx (2013a) 
support these findings of Fama and French and show that gross-profitability measured 
by profits to assets (profitability ratio) generates significantly higher average returns 
when profitable and unprofitable firms are compared. This is true even to fact that 
those unprofitable firms having lower BE/ME, and higher market capitalizations. This 
effect is called cross-profitability premium. Profitability factor has approximately the 
same predictive power as the value factor has to cross-section tests of stock returns. 
Novy-Marx also discovered that profitability factor generates perfect hedge for value 
strategies as these strategies look for returns in opposite directions from value and 
growth firms. Profitability is on the other side of value. Investors demand higher 
returns from firms that are riskier, resulting in higher BE/ME ratios. The argument is 
similar to that productive firms where investor require higher average returns should 
be priced similarly to less profitable firms that investors look for lower returns. 
Productivity helps us identify this profitability factor leading to the fact that higher the 
required profitability higher the returns. This results in more profitable firms to 
generate higher average returns than similar unprofitable firms. (Novy-Marx, 2013a) 
This profitability effect is typically thought as mispricing in markets, referring to 
irrational pricing of assets. Another explanation is based on rational pricing, and 
differences in risk as stocks with higher profitability and higher BE/ME are riskier, 
thus having higher average returns. What explanation is the right one is still not clear. 
(Fama & French, 2006) To find an answer to this question, Sun, Wei and Xie (2014) 
studied cross-sectional profitability on international equity markets and find similar 
gross-profitability premium than in U.S. based studies. Explanation to gross-
profitability premium is in line with rational pricing, as in highly developed markets 
with low investment frictions effect is significantly stronger than in markets with high 
investment frictions. Explanations for irrational pricing of assets had no support based 
on findings from international markets. (Sun et al. 2014) 
Investment effect means that low investing firms have higher expected returns on 
average than high investing firms. Fama and French (2006) show that higher expected 
rates of investment are associated with lower expected returns when controlling for 
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other variables such as BE/ME and profitability. Assets growth relation to cross-
sectional of stock returns has been studied mainly thought sub-components of growth. 
Cooper, Gulen and Schill (2008) take a new approach to study asset growth relation to 
stock return by studying firms aggregate asset growth’s relation to returns. Asset 
growth ratio is measured by the percentage change in total assets, which captures 
complicated links between returns, size groups and financing types of different firms. 
Cooper et al. document strong cross-sectional predictive power and negative relation 
between asset growth and stock returns. The aggregate asset growth rate is a strong 
predictor for future abnormal returns, and it is common to many subcomponents that 
make total asset growth. Cooper et al. show that events that are associated with asset 
expansion such as mergers and acquisitions are followed by low abnormal returns and 
events following the asset contraction will result in high abnormal returns on average. 
Low growth firms can generate much higher returns than firms with high growth 
percentage in total assets. Spread with equally weighted data is large at 19.4 % 
percentage and with value-weighted data spread is 8.4% between low and high growth 
firms. (Cooper et al. 2008) 
The market state has an effect on this phenomenon. Cooper et al. argue that lagged 
market states predict larger spread between low and high growth firms when 
managerial overconfident increases as market increases. Market increase and a larger 
number of lagged positive returns result in higher managerial overconfident and 
investor overreaction to high growth rate firms. These facts will lead to stronger 
mispricing between firms with high or low asset growth characteristics. A possible 
explanation for investor overreaction to high growth rate firms comes from agency 
theory as there are fears of overinvestment problems or empire-building susceptibility 
of management. (Cooper et al. 2008)  
International evidence by Watabane, Xu, Yao and Yu (2013) supports Cooper et al. 
findings in the U.S stock market. Watabane et al. find a significant spread between 
high and low asset growth firms in value and equally weighted portfolios in robust 
tests. The relation is similar that found in U.S. markets that high asset growth rates 
predict low expected returns. More important were findings that the asset growth effect 
varies across countries studied. The return spread was in the range of -11% to 11% and 
was positive in thirty countries, but negative in thirteen countries. Watabane et al. show 
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that the effect of asset growth is stronger in developed economies with more important 
and effective stock markets. Another explanation for asset growth effects such as limits 
to arbitrage, higher investor protectionism, and more quality accounting had only small 
explanatory power on asset growth effect in international tests. (Watabane et al. 2013) 
Metrics to evaluate profitability is to use the procedure as in studies by calculating 
profitability ratio by dividing earnings by book value of assets. There are also many 
financial ratios such as operating profit margin, net profit margin to evaluate firm 
profitability. Firm growth can be measured by total asset growth or calculating the 
growth percentage of different parts of a financial statement. 
3.6 Market States and Risk Factors 
All these risk factors have been under a lot of discussion in the academic world. There 
are many opposite views with different research setups and market environments. 
Research discussing different risk factors existence and patterns are still going on, and 
much new evidence is discovered in recent years. What we can conclude based on the 
literature review is that all these risk factors will be affected in some way by different 
states in the markets and changes in funding liquidity risk seem to be the common 
factor behind changes in many risk factors patterns. Funding liquidity risk and liquidity 
are affected by different market states. As the market goes down, liquidity is weaker 
and when markets go up liquidity is higher. Those situations will eventually be 
reversed in tops and downs of business cycles with the help of government and 
automatic stabilizers. 
Based on literature review value and quality risk-factors are not much affected by 
different states on the market. Trading strategies based on those risk-factors seem to 
perform consistently well in different market states in earlier empirical studies. 
Gathering steady returns quality of firm seems to be a more important factor than value 
as quality outperforms value in the downmarket environment. This effect is referred 
many times as “flight to quality” that happens when crises arise in markets. Everyone 
wants to buy the safest quality stocks that are thought to get the least hit from the crisis. 
This eventually leads assets that are characterised as quality to have steadier bid-ask 
spread through different market states and price is more stable. 
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Some risk-factor effects even seem to disappear and reverse in the downmarket as seen 
in case of momentum. This really gives a thought is this phenomenon really risk factors 
in equity markets or something else. But momentum crash is more since this trading 
strategy used in empirical studies buys past losers which there are many in 
downmarket compared to winners. The market tends to reverse in some horizon after 
the crises and lower the high return premiums from all stocks. If investors are betting 
on the short size on these situations its most surely going to be a loss. It is easy to 
assume that rational investors would not be shorting four out of five stocks strictly 
following the momentum strategy in long downmarket during recessions. This fact is 
again causing a momentum effect to lose power and reverse. Cross-sectional 
momentum is thus much stronger in the upmarket than in the downmarket. Interesting 
was that time-series momentum still seems to perform very well in extreme conditions.   
Betting against beta factor and asset growth are also highly tied phenomena of upwards 
markets. In higher markets levels as betas and overconfident increases spreads between 
extreme portfolios increases in a significant manner. In down markets, these effects 
lose much of their power and spread decrease. Markets then reverse on time to time as 
valuations fall too far away from the firm fundamentals. So, it is interesting thought 
which market situation best describes the normal situation in markets? The time when 
valuations are far away from their fundamentals in up markets and investors are 
accepting lower return premiums. Or in downmarket when common structures that 
academics have found in returns are mainly weak, not very significant, and return 
premiums are high. It is also interesting what is the situation now in the equity markets, 
approximately eleven years after the beginning of the global financial crisis. The 
market seems not to still recover fully from this crisis as the financial market has 
characteristics of both up and down market with low-interest rates and high equity 
valuations.   
It is also interesting that these common factor patterns to not have much return 
predictability in the short run tests. This may be because they do not follow 
macroeconomic changes very closely as stated in the definition of global risk factor. 
They reverse and settle with macroeconomic variables only at the longer run. Only the 
factor build from volatility innovations seems to have short-run predictability power 
on future market returns. 
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4 FAMA-FRENCH ASSET PRICING MODELS 
There is a large number of asset pricing models that are built from the different risk 
factors discovered in the global financial markets. In chapter three, there was a 
discussion on these risk factors and very short introductions to the basics of asset 
pricing models. This chapter takes a more detailed look at asset pricing models 
focusing mainly on equity markets and ground-breaking work of Fama and French on 
thirty year-long period. The chapter also evaluates the performance of Fama-French 
models in different tests closely to understand models’ weaknesses, areas of good 
performance and applications. 
To start introducing asset pricing models first look should be taken to the very simplest 
one, the random walk model. 
𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚	𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑘	𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙, 𝐸(𝑃0) = 𝑃034	+	∈ 																																																														 (1) 
Where E(Pt) is expected price at time t, Pt-1 is price at t-1 and ∈ is error term.  
Random walk model tells that asset price today is asset price yesterday and something 
random. Interpretation of this model reveals that it is not possible to predict future 
asset prices based on historical return data. There is always a random component in 
the model that could not be predicted. Best guess for tomorrow’s price is that it is the 
same as price today. But this is not the whole case at least in the longer run, there 
should be some predictability on the returns of assets. Most well-known asset pricing 
model is the capital asset pricing model by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) which 
was one driver to start a large amount of academic literature and applications to 
different asset pricing models which try to explain common patterns in asset returns. 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡	𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔	𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙,				𝐸(𝑅B) = 𝑅C + 𝛽E𝐸𝑅F − 𝑅CH																																	(2) 
Where 𝐸(𝑅B) is expected return on investment, 𝑅C is the risk-free rate (usually as 
estimate for 𝑅C one month U.S. T-bill rate is used), 𝐸𝑅F is expected return on market 
and 𝛽 is beta coefficient of asset.  
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Although of its publicity and popularity, CAPM is a very simple definition of how 
assets are priced and how the risk should affect directly to the expected return of the 
stock. Because of this simplicity, CAPM suffers many drawdowns when compared to 
what we have seen in equity markets and empirical studies. More sophisticated models 
take many different characteristics into account that affect or may have an effect on 
explaining expected returns. Those explanatory variables are, for example, the risk 
factors such as value, quality, and profitability that were discussed in chapter three.  
Performance of time-series asset pricing models is usually evaluated by different 
statistical measures. It is also relevant how steady those statistical measures are with 
different datasets over the markets and countries. Moreover, is the model able to 
explain returns universally or just from the particular equity market? Most well-known 
and easy to intercept performance measures are the regression intercept also referred 
as alpha of regression, adjusted R2 -value and when making multiple regressions the 
CRS test static value by Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken (1989). Asset pricing models try 
to achieve as low as possible insignificant intercept. When evaluating asset pricing 
models in empirical tests, intercept means that there is some variation that regressors 
(risk factors, for example) are not able to explain. There is something that affects asset 
prices, but the model is not able to explain that variation. Thus, if exposures to different 
factors capture all variation in the expected returns and intercepts are zero for all stocks 
and portfolios to be tested, the conclusion can be made that these values are true values 
of the population rather than just estimates (Fama & French, 2015). 
R2 adjusted is the measure of regression fit, and it defines how well regressors can 
explain the returns. It punishes by lowering the value if there are unimportant 
regressors that really are not explaining returns. Easy to understand, higher the 
adjusted R2 value, higher the explanation power of the asset pricing model. CRS-value 
tests all the regression intercepts in the joint examination, as there is the possibility 
that single intercept value is not significant, but in the joint examination, intercepts are 
significant (Gibbons et al. 1989). Intercept, R2, and CRS-values are statistics that are 
mainly used to evaluate the performance of asset pricing models in this study. Getting 
high R2, low insignificant intercept and not getting rejected by CRS test does not face 
easy job, but as Fama and French (2015) state “asset pricing models are simplified 
propositions about expected returns that are rejected in tests with power” (p. 10). Based 
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on this statement and the difficulty of finding all the possible explanatory for returns, 
asset pricing models are more of finding the best possible alternative to explain returns 
(Fama & French, 2015).     
4.1 Fama-French Three-factor Model 
Fama and French (1993) studied common factors in returns of stocks and bonds, which 
resulted in the creation of a three-factor asset pricing model (later FF3). Fama and 
French found that size measured as market capitalization, BE/ME book-value to 
market-value of equity and market return minus the risk-free rate had high explanation 
power of the U.S. stock returns. Fama and French used time-series regression approach 
to point out the importance of these risk factors in empirical tests. In the time-series 
regression approach, monthly excess returns on stock portfolios sorted by different 
characteristics are regressed against portfolios created to mimic factor returns. Risk 
factor portfolios used in their study were market factor (later MKT, that means market 
portfolio returns minus the risk free rate), size factor (later SMB, that means small-
minus big, difference in simple returns between three small and three big portfolios 
that have similar BE/ME) and value factor (later HML, that is similar to SMB, but 
build on difference in simple returns between two low and two high BE/ME 
portfolios). To form factors and stock return portfolios, value-weighted returns were 
used. This was because value-weighted returns reflect more realistic investment 
opportunities in the market than the equally-weighted approach. (Fama & French, 
1993)    
4.1.1 Performance and applications 
Outcomes from regression referred to as coefficients or slopes of regression then show 
the loadings and sensitivities of excess returns on these three risk factors MTK, SMB 
and HML. This approach is convenient because slopes and R2 values show how well 
factor portfolios can imitate returns on factors and to capture variation in stock returns. 
FF3 regressions made to explain returns were successful as regression intercepts were 
close to zero and R2 values high. These findings on empirical tests confirm that factors 
made from the market return, size, and BE/ME can explain differences in returns, and 
there are at least three factors in the equity market. This study resulted in the creation 
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of well-known asset pricing model referred to as the three-factor model that was able 
to explain returns in 1963 – 1990 period better than previous asset pricing models. FF3 
model was extending the CAPM by Sharpe and Lintner as it suffered multiple 
drawdowns with empirical data and lack of explanation power compared to FF3. 
(Fama & French, 1993) 
𝐹𝐹3, 𝑅B − 𝑅C = 𝑎 + 𝑏B𝑀𝐾𝑇 + 𝑠B𝑆𝑀𝐵 +	ℎB𝐻𝑀𝐿 +	∈B 																																								 (3) 
Where 𝑅B − 𝑅C is the excess return on portfolio to be explained, 𝑎 is the regression 
intercept, 𝑀𝐾𝑇 market portfolio excess return, SMB size factor portfolio returns, and 
HML value factor portfolio returns, 𝑏B, 𝑠B, ℎB are regression parameters, and ∈B is error 
term.  
FF3 allows for many applications in empirical studies, for example, to study sources 
of abnormal returns on event studies or to evaluate the performance of active portfolio 
management more accurate than using an alternative model such as CAPM. (Fama & 
French, 1993) In performance tests, Fama and French (1996) show that the three-factor 
model is successful in explaining return differences in anomalies such as sales growth, 
earnings-per-price and cashflow-per-price discovered in the equity markets and seen 
as anomalies by CAPM. Those anomalies disappear and are explained by different 
loadings on SMB and HML risk factors. This simply means that these firms have 
different characteristics and differences in returns are explained by differences in size 
and BE/ME ratio. Sales, E/P and C/P can be viewed as subcomponents to these factors 
as their return premiums are captured by size and BE/ME factors, thus subcomponents 
providing no further information. However, it was discovered that the three-factor 
model was unable to explain the momentum effect discovered by Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993) in the empirical part of this study. (Fama & French, 1996) 
Griffin (2002) studied whether the factors in FF3 are country-specific or international 
by comparing country-specific FF3 to global FF3. Griffin studied whether the SMB 
and HML factors made from international stock market returns or from domestic stock 
market returns can better explain on a country-specific basis. Results of the study show 
that the domestic model is easily beating the world factor model in this task. Domestic 
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models were able to explain much more time-series variation and had less pricing 
errors than world factor model did. Adding foreign factors to model was not able to 
improve the explanatory power of the model on stock and portfolio returns. Based on 
these findings, extending the model to the international context is not useful. Griffin 
concludes that for practical applications of FF3, the model should be built with 
country-specific return data and usage of the wrong model could lead to wrong 
conclusions as there is a large variation between performance of these alternatives on 
explaining country-specific returns. (Griffin, 2002) 
4.1.2 Critical view on three-factor model 
After the publication, FF3 has been tested, criticized, studied, and modified on several 
cases which shows its importance to asset pricing literature. Critics to FF3 has been 
made by Kothari, Shanken, and Sloan (1995). They argue that results found in Fama 
and French (1993) were largely due to survivorship bias in the COMPUSTAT database 
and biased research set up to study explanation power of factors. Comparing different 
databases with the COMPUSTAT database lowers the difference of BE/ME on returns 
by a significant 40 %. For example, returns of small firms in the COMPUSTAT 
database are 9 – 10 % percentage points higher than CRSP – COMPUSTAT returns. 
Kothari et al. use also the S&P industry-level data to show that data in the 
COMPUSTAT database may be influenced by survivorship bias on firms that were 
used to study BE/ME return association. Also, making industry portfolios from 
COMPUSTAT data lower the return association, which suggest that the research setup 
is determining the results. Another argument to biases research setup, was against beta 
risk, that Fama and French (1993) does not consider substantial in determining asset 
returns. Using annual instead of monthly beta estimates shows the compensation for 
beta risk more precise than using the monthly values. There is also concern on data-
snooping as returns on different BE/ME has been varying around time, which may 
have affected the results based on data period selection. (Kothari et al. 1995) This critic 
of biased data selection period and time-varying effect of BE/ME returns is much 
brought down by tests of Fama and French (2015) as they can show that patterns are 
similar to that made in Fama and French (1993) with 21 years of new data. 
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Petkova (2006) argues that FF3 factors are related to time-varying investment 
opportunities. This explanation is supported by Vassalou (2003), who shows that 
information content and explanatory power of SMB and HML reduces as 
macroeconomic risk is taken into account. The asset pricing model that is built by 
choosing only the variables that have forecasting power to future investment 
opportunities such as different state variables (e.g. aggregate yield, term spread, 
default spread, one-month T-bill etc.) can explain returns better than FF3. Petkova 
argues that SMB and HML are only proxies for state variables that can predict future 
excess returns and the yield curve. This means that SMB and HML are highly 
correlated to different state variables. This is supported by the fact that FF3 factors 
lose their explanatory power as state variables are added to the regressions. (Petkova, 
2006) Fama and French (2015) answer to this critique in the way that variables in their 
asset pricing models are not state variable imitating portfolios, moreover these 
portfolios are presenting and providing different combinations of exposures and links 
to unknown state variables. This easies the job capturing this variation with a couple 
of factors without necessarily identifying the all unknown state variables. (Fama and 
French, 2015) 
4.2 Fama-French Five-factor Model 
To partly to answer the critics against the FF3 and improve performance of their model 
to the present day, Fama and French (2015) developed the five-factor model (later 
FF5) that adds two factors to the original FF3. Those factors are profitability and 
investments factors, that can be seen as quality characteristics of a firm. As discussed 
in chapter three, Noxy-Marx (2013) points out the importance of quality characteristics 
of a firm in expected returns. Profitability and investment factors were chosen because 
they seem like natural choices based on the decomposition of the dividend discount 
model. Decomposition suggests that expected return on the stock is determined by the 
price-to-book ratio, expected future investments and profitability. There are also 
variables such as size in the model that are not directly linked to the decomposition of 
this model but may help in improving forecasts of future investments and profitability 
capturing the horizon effect of expected returns. Empirical evidence also supports 
these factors as Fama and French (1993) states that FF3 leaves much of variation in 
excess returns unexplained by related differences in profitability and investments of 
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firms. Definitions of new factors are robust-minus-weak, RMW, which is profitability 
factor that is built as the difference between diversified portfolios of stocks with robust 
and weak profitability. Conservative-minus-aggressive, CMA which is investment 
factor which is built as a difference in returns between diversified portfolios of stocks 
that have high or low investments. (Fama & French, 2015) 
𝐹𝐹5, 𝑅B0 − 𝑅U0
= 𝑎B + 𝑏B𝑀𝐾𝑇0 + 𝑠B𝑆𝑀𝐵0 + ℎB𝐻𝑀𝐿0 + 𝑟B𝑅𝑀𝑊0 + 𝑐B𝐶𝑀𝐴0 +∈B0 	 (4) 
Where 𝑅B0 − 𝑅C0 is the excess return on portfolio to be explained subject to time, 𝑎 is 
the regression intercept, 𝑀𝐾𝑇 market portfolio return minus the risk-free rate, SMB 
size factor portfolio returns, and HML is value factor portfolio returns, RMW is the 
profitability factor, CMA is the investment factor, 𝑏B, 𝑠B, ℎB 𝑟B 𝑐B are regression 
parameters, and ∈B0 is error term.  
4.2.1 Performance and applications of five-factor model 
Fama and French (2015) five-factor model is successful in explaining variation in 
excess returns in multiple categories that are created in similar, but adjusted way to 
FF3 by creating portfolios based on size, investments, profitability and BE/ME. Those 
portfolios are finer sorts from variables that are used to build FF5 factors. On empirical 
tests, only a couple of extreme sorts pose difficulties to the explanatory power of FF5. 
These sorts are in small stocks that invest a lot despite having low profitability. 
BE/ME portfolio sorts show that average returns increase with BE/ME in every size 
row. The difference is nearly one percentage with the smallest size category per month 
when comparing the lowest BE/ME sort to highest BE/ME sort. In biggest size 
category, this value effect between lowest and highest sort reduces to 0.16 % 
difference per month. The value effect discovered in empirical studies is highly visible 
in those portfolio sorts (Fama & French, 2006; Asness et al, 2013). Similar results can 
be found when investment portfolio sorts are made. In every size quantile, the lowest 
investment category has significantly higher average returns, and those returns 
increase in portfolios at smaller size categories. This result was in line what was 
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expected due to empirically discovered low asset growths association with lower 
returns (Fama & French, 2006; Cooper et al. 2008; Watabane et al. 2013). However, 
using three-way categorization, the valuation equation does not predict the fact that 
the effect of investments, operating profitability and BE/ME do not show in average 
returns without proper controlling of factors. This fact calls for the need to sort them 
differently to point out differences in average returns. Thus, variables are sorted 
differently, creating thirty-two portfolios in each category which allows controlling for 
one variable. Portfolios are categorized by three variables, for example, sort on size, 
BE/ME and operating profitability. This reveals patterns in excess returns as 
anticipated. Small stocks have strong value, profitability, and investment effects in 
their average returns based on those sorts. Patterns are also similar in big stocks 
category but showing a weaker pattern in returns. (Fama & French, 2015) 
Evaluating the performance of FF5 model is evaluated against FF3 and different four-
factor models combining these factors. Performance tests are made with several 
summary statics, for example, absolute alpha and CRS value. CRS test rejects all 
models considered, which suggest that models are incomplete descriptions of returns. 
But as brought out earlier by Fama and French (2015) statement, it is about finding the 
best alternative. For comparison, FF5 produces lower CRS test statics and absolute 
alphas with lower dispersion than FF3. Biggest improvements are in new sorts of 
thirty-two portfolios, which is anticipated as FF3 is not targeting CMA and RMW risk 
factor effects on average returns. What was interesting in those results was that FF5 
has similar statics to the four-factor model that excludes the HML factor. This fact 
calls for a revaluation of HML factor in the FF5 as it seems that value factor returns 
are captured by other factors and HML is really redundant at least in 1963 – 2013 U.S 
stock sample. This is also confirmed by regressions between factors showing the 
insignificance of the HML factor. Quality paper by Novy-Marx (2013) did little bit 
anticipate this with its results showing value-based strategies association with quality 
strategies. Anyhow, testing differences between adjusted HML factor, four-factor and 
FF5 show only marginal effects on regression coefficients and similar explanation 
power between the alternative models. Thus, pattern and explanations remain the same 
no matter what model of these alternatives are used. Despite poor performance on CRS 
tests, FF5 can explain almost all variation in these test portfolios formed by different 
characteristics. Almost all unexplained returns are close to zero, and the model can 
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explain 71 – 94 % of the cross-sectional variance of sorted portfolios examined in the 
study. The only exception to this was small firms that invest a lot despite low 
profitability, which returns FF5 does not capture. (Fama & French, 2015) 
4.2.2 Dissecting anomalies and international tests 
Testing the performance of FF5 on explaining anomaly patterns in returns was done 
similar to tests made with FF3 on anomaly return patterns. Fama and French (2016) 
test FF5 power to explain returns associated with returns anomalies such as accruals, 
net share issues, momentum and volatility. FF5 was able to explain and shrink the list 
of anomalies as they show similar exposures to FF5 factors suggesting they are related 
to the same phenomena in general. Anomalous patterns in low beta stocks, low 
volatility, and share repurchases are explained by the exposures to CMA and RMW 
risk factors. The expectation to this were accruals and momentum anomalies that pose 
problems earlier on to the FF3 too. In accruals patterns, extreme quantiles pose 
problems to FF5, and it does worse in explaining returns than FF3. Momentum is also 
a problem for FF5, and this could be anticipated because portfolio sorts do not provide 
momentum effects that the model is trying to explain. Adding momentum factor to 
FF5 model provides better explanation power, but still leaving some of the extreme 
small sorts unexplained. Adding momentum factor is also kind of playing the home 
game by creating a portfolio with the same returns as the factor itself. FF5 is adding to 
the explanation of common returns by shrinking down the list of anomalous return 
patterns significantly. Most of the problems posed to the model are concentrated on 
the extreme portfolio sorts such as microcaps, which we know play a very minor part 
in equity markets. (Fama and French, 2016) 
Testing out of sample performance of FF5, Fama and French (2017) conduct 
international tests on North America, Europe, Japan, and Asia Pacific equity markets. 
They use approach to build factors from domestic data rather than trying to build a 
global asset pricing model in line with the findings of Griffin (2002) on FF3. Based on 
this Griffin and Fama and French (2017) findings from international markets, it seems 
impossible to build a universal model that can explain country-specific returns with 
factors that are created globally. This holds at least for FF5 and similar models. 
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Accurate estimates to factor sensitivities call for the need of creating portfolio sorts 
and factors from the same domestic return data. 
Findings follow mainly the same results found in Fama and French (2015, 2016). 
Average returns increase with book-to-market and operating profitability. Patterns 
found in portfolio sorts are weaker for big stocks. Local versions of FF5 can explain 
most value, profitability and investment patterns in average returns. Small stocks seem 
to pose some problems to FF5, but some patterns in small stocks were explained well 
by FF5. Most interesting findings on international tests were that CMA seems to be a 
redundant factor in explaining returns in Europe and Japan. Portfolio sorts show that 
small firms that invest a lot despite being unprofitable seem to have extreme -0.65 % 
and -0.71 % per month negative excess returns in Europe and the Asia Pacific, and low 
but less extreme positive excess return of 0.12 % in North America. Returns are 
substantially lower for the highest investment portfolios, but the pattern is less 
prominent in big stocks in line with other tests. In Japan, only BE/ME and average 
returns seem to have high relation with each other, which is explained well by 
coefficient loadings to FF3. (Fama & French, 2017) 
4.2.3 Critical view on Fama-French five-factor model 
Adding two factors to the three-factor model seems like a long leap from FF3 to the 
creation of FF5 model as HML is redundant in some tests, CMA does not play an 
important part in explaining returns universally, and four factors can do the job same 
way as FF5. Blitz, Hanauer, Vidojevic and van Vliet (2016) find possible problems 
that should be considered based on the FF5. Main concerns focus on the factor 
selection of the FF5 as Fama and French (2015) choose two new factors that could be 
identified as quality factors. Although these are only two quality characteristics of the 
firm, so it is a fair argument why to choose only two of those opposed to the fact that 
Novy-Marx (2013a) and Asness et al. (2019) discover several quality characteristics 
of the firm that could be used in factor selection. Building the FF3, the main focus was 
on the risk-based explanations that build strong foundations to the model. However, in 
FF5, the economic rationale between the selected factors lies much weaker explained 
and less clear than before. The FF5 also maintains its CAPM relation with the market 
beta and the expected returns opposed to the fact that it has been shown empirically 
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that this relation is flatter or even negative with empirical data. On another way around 
Blitz et al. are surprised why momentum is not included in some way to the FF5, 
although momentum has been studied widely and there have been found long-lasting 
robustness behind its risk premium and return patterns. These problems with the model 
may eventually lead to the outcome that not much debates can be settled or consensus 
understanding to be drawn based on the FF5. These concerns question the importance 
of FF5 to asset pricing literature. (Blitz et al. 2016) 
4.3 Conclusions on Fama-French Models 
Findings of Fama and French (2017) CMA as being redundant factor and patterns 
being mostly invisible in returns of Japan were very interesting on the view of this 
study. Japan has long lived in a period of low-interest rates and low gross domestic 
product growth (later GDP). GDP growth has been around 1 % annual in the period of 
2010 to 2017 following the sharp drop of 5.5 % in 2009 after the financial crisis. 
Similar figures in Europe was 1.5 % and a drop of 4.5 %. In the U.S. GDP growth has 
been around 2 % and the drop was only 2.5 %. GDP growth rates have been collected 
from Google public data that is created based on data of The World Bank (2017). Japan 
and Europe lack CMA factor as it is redundant, and in Japan patterns in returns are not 
visible the way they are in the U.S. in the test period data of 1990 – 2015 that was used 
in Fama and French (2017). These results may give some direction what results of this 
thesis may show as interest rates and growth rates have been low in Europe and in the 
U.S. after the financial crisis. Anyhow, interest rates and growth are not as low as in 
Japan and period has been short compared to what Japan has suffered, but these low 
rates could be a sign of lower importance of CMA factor and weaker patterns in the 
U.S. returns in the 120 months of 01/2009 to 12/2018. 
Finding of Griffin (2002) and Fama and French (2017) show that FF models are not 
able to explain returns with universal factors, so it is not pleasant to try to build a 
universal model similar to FF3 and FF5 models. This evidence shows that this is not 
possible due to the lack of explanatory power in universal factors to differences 
between countries. Countries pose such differences that a model containing five factors 
seems to be too large on some occasions. Could there be some more universal factors 
or state variables that can explain returns on a more universal basis? There are also 
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critics like Blitz et al. (2016) on factor selection of the FF5. Models and portfolio sorts, 
however, provide us with much new information on existing patterns on common stock 
returns and the way that markets are pricing different assets with different exposures 
to risks. Applications of FF3 and FF5 models also widen the field to make event studies 
and understand sources of returns by different portfolios, indexes or funds. Models and 
findings of Fama and French (1993, 1996, 2015, 2016, 2017) provide much new 
insight on asset pricing literature. 
In conclusions of paper Fama and French (2017) state that time variation in the slopes 
could pose potential problems to FF3 and FF5 models. They, however, point out that 
it would be not too serious if we want to evaluate, for example, the performance of the 
actively managed fund. Intercept will capture the variation that is left unexplained by 
the factors. (Fama and French, 2017) Studying the magnitude of this variation on 
regression coefficients is exactly what this thesis is going to study in the next chapter. 
Statement of Fama and French (2017), evidence of risk factors related to macro-
economic state variables (Petkova, 2006), Cochranes (2017) deduction on market 
states and stock prices among other empirical evidence strongly supports the first 
hypothesis of this study: there are significant changes in risk-factors after the financial 
crisis. This hypothesis anticipates strong changes in priced risks between two periods 
before and after the financial crisis using the end of 2008 as a breakpoint for data. 
We are also interested in how much the regression intercepts and R2 values change 
because of changes in the market caused by the financial crisis. This should tell us how 
much performance of FF5 is affected by the changes in market states. Changes in 
performance can be anticipated based on the same findings of previous studies. This 
supports the creation of the second hypothesis: the performance of FF5 is affected by 
different states in the market. To find more prominent evidence to support these 
hypotheses among other hypotheses, this thesis next tests the FF5 on three different 
periods with differently shorted stock portfolios. 
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5 FIVE-FACTOR MODEL IN DIFFERENT MARKET STATES 
Aim of this thesis is to study significant changes in major risk-factors between the 120 
months before and after the financial crisis using the end of 2008 as a 
breakpoint. Research set up follows a mainly similar approach as Fama and French 
(1993, 1996, 2015, 2016, 2017) studies by using portfolio sorts of different 
characteristics and portfolios that mimic risk factor returns. This thesis adds to the 
existing literature by evaluating three short periods with high-frequency data of 120-
months (2515 – 2528 daily obs.) and comparing relative changes on these periods. 
This is kind of a different approach than used in the existing literature. This thesis takes 
a view on asset pricing on an event-based study set up focusing on the financial crisis. 
First, the main focus of this chapter is comparing risk factor pricing patterns and 
performance of FF5 in (01/1999 – 12/2008) period to (01/2009 – 12/2018) period in 
the U.S. equity market (using returns from 3424 – 5201 firms on average during 
different periods). These two periods can be seen as the period before the financial 
crisis and period after the financial crisis. Period one (control period) is added to the 
analysis to study and point out the magnitude of changes in the latter two periods. 
Second, this chapter studies the regression coefficients from 321 regression tests which 
reveal the changes in risk factor coefficients and risk factors importance on explaining 
common returns. This should shed some light to following four questions and help to 
answer the research questions of this thesis. (1) how the different states on the market 
affect risk factors (2) does the risk factor pricing patterns found in the previous 
empirical studies hold in shorter periods with high frequently data (3) what is the 
magnitude of the effect of global financial crisis on the risk factors and (4) how steady 
is the performance of FF5 model between different market states. 
5.1 Research Method 
Previous empirical studies have been able to identify the most important risk factors 
that were discussed in chapters three and four. Based on the empirical evidence 
provided in those chapters, the Fama-French five-factor model is used to study changes 
in the U.S. equity market before and after the financial crisis in this thesis. FF5 can be 
identified as the best alternative to explain and capture variation, as it has been shown 
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that FF5 performance is high with U.S. return data. These previous findings suggest 
that FF5 is the best model to answer questions assessed by this thesis. Research method 
follows studying the return patterns of differently sorted portfolios that should show 
the effects of risk factors and conducting multiple regressions tests to study changes 
in regression coefficients and model performance. 
FF5 is used in multivariate time-series regression approach, which means that the left-
hand-side (later LHS) variable is the excess return on the portfolio created by different 
characteristics. Right-hand-side (later RHS) variables are the returns on different 
portfolios that are created to mimic risk factor returns similar to Fama and French. 
Time-series regression coefficients then give different risk factor loadings in LHS 
portfolio excess return as the outcome. Regression statistical measures tell about the 
explanatory power of the FF5 model. These outcomes from regression tests allow this 
thesis to conduct analysis which answers the research questions assessed by this thesis 
by comparing differences in coefficients and statistics between those periods. 
5.1.1 Data 
Data is collected from Kenneth R. French (2019) data library which provides similar 
and updated data as used in Fama and French (1993, 1996, 2015, 2016, 2017) studies. 
Return data in Kenneth. R French database is collected from CRSP and COMPUSTAT 
databases, and there have been added firms that are hand-collected from the Moodys 
Industrial, Transportation, Utilities, and Financial Manuals. Return data includes all 
stocks from AMEX, NYSE, and NASDAQ which had market equity data for 
December of (t)-1 and June of (t), and positive book equity data for (t)-1 (requirement 
for book-to-market, operating profitability, investments, and factor portfolios), non-
missing revenues data for (t)-1 and data at least one of following variables: cost of 
goods sold, selling, general and administrative expenses, or interest expense for (t)-1 
(operating profitability, factor portfolios) and total assets data for (t)-2 and (t)-1 
(investments, factor portfolios). Rm uses value-weighted returns of all CRSP firms that 
are incorporated in the U.S., listed in NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ having CRSP code 
10 or 11 at beginning of the month of (t), and good return data for (t). One-month U.S. 
T-bill rate is used as a proxy for the risk-free rate. (Kenneth R. French Database, 2019) 
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Data selected includes daily and monthly value-weighted average returns on 2x3 
portfolio sorts (6 portfolios), formed to mimic FF5 factor returns. Daily value-
weighted average returns on 5x5 portfolio sorts (25 portfolios) formed on size and 
book-to-market, size and operating profitability and size and investments. Monthly 
value-weighted average returns on 2x4x4 sorts (32 portfolios) on formed on size, 
operating profitability, and investments. Data is collected for both sorts on three 120-
month periods: (01/1989 – 12/1998), (01/1999 – 12/2008), and (01/2009 – 12/2018). 
These different portfolio sorts are LHS variables in the regression tests. Daily and 
monthly value-weighted average returns for risk factor portfolios and the risk-free rate 
are collected for the same periods. These risk factor portfolios are RHS variables in 
the regression tests. Data includes 2528 daily and 120 monthly return observations in 
(01/1989 – 12/1998) control period/period one. 2515 daily and 120 monthly return 
observations in (01/1999 – 12/2008) period two. 2516 daily and 120 monthly return 
observations in (01/2009 – 12/2018) period three. The average number of firms has a 
large decrease coming to period three. However, this decrease is significant only on 
the smallest firm size category, and other size quantiles are pretty steady over periods. 
Changes in the number of firms can thus be seen as a normal outcome of recession and 
not biasing results found on this thesis. Detailed tables of the average number of firms 
in each of the portfolios you can find from the appendix one. 
This thesis uses daily data on 5x5 portfolios sorts to get more accurate estimates of 
risk factor loadings and movements. The main focus of this thesis is on these 5x5 
portfolio sorts. On three-variate sorts, only monthly return data is provided and used. 
Thus, three-variate sorts provide only supplementary information to study these 
research questions. Using daily data on 5x5 sorts is different from Fama and French 
studies as they used a monthly approach in all portfolio sorts. Value weighted average 
returns are used in all tests as value-weighted returns give a more realistic view on 
real-world investment opportunities than equally-weighted data (Fama & French, 
1993). Usage of Kenneth. R. French database is supported because it provides unique 
return data created with an approach that combines multiple databases confirming that 
data in this thesis is a robust variable. Publicly available data allows repeatability of 
this thesis and the possibility to study and compare different periods similar to this 
thesis. 
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5.1.2 Variable construction 
This subchapter follows closely on what is provided about variable construction on 
Kenneth R. French Database to give the reader clear thought how returns are formed. 
Risk factor mimicking portfolios are built the following way. SMB, small-minus-big 
(size factor) is built as the difference in average returns on the nine small stock 
portfolios minus the average return on the nine big stock portfolios. Three small and 
big portfolios are built on each category (book-to-market, operating profitability, 
investments), resulting in a total of nine small and big portfolios. SMB is an estimate 
that shows the difference in average returns between small and big firms. HML, high-
minus-low (value factor) is built as the difference in the average returns on the two 
value (high BE/ME) portfolios minus the average return on the two growth (low 
BE/ME) portfolios. HML is an estimate of return difference between value and growth 
firms. RMW, robust-minus-weak (profitability factor) is built as a difference in 
average returns between two robust operating profitability portfolios minus two weak 
operating profitability portfolios. RMW is an estimate of return difference between 
firms that have robust operating profitability and the firms that have weak operating 
profitability. CMA, conservative-minus-aggressive (investment factor) is built with a 
difference between two the conservative investment portfolios minus two aggressive 
investment portfolios. CMA is an estimate of return difference between low total asset 
growth firms and high total asset growth firms. The more detailed description and 
formulas behind factor construction are provided in Kenneth R. French Database and 
Fama and French (2015) study. (Kenneth. R. French Database, 2019) 
Portfolio average returns are more accurate sorts of the same return data as used in the 
risk factor construction. First, 5x5 sorted portfolios. All portfolio sorts are constructed 
at the end of June. Size and book-to-market portfolios are constructed as intersections 
of five portfolios formed on size (market equity) and five portfolios formed on book-
to-market. Size breakpoints for the year (t) are the NYSE market equity quantiles at 
the end of June (t). BE/ME for June in the year (t) is the book equity for the last fiscal 
year-end in (t)-1 divided by ME for December of (t)-1. Breakpoints for BE/ME are 
NYSE quantiles. Similar ten portfolio intersection is created to size and operating 
profitability. Five of each portfolio are created for size and operating profitability. 
Operating profitability for June of the year (t) is annual revenues minus the cost of 
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goods sold, interest expense, selling, general and administrative expenses divided by 
book equity for the last fiscal year-end in (t)-1. Resulting in a profitability ratio. 
Breakpoints for size and operating profitability again as NYSE quantiles. Similar five 
portfolios are created for each sort in size and investment. The intersection of these 
portfolios creates 25 portfolios. Investments are the change in total assets from the 
fiscal year ending in the year (t)-2 to the fiscal year ending in (t)-1, divided by (t)-2 
total assets. Resulting in a total asset growth percentage. Breakpoints for portfolios are 
used again as NYSE quantiles for size and investments. Three-variate sorts (2x4x4) 
portfolios are allocated in two size groups using NYSE median market cap as the 
breakpoint between small and big firms. In each size group, stocks are allocated in 
four groups based on operating profitability in (t)-1 and investments similar as in 5x5 
sorts. Using again NYSE breakpoints specific to each category to define breakpoints 
for portfolios. Descriptions of variables (size, operating profitability, investments) in 
2x4x4 sorts are same as in 5x5 portfolio sorts. (Kenneth. R. French Database, 2019) 
5.1.3 Average returns on Fama-French factors  
Average daily returns for Fama-French five factors are reported below in table one. 
The interesting difference among the tables can be seen from table 1.b. It shows that 
average and median returns on all factors have been relatively high and all positive in 
the period two of (01/1999 to 12/2008) expect for the market minus risk-free average. 
Risk-factors excluding the market excess return has not been driving positive returns 
on the period three on average or with the median values. Averages and medians are 
close to zero in control (table 1.a) and on period three (table 1.c). This is good news as 
returns should be around zero as the five factors are made to differentiate firms based 
on these characteristics. 
Among the other differences in risk factor average returns around the periods, the most 
important difference that can be seen from these tables is the low risk-free rate in the 
in period three (table 1.c). It shows that the risk-free rate has been on average, 0.001 
percent daily. This is only 0.252 % on an annual basis if we use 251.8 trading days on 
average a year on this period. Period three is characterised with low costs to use 
borrowed money, and this should have some effects on markets and risk-factors. 
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Table 1.a Average daily returns on Fama-French five factors and the risk-free rate on time 
period of (01/1989 – 12/1998) 
  MR – Rf  SMB HML RMW CMA Rf 
Average 0,049 -0,018 0,009 0,019 0,007 0,020 
Stand. Dev. 0,797 0,479 0,393 0,249 0,351 0,006 
Median 0,070 0,000 0,000 0,010 0,000 0,020 
       
Table 1.b Average daily returns on Fama-French five factors and the risk-free rate on time 
period of (01/1999 – 12/2008) 
  MR – Rf  SMB HML RMW CMA Rf 
Average -0,006 0,025 0,023 0,027 0,023 0,013 
Stand. Dev. 1,341 0,655 0,707 0,639 0,535 0,007 
Median 0,040 0,050 0,010 0,010 0,010 0,013 
       
Table 1.c Average daily returns on Fama-French five factors and the risk-free rate on time 
period of (01/2009 – 12/2018) 
  MR – Rf  SMB HML RMW CMA Rf 
Average 0,054 0,003 -0,007 0,004 0,001 0,001 
Stand. Dev. 1,071 0,544 0,620 0,355 0,305 0,002 
Median 0,070 0,000 -0,030 0,000 -0,010 0,000 
 
Table one presents average daily returns, median daily returns, and standard deviation of return for Fama-
French risk-factors and the risk-free rate for three time periods evaluated in this thesis. For a detailed description 
of factors check chapter 5.1.2 Variable construction. 
5.2 Tests on Size and Book-to-Market Portfolios 
The first part of the analysis focus on the risk factor patterns on average returns on the 
portfolio sorts of size and book-to-market on three different periods. Hoping that 
average returns provide clear patterns in returns that follow the risk factor effects that 
have been identified by the previous studies. Second, the performance of the FF5 
model is evaluated and compared with regression intercepts and adjusted R2 values 
and R2 dispersion. CRS tests are not conducted and reported, as they are most likely 
to dismiss the model as seen in Fama and French (2015) providing no further 
information to analysis and comparison. The third part of this subchapter, regression 
coefficients interpreted as risk-factor loadings and their relative changes during the 
three periods are evaluated, compared, and analysed. At the end of this subchapter, 
there is a short chapter that concludes the highlights found on different tests. 
In the evaluation of risk factor coefficients, absolute average values are used when 
discussing all coefficients jointly to effectively squeeze up main changes between the 
periods from a large number of coefficients. Main changes on single coefficients are 
also brought up if those are visible and significant additions to the analysis. Using 
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absolute values on averages when there are highly positive and negative values gives 
the real value on which the factor has on explaining the returns on either direction as 
all factors excluding the market excess return provides positive and negative 
coefficient values. Thus, using only average values provide not the real importance of 
risk factor. To effectively understand the coefficient comparison, for example, the 
coefficient value of 0.5 means that as the return for risk factor increases 1 % the return 
of these firms having this coefficient increase by 0.5 % on average. If the coefficient 
is negative -0.5 the returns decrease by -0.5% as factor return increase 1 % and 
opposite. Absolute values then give the importance of explanatory power of the risk 
factor if values differentiate highly from negative to positive. In calculating the 
absolute averages, all coefficients are used in comparison if most of the coefficients 
are significant (twenty or more) and those are reported in each comparison. 
Insignificant coefficients are most likely close to other coefficients not changing the 
main story behind the average of coefficients. This approach gives the reliable 
direction of the trend but could not be viewed as the absolute change on coefficients. 
Significant single coefficients give a more realistic view of absolute change. 
5.2.1 Return patterns 
Average returns for twenty-five different portfolios sorted on size and book-to-market 
are reported below in table two. The patterns in control period (table 2.a) follow closely 
BE/ME effect as high book-to-market stocks have higher returns in the first three size 
columns. In the fourth size column, the effect is similar but not as strong. In biggest 
size column value effect seems to mix for a bit having the highest return in the table at 
the lowest row of BE/ME and almost as high return in the highest row of BE/ME. 
Average returns table for the period one shows that BE/ME effect is stronger in small 
stocks, but the highest returns are still achieved in biggest size columns. 
Returns are very close to each other when comparing differences in average returns 
between the size columns. Only the smallest and biggest size column at the lowest 
BE/ME row, and biggest size column at the highest BE/ME row excludes from this 
similarity in average returns. Average returns from the first period (table 2.a) show no 
support to size effect in this period and sort. Size effect seems to be reversed as bigger 
size columns have higher returns than small size columns.  
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Table 2.a Period one: Average daily returns on (SIZE&BM) 01/1989 - 12/1998 
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low B/M 0,010 0,041 0,055 0,061 0,085 
2 0,047 0,047 0,056 0,059 0,068 
3 0,049 0,056 0,059 0,057 0,069 
4 0,062 0,066 0,062 0,066 0,064 
High B/M 0,063 0,063 0,066 0,066 0,083 
      
Table 2.b Period two: Average daily returns on (SIZE&BM) 01/1999 - 12/2008 
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low B/M -0,004 0,007 0,004 0,026 -0,002 
2 0,037 0,034 0,035 0,029 0,020 
3 0,037 0,044 0,033 0,022 0,020 
4 0,058 0,041 0,033 0,037 -0,004 
High B/M 0,049 0,037 0,059 0,018 0,013 
      
Table 2.c Period three: Average daily returns on (SIZE&BM) 01/2009 - 12/2018 
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low B/M 0,043 0,069 0,063 0,069 0,060 
2 0,056 0,068 0,064 0,065 0,054 
3 0,053 0,060 0,055 0,058 0,055 
4 0,054 0,048 0,061 0,056 0,044 
High B/M 0,057 0,054 0,050 0,060 0,052 
 
Table two presents average daily returns for 25 portfolios sorted by size measured as market capitalization and 
the book-to-market ratio for three different 120-month time periods. Table a presenting the returns on the 
control/first period, table b presenting returns on the period two (before the financial crisis breakpoint) and table 
c presenting results on the period three (after the financial crisis). 
Patterns in period two (table 2.b) also show support to BE/ME effect in average 
returns. The only expectation is the biggest size column which has average daily 
returns of (0.009 %) and returns are mixed through BE/ME rows. Returns increase as 
BE/ME increases strictly following BE/ME effect in first four size columns, excluding 
the highest BE/ME row which has a bit lower returns than other BE/ME rows. Third 
size column of medium-sized firms that have high BE/ME ratio has the highest average 
returns on period two (table 2.b). The size effect is well visible in this second period 
as smaller size columns have almost systematically higher average returns than bigger 
size columns. 
Patterns in period three (table 2.c) show that the BE/ME effect seems to reverse in this 
period. Only smallest size column shows persistence in BE/ME effect. On other size 
columns, returns increase as BE/ME ratio lowers and highest returns in (table 2.c) are 
found in the lowest BE/ME row in the biggest four size columns. The size effect is 
also invisible in this period, as no clear patterns in returns could be seen. These results 
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from the last table need to be viewed with the fact that all returns are very close to each 
other as the range is between (0.043 - 0.069). Differences between the (01/1999 - 
12/2008, table 2.b) and (01/2009 - 12/2018, table 2.c) seem significant. BE/ME and 
size effect lose its differentiation power in the third period, and returns are much closer 
to each other. Dispersion in returns on period two is (-0.004 to 0.059) and on period 
three (0.043 to 0.069). In the control period, this is (0.010 to 0.085), which is more 
similar to the second period the same way as BE/ME patterns are more visible in the 
periods one and two. Exceptional in period three (table 2.c) is a fact as there are not 
even close to zero returns on each of the sorts. Firms in all categories have been 
providing steady and similar average returns with no matter the differences in 
characteristics. 
5.2.2 Performance of FF5 
Table 3.a Period one: Adjusted R2 values for regression (SIZE&BM) 01/1989 - 12/1998 
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low B/M 0,886 0,939 0,920 0,888 0,957 
2 0,861 0,906 0,885 0,875 0,910 
3 0,833 0,884 0,858 0,867 0,883 
4 0,821 0,866 0,849 0,844 0,894 
High B/M 0,859 0,847 0,809 0,763 0,804 
      
Table 3.b Period two: Adjusted R2 values for regression (SIZE&BM) 01/1999 - 12/2008 
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low B/M 0,885 0,956 0,941 0,926 0,979 
2 0,905 0,950 0,931 0,902 0,915 
3 0,923 0,945 0,910 0,872 0,882 
4 0,924 0,949 0,900 0,880 0,892 
High B/M 0,926 0,941 0,884 0,842 0,849 
      
Table 3.c Period three: Adjusted R2 values for regression (SIZE&BM) 01/2009 - 12/2018 
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low B/M 0,921 0,961 0,951 0,942 0,976 
2 0,940 0,968 0,960 0,944 0,962 
3 0,954 0,975 0,955 0,937 0,948 
4 0,953 0,974 0,952 0,936 0,943 
High B/M 0,963 0,966 0,933 0,936 0,927 
 
Table three presents the adjusted R2 values of the 25 regressions made to portfolios sorted on size and book-to-
market for three different 120-month time periods. Table a presenting the returns on the control/first period, table 
b presenting returns on the period two (before the financial crisis breakpoint) and table c presenting results on 
the period three (after the financial crisis). For a detailed description of the adjusted R2 value check the first part 
of chapter 4. Asset pricing models. 
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Performance measured as adjusted R2 values and intercept values is the weakest in the 
control period (table 3.a). R2 dispersion is high (0.193) between the lowest and highest 
value, average absolute intercept is (0.007), and in twenty-five regressions, there were 
seven significant intercept values by using 95 % confidence level t-test. These 
significant intercept values were mostly in the smallest (3), and the biggest (2) size 
columns. Performance increased in terms of R2 values and number of significant 
intercepts on period two (table 3.b). R2 dispersion is (0.137) between the lowest and 
highest value, absolute intercept is (0.009), and in twenty-five regressions, there were 
five significant intercepts on a 95 % confidence level t-test. Results from the second 
period are very close to the control period as FF5 only slightly improves test statics 
from the control period. In period three (table 3.c), significant improvement is seen as 
FF5 was most successful in explaining average excess returns. R2 dispersion as low as 
(0.055) showing steady performance between portfolios, the absolute intercept was 
low as (0.004) with zero significant values. Even the lowest R2 was (0.921) in period 
three after the financial crisis. Thus, FF5 captures returns with high performance in 
period three. Explanation power and the performance of FF5 increases significantly 
after the financial crisis based on size and BE/ME portfolio sorts. 
5.2.3 Factor loadings 
Below on tables four, five and six, the regression outcomes from tests on size and 
book-to-market are reported. First, evaluation of risk factor coefficients takes a view 
on joint examination of all coefficients. All market and size factor coefficients are 
statistically significant in all the tables showing the importance of these risk factors in 
the asset pricing models. Average absolute SMB coefficients have lowered from the 
control period (0.603) to period two (0.571) but increased again strongly in period 
three (0.613). This increase on average absolute slopes results from the increased 
positive explanatory power of SMB in the smallest size column in period three. This 
fact and increase of SMB explanatory power can be a result of the relatively much 
lower number of small firms after the financial crisis. The financial crisis seems to be 
wiped out a large number of small firms (which most surely are junk firms on average). 
This lower number of small firms seems to increase SMB positive explanation power 
on smallest size quantile, increasing the size effect on lowest market capital firms.  
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  a      t(a)   
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size    Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low B/M -0,035 -0,006 0,006 0,010 0,011  Low B/M -5,658 -1,168 1,081 1,490 2,721 
2 0,000 -0,004 -0,002 -0,003 -0,006  2 0,044 -0,798 -0,283 -0,554 -1,164 
3 0,003 0,003 0,000 -0,012 -0,006  3 0,517 0,679 -0,009 -2,167 -0,972 
4 0,016 0,010 0,000 -0,001 -0,016  4 3,189 2,105 0,059 -0,229 -2,975 
High B/M 0,013 0,000 -0,002 -0,006 -0,007  High B/M 2,955 0,034 -0,256 -0,795 -0,785 
  b      t(b)   
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size    Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low B/M 1,081 1,170 1,128 1,015 0,926  Low B/M 93,107 119,640 98,931 80,429 119,494 
2 0,973 1,000 1,057 1,013 0,985  2 89,206 109,208 98,836 96,047 99,911 
3 0,862 0,908 0,960 1,042 1,023  3 83,938 107,136 97,497 100,893 93,592 
4 0,792 0,922 0,943 0,926 1,066  4 84,479 104,831 98,653 93,454 104,134 
High B/M 0,851 1,061 1,054 1,045 1,251  High B/M 101,943 99,773 88,292 74,092 75,039 
  s      t(s)   
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size    Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low B/M 1,066 1,061 0,788 0,353 -0,292  Low B/M 65,517 77,385 49,306 19,962 -26,917 
2 0,988 0,938 0,761 0,342 -0,200  2 64,579 73,071 50,733 23,139 -14,454 
3 0,869 0,825 0,629 0,378 -0,264  3 60,359 69,419 45,590 26,076 -17,231 
4 0,806 0,815 0,607 0,218 -0,163  4 61,300 66,073 45,238 15,692 -11,326 
High B/M 0,841 0,880 0,624 0,318 -0,070  High B/M 71,859 59,010 37,254 16,080 -3,011 
  h      t(h)   
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size    Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low B/M -0,285 -0,356 -0,348 -0,286 -0,484  Low B/M -12,141 -18,051 -15,129 -11,207 -30,952 
2 -0,037 0,014 0,100 0,154 -0,020  2 -1,702 0,733 4,630 7,238 -1,018 
3 0,082 0,211 0,353 0,420 0,186  3 3,970 12,331 17,744 20,160 8,434 
4 0,206 0,374 0,425 0,472 0,671  4 10,880 21,088 21,992 23,594 32,443 
High B/M 0,322 0,509 0,571 0,731 1,245  High B/M 19,085 23,690 23,692 25,651 36,991 
  r      t(r)   
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size    Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low B/M -0,404 -0,337 -0,357 -0,353 0,389  Low B/M -14,794 -14,664 -13,322 -11,893 21,316 
2 -0,211 -0,091 -0,040 -0,155 0,043  2 -8,223 -4,207 -1,571 -6,262 1,860 
3 -0,111 0,045 -0,012 -0,005 -0,254  3 -4,578 2,280 -0,538 -0,218 -9,888 
4 -0,052 0,067 0,091 0,027 -0,068  4 -2,337 3,218 4,065 1,166 -2,829 
High B/M -0,039 0,029 0,032 -0,047 -0,149  High B/M -1,967 1,167 1,137 -1,408 -3,803 
  c      t(c)   
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size    Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low B/M 0,152 -0,209 -0,425 -0,447 -0,028  Low B/M 5,967 -9,749 -17,045 -16,186 -1,645 
2 0,121 -0,060 -0,158 -0,065 0,089  2 5,051 -2,987 -6,747 -2,816 4,146 
3 0,108 0,019 -0,076 -0,040 0,315  3 4,797 1,005 -3,543 -1,758 13,160 
4 0,091 0,033 -0,009 0,024 -0,083  4 4,437 1,724 -0,450 1,119 -3,682 
High B/M 0,124 0,055 0,030 -0,101 -0,418  High B/M 6,772 2,360 1,155 -3,275 -11,463 
 
Table four contains regression outcomes from 25 regression on 5x5 sorted portfolios by size and book-to-market in control period of 
(01/1989 – 12/1998). Size variable increases from the left to right from small firms to big firms, size measured as market capitalization. 
Book-to-market level increases from up to bottom from low book-to-market firms on the first quantile to the high book-to-market firms in 
the last quantile. The book-to-market ratio is calculated by dividing the book value of assets by the market value of the assets. The left-
hand-side variable in the regression is the excess return from each of the portfolios (Ri – Rf) and right-hand-side variables are the Fama-
French five factors. RHS factor coefficients, interpreted as factor loadings are reported in the table above (a) = regression intercept, (b) = 
market excess return (market factor), (s) = small-minus-big (size factor), (h) = high-minus-low (value factor), (r) = robust-minus-weak 
(profitability factor), (c) = conservative-minus-aggressive (investment factor). For a more detailed description on LHS portfolios and factors 
check chapter 5.1.2 Variable construction. Regression t-values are reported on the right side of the table for each of the variables. Higher or 
(lower) value than 1.96 (-1.96) standing for statistical significance in a 95 % confidence interval based on simple t-test. Higher or (lower) 
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  a      t(a)   
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size    Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low B/M -0,027 -0,009 0,004 0,036 0,000  Low B/M -2,439 -1,182 0,521 3,900 0,125 
2 0,005 -0,001 0,011 0,006 0,003  2 0,504 -0,207 1,534 0,701 0,408 
3 -0,002 0,002 0,001 -0,008 0,000  3 -0,346 0,340 0,099 -0,811 -0,028 
4 0,019 -0,003 -0,003 0,007 -0,027  4 2,964 -0,496 -0,335 0,733 -2,619 
High B/M 0,008 -0,011 0,026 -0,008 -0,004  High B/M 1,205 -1,384 2,450 -0,579 -0,288 
  b      t(b)   
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size    Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low B/M 0,967 1,058 1,041 1,017 0,969  Low B/M 99,426 168,335 140,058 125,127 279,174 
2 0,932 1,061 0,980 0,977 1,012  2 117,392 179,072 155,559 137,882 149,965 
3 0,862 1,030 0,998 1,018 0,986  3 142,100 177,236 142,487 121,352 124,269 
4 0,808 1,041 0,990 0,988 1,076  4 140,705 184,899 136,685 121,956 119,283 
High B/M 0,812 1,121 1,062 1,080 1,070  High B/M 142,290 166,131 115,511 95,357 90,746 
  s      t(s)   
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size    Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low B/M 1,020 0,956 0,656 0,314 -0,196  Low B/M 55,367 80,251 46,560 20,386 -29,722 
2 1,028 0,986 0,611 0,229 -0,163  2 68,334 87,839 51,214 17,042 -12,764 
3 0,907 0,939 0,568 0,232 -0,160  3 78,872 85,294 42,757 14,579 -10,662 
4 0,874 0,944 0,498 0,223 -0,163  4 80,298 88,447 36,319 14,538 -9,530 
High B/M 0,865 0,996 0,482 0,093 -0,163  High B/M 79,970 77,887 27,643 4,341 -7,312 
  h      t(h)   
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size    Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low B/M -0,081 -0,217 -0,302 -0,285 -0,295  Low B/M -4,344 -18,114 -21,306 -18,360 -44,467 
2 0,037 0,020 0,028 0,080 0,068  2 2,473 1,731 2,342 5,931 5,303 
3 0,184 0,173 0,240 0,270 0,350  3 15,899 15,589 17,958 16,852 23,082 
4 0,279 0,337 0,309 0,480 0,964  4 25,482 31,339 22,371 31,054 55,982 
High B/M 0,431 0,624 0,739 0,901 1,220  High B/M 39,577 48,449 42,082 41,671 54,203 
  r      t(r)   
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size    Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low B/M -0,411 -0,367 -0,426 -0,471 0,085  Low B/M -19,084 -26,366 -25,854 -26,168 11,035 
2 -0,191 0,059 0,037 0,076 0,203  2 -10,888 4,517 2,617 4,869 13,606 
3 0,039 0,175 0,162 0,192 0,186  3 2,900 13,573 10,467 10,355 10,580 
4 0,011 0,155 0,152 0,054 -0,043  4 0,892 12,420 9,451 2,997 -2,137 
High B/M -0,001 0,069 -0,128 -0,247 -0,341  High B/M -0,115 4,631 -6,276 -9,838 -13,042 
  c      t(c)   
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size    Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low B/M 0,151 0,017 -0,201 -0,224 0,007  Low B/M 5,727 1,022 -9,963 -10,158 0,724 
2 0,172 0,107 0,020 0,286 0,328  2 7,991 6,635 1,177 14,876 17,902 
3 0,157 0,110 0,083 0,284 0,221  3 9,555 6,963 4,338 12,453 10,271 
4 0,101 0,084 0,231 0,260 0,038  4 6,467 5,498 11,757 11,818 1,566 
High B/M 0,093 0,043 0,061 0,173 -0,149  High B/M 6,028 2,358 2,458 5,607 -4,663 
 
Table five contains regression outcomes from 25 regression on 5x5 sorted portfolios by size and book-to-market in period two of (01/1999 
– 12/2008). Size variable increases from the left to right from small firms to big firms, size measured as market capitalization. Book-to-
market level increases from up to bottom from low book-to-market firms on the first quantile to the high book-to-market firms in the last 
quantile. The book-to-market ratio is calculated by dividing the book value of assets by the market value of the assets. The left-hand-side 
variable in the regression is the excess return from each of the portfolios (Ri – Rf) and right-hand-side variables are the Fama-French five 
factors. RHS factor coefficients, interpreted as factor loadings are reported in the table above (a) = regression intercept, (b) = market excess 
return (market factor), (s) = small-minus-big (size factor), (h) = high-minus-low (value factor), (r) = robust-minus-weak (profitability factor), 
(c) = conservative-minus-aggressive (investment factor). For a more detailed description on LHS portfolios and factors check chapter 5.1.2 
Variable construction. Regression t-values are reported on the right side of the table for each of the variables. Higher or (lower) value than 
1.96 (-1.96) standing for statistical significance in a 95 % confidence interval based on simple t-test. Higher or (lower) value than 2.576 (-
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  a      t(a)   
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size    Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low B/M -0,014 0,007 0,002 0,009 0,003  Low B/M -1,593 1,246 0,328 1,557 1,021 
2 0,000 0,007 0,004 0,004 -0,001  2 0,002 1,507 0,778 0,771 -0,308 
3 -0,001 0,000 -0,003 -0,003 0,001  3 -0,158 0,076 -0,632 -0,396 0,185 
4 0,003 -0,008 0,005 0,001 -0,005  4 0,450 -1,780 0,888 0,192 -0,801 
High B/M 0,009 -0,005 -0,005 0,006 0,001  High B/M 1,794 -0,859 -0,598 0,742 0,117 
  b      t(b)   
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size    Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low B/M 0,961 1,036 1,048 1,041 0,995  Low B/M 97,621 155,194 154,384 157,423 277,826 
2 0,951 1,027 1,036 1,050 0,984  2 114,153 178,353 176,282 162,244 215,159 
3 0,926 1,020 1,023 1,082 0,996  3 134,701 198,901 162,792 145,564 171,870 
4 0,892 0,988 0,999 1,014 0,968  4 125,533 188,311 148,252 135,941 139,101 
High B/M 0,838 1,085 1,030 1,055 1,109  High B/M 140,547 154,763 115,154 122,016 102,686 
  s      t(s)   
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size    Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low B/M 1,091 0,965 0,643 0,279 -0,154  Low B/M 63,475 82,850 54,258 24,151 -24,604 
2 1,104 0,952 0,616 0,264 -0,142  2 75,886 94,701 60,000 23,408 -17,846 
3 1,080 0,945 0,603 0,288 -0,174  3 89,976 105,534 54,926 22,153 -17,166 
4 1,102 0,934 0,595 0,252 -0,194  4 88,850 101,994 50,558 19,370 -15,967 
High B/M 1,003 0,985 0,587 0,237 -0,123  High B/M 96,348 80,493 37,599 15,727 -6,502 
  h      t(h)   
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size    Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low B/M -0,297 -0,409 -0,368 -0,306 -0,315  Low B/M -17,527 -35,623 -31,469 -26,913 -51,076 
2 -0,186 -0,147 -0,079 -0,132 -0,054  2 -12,942 -14,798 -7,773 -11,839 -6,860 
3 0,037 0,144 0,108 0,133 0,126  3 3,156 16,323 9,956 10,361 12,676 
4 0,308 0,363 0,312 0,368 0,707  4 25,177 40,194 26,901 28,664 58,965 
High B/M 0,414 0,611 0,624 0,724 1,101  High B/M 40,312 50,632 40,540 48,637 59,228 
  r      t(r)   
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size    Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low B/M -0,656 -0,469 -0,267 -0,093 0,108  Low B/M -23,141 -24,425 -13,666 -4,884 10,475 
2 -0,466 -0,090 0,047 0,030 0,122  2 -19,412 -5,452 2,761 1,595 9,290 
3 -0,135 0,090 0,099 0,080 -0,013  3 -6,832 6,090 5,454 3,759 -0,772 
4 -0,036 0,144 0,052 0,064 -0,007  4 -1,744 9,512 2,685 2,957 -0,356 
High B/M -0,010 0,014 -0,064 -0,139 -0,656  High B/M -0,592 0,708 -2,477 -5,588 -21,096 
  c      t(c)   
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size    Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low B/M -0,180 -0,246 -0,234 -0,043 -0,157  Low B/M -5,657 -11,372 -10,664 -2,009 -13,579 
2 -0,157 -0,047 0,063 0,161 0,091  2 -5,818 -2,518 3,292 7,698 6,146 
3 0,002 0,043 0,114 0,113 0,209  3 0,104 2,569 5,630 4,716 11,128 
4 -0,065 0,011 0,141 0,033 -0,206  4 -2,846 0,668 6,472 1,353 -9,127 
High B/M 0,073 0,089 0,164 -0,071 -0,520  High B/M 3,808 3,928 5,668 -2,551 -14,874 
 
Table six contains regression outcomes from 25 regression on 5x5 sorted portfolios by size and book-to-market in period three of (01/2009 
– 12/2018). Size variable increases from the left to right from small firms to big firms, size measured as market capitalization. Book-to-
market level increases from up to bottom from low book-to-market firms on the first quantile to the high book-to-market firms in the last 
quantile. The book-to-market ratio is calculated by dividing the book value of assets by the market value of the assets. The left-hand-side 
variable in the regression is the excess return from each of the portfolios (Ri – Rf) and right-hand-side variables are the Fama-French five 
factors. RHS factor coefficients, interpreted as factor loadings are reported in the table above (a) = regression intercept, (b) = market excess 
return (market factor), (s) = small-minus-big (size factor), (h) = high-minus-low (value factor), (r) = robust-minus-weak (profitability factor), 
(c) = conservative-minus-aggressive (investment factor). For a more detailed description on LHS portfolios and factors check chapter 5.1.2 
Variable construction. Regression t-values are reported on the right side of the table for each of the variables. Higher or (lower) value than 
1.96 (-1.96) standing for statistical significance in a 95 % confidence interval based on simple t-test. Higher or (lower) value than 2.576 (-
2.576) standing for statistical significance in a 99 % confidence interval based on simple t-test. 
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On other size columns, coming to the present-day SMB has lost slightly its explanatory 
power pushing it towards zero. This supports the importance of size factor in 
explaining returns of the smallest firms, but on explaining returns of firms on other 
size columns factor seems to lose its power steadily. This is in line what was seen on 
the average return patterns in (table 2.c) on the smallest size column. The importance 
of market factor positive explanatory power also has increased with excess returns, as 
the coefficients in the period three (table 6) on average were (1.006) as the period two 
(table 5) average is (0.998).  
Evaluating the home sort risk-factor, the value, in this case, shows that value factor 
has been steady in the period one and two decreasing coming to period three. These 
results are similar to what was seen on average return patterns as on the period three 
BE/ME effect seems to reverse. On absolute average terms, HML (value) coefficient 
has lowered from period two (0.357) with 24 significant coefficients to period three 
(0.335) with 25 significant coefficients. This drop of six percentage of explanation 
power on average absolute coefficients of HML factor is big and significant since 
absolute value was (0.354) on control period with 20 significant coefficients. Showing 
the HML factor was steady and increasing between the control period and period two, 
suffering drop after financial crisis breakpoint. On average absolute terms, RMW and 
CMA have had the lowest coefficients on the control period (0.136, 0.131), increasing 
highly to second period (0.171, 0.144) and again dropping to the value of (0.158, 
0.129). With RMW and CMA having significant coefficients between 20 - 23 in the 
last two periods. 
Second, in the straight coefficient comparison, extreme sorts are used mainly because 
those provide significant coefficients in all periods studied in this thesis and thus allow 
direct comparison. On profitability and investment coefficient comparison, there seem 
to be some trends that can be seen. In RMW coefficients firms in smallest size column 
with the lowest BE/ME, rows seem to be unprofitable in all periods, but in the last 
period, negative coefficients (robust profitability) decreases significantly more. 
Showing that small-sized low BE/ME firms are very unprofitable on average at period 
three. However, as size increases to biggest size column, these firms on the lowest 
BE/ME category have positive coefficient throughout the periods, and negative 
coefficients of RMW on high BE/ME row directly opposite to small firms’ column. 
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Highest BE/ME row seems to have weak profitability throughout time, which 
decreases almost half (-0.341) to (-0.656) from period two to period three. The period 
after the financial crisis (table 6) seems to hit firms in the extreme categories of size 
and BE/ME very hard in terms of profitability. 
On CMA comparison, the biggest changes are visible again in the extreme size 
columns. On the column of small firms at the control and the second period, the 
positive CMA coefficient has been on average (0.119) at the control period slightly 
increasing to period two (0.135). This average coefficient drops to (-0.065) on period 
three, suggesting small firms making more aggressive investing than in the first two 
periods. On other size columns, the investment factor coefficients seem to variate 
highly, and statistically significant coefficients that are found from two lowest BE/ME 
rows are mostly negative in the control period. On period two, there are many positive 
statistically significant coefficients in the table, and this positive relation lowers but 
stays in period three, excluding the lowest BE/ME row and smallest size column. 
Firms on the lowest BE/ME row, growth firms seem to invest aggressively, which 
leads to negative coefficients. Lowest BE/ME row firms are also unprofitable on 
average based on what is seen on RMW factor loadings. The similar story is seen on 
the biggest size column, and highest BE/ME row as firms in that category seem to 
invest aggressively despite low profitability (RMW -0.656 and CMA -0.520). 
On the first two periods, low average returns of firms on low BE/ME portfolios are 
clearly seen. Still, average returns of low BE/ME firms on the period three are good 
on relative comparison suggesting the market has changed after the financial crisis on 
this term and drivers of good returns of growth firms in the period three are on 
somewhere else than in the robust profitability or conservative investing activities. To 
conclude lowest BE/ME row firms seem to be unprofitable and invest aggressively, 
which definitely is one driver behind the BE/ME and value effect. Still, this fact of low 
profitability and aggressive investing seems not to have an effect on the average 
returns of these firms.  
SMB factor has been steady in the first two periods in the smallest size column 
increasing above one on period three as pointed out earlier in the joint examination. 
SMB coefficient increases slightly coming from second to last period in the three 
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highest BE/ME rows on all size columns. Mostly on size columns three (0.482 to 
0.587) and four (0.093 to 0.237). Two lowest BE/ME rows have a steady increase over 
the second and last period. In biggest size column, on comparison of SMB average, 
negative slopes increase steadily as on the control period the average slope is (-0.198), 
(-0.169) on second and on third (-0.157). SMB trend is visible as explanatory power 
increases in small firms over the coefficient of one and decreases towards zero on big 
firms. HML factor coefficients are pretty steady in the lowest and highest BE/ME rows 
through periods. Firms on lowest BE/ME rows having negative coefficients and firms 
on the highest BE/ME rows having strongly positive coefficients. Single HML factor 
coefficients do not variate too much around periods, but lower importance is seen on 
joint examination. There are a couple more negative coefficients on the third period 
compared to second which signs about lowering importance of positive explanation 
power on excess returns of BE/ME. High BE/ME firms are much more explanatory 
with HML factor than lower BE/ME firms having twice as high absolute coefficients. 
5.2.4 Highlights on size and book-to-market tests 
Lowering dispersion in returns on different sorts on size and BE/ME signs lower 
importance of BE/ME effect on the period after the financial crisis in explaining 
differences in average returns. This is in line with Kothari et. al (1995) critics as they 
argued that BE/ME significance may variate in different states. What comes to value 
factor and its importance on asset pricing, we need to remember that these are the size 
and BE/ME sorts only. BE/ME does not fully reflect the value effect, only some part 
of it. Other ratios and characteristics of firms such as P/E, P/C also play the main role 
in value effect and importance of quality on value investing has been brought up by 
many studies (e.g. Novy-Marx, 2013, Asness et al. 2019).  
From regression performance statics on size and BE/ME tests, it is easy to see that 
average excess returns on these portfolios are significantly more explanatory with 
different risk factor returns in present day and last ten years than in the 1990 - 2008 at 
the U.S. equity market. FF5 performance had significant improvements on 
performance statics between the period two and period three.  
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Coefficients on the HML risk factor reveals a drop of six percentage on explanation 
power after the financial crisis breakpoint. This is significant as results show that HML 
factor was pretty steady and increasing between the periods one and two. The financial 
crisis and changes in the market resulted in a drop on explanation power of the HML 
factor. Regression tests also reveal that high BE/ME firms are much more explanatory 
with HML factor than lower BE/ME firms. High BE/ME firms having twice higher 
absolute average coefficients than low BE/ME firms. Growth firms (low BE/ME) seem 
to invest aggressively and unprofitable based on factor loadings, which surely have 
been one driver behind differences in value and growth firms’ average returns. Large 
differences in average returns between value and growth firms have been seen on the 
first two periods, as the value was delivering higher average returns. On period three, 
this difference vanishes and returns of growth firms are good in relative comparison. 
This suggests that markets and the risk factor have changed after the financial crisis 
on this term and drivers of a good return on growth firms are on somewhere else than 
in straight profitability or conservative investing activities. Maybe the return 
expectations on growth firms have increased, good investment opportunities 
decreased, or markets trust on BE/ME effect delivering better returns decreased. 
Whatever the explanation, the results are straightforward in this case. 
Interesting findings were also made on SMB factor coefficients. SMB coefficients 
seem to increase on small firms and decrease towards zero on big firms. The 
profitability of small firms has decreased at the same time as the SMB has increased. 
Seems like liquidity premium between different sized firms have increased on period 
three based on these results. Thus, SMB is much more effective in explaining the 
returns of small firms compared to big sized firms.  
What we can conclude is that BE/ME differentiation power in average returns is 
affected by different states and straight size effect on average returns seems to be 
visible on these sorts only on the second period. This is in line with low size importance 
found in empirical studies. But as Asness et al. (2018) argue that size effect is visible 
only if junk or quality characteristics are controlled. To answer this, 2x4x4 sorts should 
control better for quality characteristics that could bring size effect more visible. 
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5.3 Tests on Size and Operating Profitability Portfolios 
Tests on the size and operating profitability on 5x5 sorted portfolios are evaluated in 
this subchapter. The subchapter structure is similar to the previous, tests on size and 
book-to-market. 
5.3.1 Return patterns  
Table 7.a Period one: Average daily returns on (SIZE&OP) 01/1989 - 12/1998 
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low OP 0,025 0,035 0,049 0,045 0,079 
2 0,057 0,054 0,059 0,057 0,064 
3 0,061 0,061 0,058 0,060 0,068 
4 0,052 0,051 0,062 0,068 0,072 
High OP 0,055 0,070 0,063 0,062 0,085 
      
Table 7.b Period two: Average daily returns on (SIZE&OP) 01/1999 - 12/2008 
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low OP 0,025 0,003 0,006 0,013 -0,035 
2 0,050 0,042 0,032 0,028 -0,001 
3 0,048 0,043 0,032 0,019 0,006 
4 0,049 0,053 0,036 0,034 0,007 
High OP 0,036 0,043 0,043 0,038 0,011 
      
Table 7.c Period three: Average daily returns on (SIZE&OP) 01/2009 - 12/2018 
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low OP 0,049 0,065 0,058 0,057 0,056 
2 0,061 0,052 0,060 0,067 0,048 
3 0,051 0,061 0,060 0,065 0,055 
4 0,062 0,055 0,057 0,063 0,056 
High OP 0,049 0,064 0,063 0,064 0,056 
 
Table seven presents average daily returns for 25 portfolios sorted by size measured as market capitalization and 
the operating profitability for three different 120-month time periods. Table a presenting the returns on the 
control/first period, table b presenting returns on the period two (before the financial crisis breakpoint) and table 
c presenting results on the period three (after the financial crisis). 
The average returns in the control period (table 7.a) follow strict risk factor patterns as 
operating profitability increases the average returns increase in each size columns. The 
only exception to the systematic pattern is a relatively high return on the biggest size 
column and lowest operating profitability row. The high average return of these firms 
is interesting as regression coefficients reveal that firms in this category are highly 
unprofitable and invest aggressively (regression coefficients discussed later). Size 
related return pattern is not visible in this period and sort. 
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The return patterns in period two (table 7.b) tell much of the same story that was seen 
on the control period. Operating profitability patterns are very visible in all categories 
except for the smallest size column that has similar returns in three middle operating 
profitability rows and lowest returns on the extremes. Size effect patterns are visible 
in the second period as returns increase as size column decreases. This result is similar 
to what was found on size and BE/ME sorts. Biggest size column has close to zero 
returns in all operating profitability rows. Return patterns on period three (table 7.c) 
are very similar to sorts made on size and BE/ME. There are no clear and strong size 
or operating profitability effect on average returns on period three. Dispersion of daily 
returns is again small (0.049 - 0.065), and all categories seem to have similar returns. 
Differences between the (01/1999 - 12/2008) and (01/2009 - 12/2018) seem significant 
also in portfolio sorts made by size and operating profitability. Size and operating 
profitability effect seem to lose its power in differentiating returns coming to the period 
after the financial crisis as all stocks in each category seem to have similar returns no 
matter the differences on these characteristics. Dispersion of returns on different 
twenty-five categories is only (0.016) after the financial crisis as in first-period 
dispersion is (0.06) and on second (0.088). These differences between periods are huge 
and significant as daily returns are used. This supports the previous empirical findings 
that risk factors lose much of their powers in some market states. 
5.3.2 Performance of FF5 
Performance statistics are reported below in table eight. Performance measured as 
adjusted R2 values and intercept values is again weakest in the control period (table 
8.a). Average R2 is (0.882), and dispersion is high at (0.148) between the lowest and 
highest value. Absolute intercept is (0.006), and in twenty-five regressions, there were 
six significant intercepts in a 95 % confidence level t-test. Significant values (5) were 
mostly found in the two lowest size columns. Performance increases coming to period 
two. Average R2 increases to (0.919) and R2 dispersion lowers to (0.099). There are 
less significant intercept values (2) than in the control period, but the absolute average 
intercept value is a bit higher on (0.008). 
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Table 8.a Period one: Adjusted R2 values for regression (SIZE&OP) 01/1989 - 12/1998 
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low OP 0,893 0,924 0,882 0,832 0,863 
2 0,860 0,892 0,871 0,847 0,884 
3 0,831 0,890 0,882 0,878 0,895 
4 0,813 0,894 0,894 0,891 0,948 
High OP 0,853 0,911 0,889 0,878 0,962 
      
Table 8.b Period two: Adjusted R2 values for regression (SIZE&OP) 01/1999 - 12/2008 
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low OP 0,913 0,968 0,932 0,921 0,929 
2 0,928 0,949 0,919 0,897 0,880 
3 0,915 0,936 0,927 0,906 0,911 
4 0,909 0,949 0,917 0,896 0,940 
High OP 0,869 0,933 0,893 0,890 0,948 
      
Table 8.c Period three: Adjusted R2 values for regression (SIZE&OP) 01/2009 - 12/2018 
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low OP 0,956 0,973 0,932 0,919 0,930 
2 0,954 0,973 0,959 0,948 0,954 
3 0,943 0,972 0,958 0,944 0,951 
4 0,943 0,964 0,955 0,940 0,971 
High OP 0,927 0,960 0,943 0,934 0,965 
 
Table eight presents the adjusted R2 values of the 25 regressions made to portfolios sorted on size measured as 
market capitalization and operating profitability for three different 120-month time periods. Table a presenting 
the returns on the control/first period, table b presenting returns on the period two (before the financial crisis 
breakpoint) and table c presenting results on the period three (after the financial crisis). For a detailed description 
of the adjusted R2 value check the first part of chapter 4. Asset pricing models. 
Period three (table 8.c) has once again the steadiest and the highest performance 
statistics of the FF5 model. Average R2 is very high at (0.951) and dispersion as low 
as (0.054). Average intercept is (0.004) with zero significant values. Two of the 
intercept values were close to being statistically significant, but slightly under the 95 
% confidence level on t-test. FF5 model performs much better and steadier after the 
financial crisis, which is in line to findings in size and book-to-market tests. 
5.3.3 Factor loadings 
Below on tables nine, ten and eleven, the regression outcomes from tests on size and 
operating profitability are reported. First starting with the joint examination of 
coefficients. The absolute average profitability coefficient increases highly over 
sixteen percentage from the control period (0.269) with 21 significant coefficients, at 
(0.313) on the second period with 24 significant coefficients. Increase to period three 
is (0.328) with 24 significant coefficients. 
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  a      t(a)   
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size    Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low OP -0,018 -0,014 0,002 -0,003 0,024  Low OP -3,498 -2,574 0,300 -0,440 3,413 
2 0,010 0,003 0,007 0,001 0,000  2 2,188 0,673 1,292 0,220 -0,078 
3 0,012 0,008 -0,001 -0,003 -0,002  3 2,248 1,724 -0,159 -0,606 -0,425 
4 0,001 -0,004 0,003 0,003 -0,008  4 0,125 -0,893 0,523 0,538 -1,867 
High OP 0,002 0,010 0,000 -0,004 0,005  High OP 0,315 2,044 0,009 -0,687 1,292 
  b      t(b)   
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size    Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low OP 0,994 1,194 1,111 0,963 1,035  Low OP 102,234 117,090 88,875 72,707 78,475 
2 0,838 0,952 0,982 0,935 1,011  2 94,800 106,798 92,948 82,883 93,948 
3 0,843 0,931 0,984 0,979 0,958  3 86,574 106,791 101,885 99,477 94,649 
4 0,894 0,983 1,036 1,017 1,032  4 81,267 107,488 105,555 101,714 133,513 
High OP 0,974 1,104 1,091 1,080 0,965  High OP 90,669 116,310 99,985 94,968 136,838 
  s      t(s)   
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size    Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low OP 0,978 0,994 0,624 0,264 -0,151  Low OP 71,769 69,536 35,618 14,219 -8,144 
2 0,843 0,827 0,613 0,286 -0,177  2 68,021 66,163 41,359 18,072 -11,723 
3 0,845 0,861 0,664 0,300 -0,287  3 61,894 70,413 49,029 21,719 -20,206 
4 0,921 0,949 0,762 0,323 -0,237  4 59,651 74,005 55,363 23,007 -21,859 
High OP 0,997 1,076 0,831 0,420 -0,257  High OP 66,165 80,866 54,302 26,350 -25,934 
  h      t(h)   
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size    Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low OP -0,116 -0,231 -0,153 -0,017 0,215  Low OP -5,891 -11,235 -6,046 -0,649 8,062 
2 0,125 0,118 0,118 0,150 0,207  2 7,016 6,533 5,539 6,577 9,542 
3 0,181 0,151 0,184 0,238 0,071  3 9,219 8,553 9,460 11,961 3,485 
4 0,157 0,210 0,225 0,209 0,074  4 7,087 11,384 11,363 10,333 4,766 
High OP 0,098 0,123 0,155 0,232 -0,265  High OP 4,507 6,400 7,044 10,109 -18,629 
  r      t(r)   
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size    Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low OP -0,450 -0,547 -0,718 -0,700 -0,953  Low OP -19,666 -22,779 -24,421 -22,437 -30,690 
2 -0,083 -0,104 -0,308 -0,319 -0,592  2 -3,984 -4,962 -12,394 -12,009 -23,380 
3 0,041 0,070 0,036 -0,097 -0,254  3 1,778 3,398 1,600 -4,185 -10,660 
4 0,069 0,143 0,073 -0,007 0,141  4 2,666 6,659 3,137 -0,308 7,733 
High OP 0,077 0,220 0,205 0,000 0,524  High OP 3,063 9,858 7,963 0,016 31,587 
  c      t(c)   
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size    Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low OP 0,211 0,042 -0,158 -0,165 -0,271  Low OP 9,922 1,898 -5,779 -5,687 -9,395 
2 0,099 -0,009 -0,141 -0,141 0,118  2 5,111 -0,474 -6,088 -5,690 4,998 
3 0,075 -0,020 -0,109 -0,069 0,224  3 3,527 -1,053 -5,167 -3,217 10,114 
4 0,121 -0,117 -0,226 -0,176 0,038  4 5,016 -5,834 -10,505 -8,024 2,251 
High OP 0,087 -0,076 -0,254 -0,263 -0,012  High OP 3,686 -3,649 -10,651 -10,570 -0,778 
 
Table nine contains regression outcomes from 25 regression on 5x5 sorted portfolios by size and operating profitability in control period of 
(01/1989 – 12/1998). Size variable increases from the left to right from small firms to big firms, size measured as market capitalization. 
Operating profitability increases from up to bottom from low operating profitability firms on the first quantile to the high operating 
profitability firms in the last quantile. The left-hand-side variable in the regression is the excess return from each of the portfolios (Ri – Rf) 
and right-hand-side variables are the Fama-French five factors. RHS factor coefficients, interpreted as factor loadings are reported in the 
table above (a) = regression intercept, (b) = market excess return (market factor), (s) = small-minus-big (size factor), (h) = high-minus-low 
(value factor), (r) = robust-minus-weak (profitability factor), (c) = conservative-minus-aggressive (investment factor). For a more detailed 
description on LHS portfolios and factors check chapter 5.1.2 Variable construction. Regression t-values are reported on the right side of 
the table for each of the variables. Higher or (lower) value than 1.96 (-1.96) standing for statistical significance in a 95 % confidence interval 
based on simple t-test. Higher or (lower) value than 2.576 (-2.576) standing for statistical significance in a 99 % confidence interval based 
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  a      t(a)   
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size    Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low OP -0,002 -0,017 0,013 0,027 -0,009  Low OP -0,280 -2,686 1,317 2,519 -0,885 
2 0,008 0,004 0,006 0,020 -0,005  2 1,188 0,666 0,746 1,993 -0,536 
3 0,004 0,002 0,003 -0,003 0,007  3 0,540 0,322 0,363 -0,359 0,800 
4 0,006 0,008 0,007 0,008 0,003  4 0,810 1,223 0,893 1,030 0,469 
High OP -0,005 0,000 0,011 0,016 -0,003  High OP -0,595 0,032 1,248 1,699 -0,554 
  b      t(b)   
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size    Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low OP 0,895 1,126 1,079 1,099 1,049  Low OP 117,013 201,327 123,469 119,107 119,905 
2 0,845 1,027 1,000 1,021 0,992  2 148,924 180,040 145,114 119,250 113,945 
3 0,827 1,029 0,977 0,967 1,039  3 137,737 164,726 156,978 139,423 132,563 
4 0,832 1,038 0,964 0,964 0,993  4 134,159 184,967 144,790 135,393 167,884 
High OP 0,884 1,038 1,025 1,023 1,000  High OP 109,327 161,178 128,424 126,479 193,358 
  s      t(s)   
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size    Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low OP 0,970 1,011 0,597 0,230 -0,253  Low OP 66,858 95,423 36,024 13,164 -15,249 
2 0,884 0,918 0,565 0,218 -0,228  2 82,124 84,861 43,290 13,432 -13,836 
3 0,877 0,925 0,571 0,218 -0,247  3 77,133 78,144 48,385 16,573 -16,615 
4 0,864 0,996 0,599 0,247 -0,161  4 73,444 93,605 47,497 18,331 -14,407 
High OP 0,900 0,955 0,627 0,346 -0,129  High OP 58,741 78,239 41,464 22,564 -13,169 
  h      t(h)   
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size    Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low OP 0,014 -0,078 -0,145 -0,019 0,423  Low OP 0,990 -7,276 -8,665 -1,087 25,340 
2 0,352 0,203 0,123 0,154 0,171  2 32,449 18,610 9,352 9,413 10,292 
3 0,406 0,226 0,173 0,245 0,057  3 35,474 18,961 14,600 18,487 3,818 
4 0,329 0,272 0,200 0,127 -0,034  4 27,769 25,356 15,725 9,373 -2,987 
High OP 0,267 0,240 0,126 0,111 -0,157  High OP 17,284 19,520 8,280 7,200 -15,940 
  r      t(r)   
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size    Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low OP -0,415 -0,503 -0,888 -0,893 -0,982  Low OP -24,483 -40,619 -45,853 -43,687 -50,682 
2 0,122 0,054 0,010 -0,392 -0,235  2 9,703 4,241 0,687 -20,636 -12,203 
3 0,227 0,205 0,143 0,060 -0,132  3 17,096 14,811 10,394 3,894 -7,628 
4 0,253 0,309 0,176 0,198 0,192  4 18,401 24,840 11,963 12,544 14,664 
High OP 0,235 0,342 0,269 0,128 0,469  High OP 13,129 23,943 15,192 7,159 40,975 
  c      t(c)   
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size    Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low OP 0,293 0,195 -0,021 -0,011 -0,398  Low OP 14,095 12,809 -0,891 -0,427 -16,765 
2 0,035 0,080 0,109 0,155 0,264  2 2,294 5,133 5,830 6,651 11,178 
3 -0,026 0,030 0,041 0,131 0,051  3 -1,581 1,793 2,429 6,964 2,417 
4 -0,010 -0,028 -0,103 0,186 -0,138  4 -0,579 -1,856 -5,694 9,618 -8,575 
High OP -0,032 -0,121 -0,051 0,046 0,091  High OP -1,443 -6,909 -2,337 2,075 6,457 
 
Table ten contains regression outcomes from 25 regression on 5x5 sorted portfolios by size and operating profitability in period two of 
(01/1999 – 12/2008). Size variable increases from the left to right from small firms to big firms, size measured as market capitalization. 
Operating profitability increases from up to bottom from low operating profitability firms on the first quantile to the high operating 
profitability firms in the last quantile. The left-hand-side variable in the regression is the excess return from each of the portfolios (Ri – Rf) 
and right-hand-side variables are the Fama-French five factors. RHS factor coefficients, interpreted as factor loadings are reported in the 
table above (a) = regression intercept, (b) = market excess return (market factor), (s) = small-minus-big (size factor), (h) = high-minus-low 
(value factor), (r) = robust-minus-weak (profitability factor), (c) = conservative-minus-aggressive (investment factor). For a more detailed 
description on LHS portfolios and factors check chapter 5.1.2 Variable construction. Regression t-values are reported on the right side of 
the table for each of the variables. Higher or (lower) value than 1.96 (-1.96) standing for statistical significance in a 95 % confidence interval 
based on simple t-test. Higher or (lower) value than 2.576 (-2.576) standing for statistical significance in a 99 % confidence interval based 
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  a      t(a)   
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size    Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low OP -0,004 0,004 -0,001 -0,003 0,001  Low OP -0,649 0,846 -0,095 -0,372 0,172 
2 0,011 -0,004 0,004 0,011 -0,006  2 1,957 -0,972 0,712 1,863 -1,115 
3 0,001 0,004 0,002 0,008 0,001  3 0,133 0,838 0,398 1,340 0,280 
4 0,009 -0,004 -0,003 0,003 0,001  4 1,385 -0,851 -0,485 0,598 0,331 
High OP -0,009 0,000 0,000 0,004 -0,001  High OP -1,178 -0,035 -0,009 0,601 -0,152 
  b      t(b)   
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size    Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low OP 0,916 1,074 1,063 1,108 1,085  Low OP 130,514 178,146 118,626 116,315 123,522 
2 0,866 0,984 0,989 1,025 1,018  2 129,992 188,685 165,295 156,464 171,986 
3 0,869 0,987 1,004 1,031 0,982  3 115,088 185,515 168,392 155,209 181,385 
4 0,895 1,011 1,035 1,040 0,977  4 117,706 166,374 164,029 156,862 243,930 
High OP 0,991 1,081 1,066 1,049 0,985  High OP 108,753 165,644 149,817 149,852 233,082 
  s      t(s)   
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size    Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low OP 1,058 0,956 0,605 0,280 -0,178  Low OP 86,254 90,897 38,683 16,837 -11,589 
2 1,029 0,930 0,601 0,253 -0,195  2 88,450 102,230 57,574 22,103 -18,890 
3 1,078 0,952 0,596 0,236 -0,151  3 81,778 102,510 57,241 20,391 -16,007 
4 1,109 0,979 0,635 0,274 -0,155  4 83,548 92,296 57,597 23,667 -22,102 
High OP 1,126 0,969 0,638 0,289 -0,142  High OP 70,748 85,033 51,321 23,624 -19,276 
  h      t(h)   
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size    Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low OP -0,142 -0,236 -0,192 -0,151 0,235  Low OP -11,750 -22,752 -12,421 -9,218 15,567 
2 0,315 0,209 0,107 0,131 0,150  2 27,472 23,262 10,404 11,604 14,688 
3 0,397 0,239 0,083 0,143 0,033  3 30,553 26,071 8,041 12,528 3,591 
4 0,272 0,198 0,150 -0,054 -0,041  4 20,796 18,959 13,792 -4,735 -6,003 
High OP 0,213 0,057 0,007 -0,063 -0,136  High OP 13,572 5,070 0,597 -5,253 -18,705 
  r      t(r)   
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size    Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low OP -0,667 -0,845 -0,833 -0,833 -0,972  Low OP -32,981 -48,700 -32,305 -30,386 -38,451 
2 0,044 0,055 -0,085 -0,139 -0,411  2 2,296 3,690 -4,910 -7,358 -24,117 
3 0,182 0,211 0,117 0,103 -0,011  3 8,368 13,764 6,835 5,377 -0,679 
4 0,179 0,346 0,325 0,184 0,099  4 8,177 19,767 17,864 9,641 8,579 
High OP 0,279 0,356 0,340 0,236 0,352  High OP 10,648 18,942 16,590 11,712 28,961 
  c      t(c)   
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size    Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low OP -0,047 -0,148 -0,086 -0,053 -0,062  Low OP -2,091 -7,580 -2,961 -1,729 -2,199 
2 -0,095 -0,033 0,045 -0,007 -0,016  2 -4,418 -1,962 2,351 -0,332 -0,834 
3 -0,111 -0,016 0,049 -0,071 0,046  3 -4,558 -0,907 2,548 -3,305 2,601 
4 0,055 0,007 0,032 0,166 0,042  4 2,245 0,380 1,552 7,718 3,242 
High OP 0,092 0,042 0,109 0,151 -0,081  High OP 3,137 1,973 4,727 6,673 -5,906 
 
Table eleven contains regression outcomes from 25 regression on 5x5 sorted portfolios by size and operating profitability in period three of 
(01/2009 – 12/2018). Size variable increases from the left to right from small firms to big firms, size measured as market capitalization. 
Operating profitability increases from up to bottom from low operating profitability firms on the first quantile to the high operating 
profitability firms in the last quantile. The left-hand-side variable in the regression is the excess return from each of the portfolios (Ri – Rf) 
and right-hand-side variables are the Fama-French five factors. RHS factor coefficients, interpreted as factor loadings are reported in the 
table above (a) = regression intercept, (b) = market excess return (market factor), (s) = small-minus-big (size factor), (h) = high-minus-low 
(value factor), (r) = robust-minus-weak (profitability factor), (c) = conservative-minus-aggressive (investment factor). For a more detailed 
description on LHS portfolios and factors check chapter 5.1.2 Variable construction. Regression t-values are reported on the right side of 
the table for each of the variables. Higher or (lower) value than 1.96 (-1.96) standing for statistical significance in a 95 % confidence interval 
based on simple t-test. Higher or (lower) value than 2.576 (-2.576) standing for statistical significance in a 99 % confidence interval based 
of simple t-test. 
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The increase is around five percentage after the financial crisis, which is not as 
significant as the earlier increase in absolute average coefficient was three times 
higher. Although, the high increase in RMW coefficient shows the hints of a trend, as 
the increasing importance of RMW factor is revealed on the size and operating 
profitability sorts.  
Joint examination of market excess return factor and SMB coefficients show a similar 
story as seen on the BE/ME sort. MKT and SMB explanation power decreases coming 
to the second period and increases again in period three. HML factor follows the 
similar pattern as it is on absolute average terms (0.161) with 24 significant 
coefficients at control period, increasing to (0.186) with 23 significant coefficients on 
the second period and again decreasing to (0.158) with 24 significant coefficients at 
the period three. Absolute CMA coefficient drops from the control period (0.129) with 
22 significant coefficients to second (0.106) with 18 significant coefficients and to last 
(0.067) with 17 significant coefficients. Which is almost twice as high decrease 
compared to a decrease from the control period to period two. This drop and decrease 
on significant coefficients are close to suggesting CMA as unimportant risk factor 
explain returns in this sort at period three. Increase in RMW coefficients can be seen 
significant also as HML and CMA seem to lose their explanatory powers to the other 
factors coming from period two to period three on all sorts studied on this thesis. 
Second, taking a view on the single coefficients and extreme categories of sorts. SMB 
factor performs better once again in explaining the returns of firms in smallest size 
column and decreases closer to zero in the biggest size column coming to last period. 
HML factor variates highly around the single coefficients on this sort, still providing 
23-24 significant coefficients on every period. Most negative HML coefficients are 
located in the lowest operating profitability row, which is similar to findings in BE/ME 
sorts as growth firms seem to be unprofitable ones on average. Thus, most of the 
growth firms can be found from the lowest operating profitability rows on this sort. 
As hints are given on the joint examination, CMA (investment factor) changes are 
large between the first two periods (tables 9,10) and period three (table 11). On the 
period one (table 9) firms on smallest and biggest size columns seem to have positive 
loadings on CMA factor excluding the extreme OP rows in the biggest size column, 
60 
which have negative coefficients to CMA. On period two (table 10) lowest operating 
profitability firms’ row in the smallest and biggest size columns turn more extreme 
compared to other coefficients. Small firms have positive loadings and big firms highly 
negative loadings on CMA factor. Coming to the period three (table 10) CMA factor 
seems to lose its power on explaining returns in size and operating profitability sorts 
as coefficients turn closer to zero, extreme coefficients disappear, and there are only 
17 statistically significant coefficients in the period three.  
Size and operating profitability portfolio sort provide visible patterns in the RMW 
factor loadings as expected. Lowest operating profitability row has highly negative 
coefficients, which are steady on the three biggest size categories trough periods. Big 
changes in single coefficients are visible in two smallest size columns as negative 
coefficients decrease from (-0.415 to -0.667) and (-0.503 to -0.845) between the 
second (table 10) and third period (table 11). Suggesting small unprofitable firms turn 
more unprofitable in the third period. On highest operating profitability row, 
coefficients increase systematically from the control period (table 9) to the third 
period. Similar as seen in the joint examination. The only expectation is the biggest 
size column where coefficient at highest operating profitability row lowers throughout 
the periods. These results show some signs of the increasing importance of profitability 
factor in explaining average returns. Differences in average returns between low and 
high profitability firms, however, were very small among different sorts in the third 
period although regression coefficients reveal many differences between 
characteristics of these firms on different portfolios of this sort. 
5.3.4 Highlights on size and operating profitability tests 
Risk factor return patterns disappear in period three also in size and operating 
profitability sorts. The average returns in period one and two provide strong evidence 
of the fact that average returns are associated with the operating profitability of the 
firm. But this profitability effect seems to fade away when comparing average returns 
on period three. Size effect pattern is visible only in the second period, providing no 
clear patterns in period one and period three similar to what was seen on the size and 
BE/ME sorts. Performance statics follows a similar story as seen on BE/ME sorts. On 
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period three, FF5 has much higher performance on explaining the average returns 
based on all performance statistics of the regression.  
The coefficient comparison reveals that profitability factor explanation power has 
increased highly between the three periods. The highest increase is between the periods 
one and two. RMW factor is able to increase its power coming to period three, but not 
with the same magnitude as between two first periods. Increase after the financial crisis 
on RMW own sort is around five percentage, which is close to similar as decrease of 
HML on its own sort. I may be that these two factors have changed powers like as 
Novy-Marx (2013b) points out the importance quality on value investing. However, 
differences in average returns were almost invisible between low and high investing 
firms, although regression coefficients reveal many differences between 
characteristics of these firms on different portfolio sorts.  
Other picks from the tests were a high drop of CMA explanation power coming to 
period three. CMA explanation power decreases around forty percentage between 
period two and period three, bringing its coefficients on absolute average terms close 
to zero. On these sorts, CMA has played the most important part in the control period. 
SMB factor performs better once again in explaining the returns of firms in smallest 
size column and decreases closer to zero in the biggest size column coming to period 
three.  
Profitability can be seen as one part of firm quality which is brought up on recent 
studies (e.g. Novy-Marx, Asness et al.) this risk factor is not able to differentiate 
average returns but shows increasing importance on regression tests. Thus, quality 
characteristics seem to play a bigger part in the pricing of firms on the present day 
when compared to earlier periods. 
5.4 Tests on Size and Investment Portfolios 
Tests on the size and investment on 5x5 sorted portfolios are evaluated in this 
subchapter. The structure is similar to the previous chapters. Risk factor patterns in 
this table are not as clear and strong as seen on BE/ME and operating profitability 
sorts. Middle rows of investment seem to have the highest average returns on those 
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tables. However, risk factor patterns in the control period (table 12.a) show support to 
asset growth/investment effect. 
5.4.1 Return patterns 
Table 12.a Period one: Average daily returns on (SIZE&INV) 01/1989 - 12/1998 
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low INV 0,049 0,055 0,064 0,066 0,080 
2 0,056 0,068 0,066 0,063 0,073 
3 0,060 0,057 0,062 0,059 0,067 
4 0,052 0,056 0,055 0,058 0,079 
High INV 0,022 0,040 0,056 0,062 0,084 
      
Table 12.b Period two: Average daily returns on (SIZE&INV) 01/1999 - 12/2008 
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low INV 0,048 0,034 0,029 0,030 0,011 
2 0,045 0,036 0,037 0,025 0,015 
3 0,055 0,050 0,036 0,032 0,014 
4 0,044 0,045 0,039 0,043 0,014 
High INV 0,007 0,005 0,009 0,014 -0,014 
      
Table 12.c Period three: Average daily returns on (SIZE&INV) 01/2009 - 12/2018 
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low INV 0,060 0,062 0,063 0,061 0,061 
2 0,062 0,060 0,058 0,065 0,046 
3 0,063 0,061 0,066 0,066 0,051 
4 0,047 0,063 0,060 0,061 0,051 
High INV 0,040 0,056 0,056 0,064 0,068 
 
Table twelve presents average daily returns for 25 portfolios sorted by size measured as market capitalization 
and the investments measured as change in total assets for three different 120-month time periods. Table a 
presenting the returns on the control/first period, table b presenting returns on the period two (before the financial 
crisis breakpoint) and table c presenting results on the period three (after the financial crisis). 
Firms on investment rows one and two have higher returns on the first four size 
columns than firms that are located in higher rows of investment. Biggest size column 
excludes this effect by having slightly higher returns on the highest investment row 
than in the lowest investment row. Period one also reveals that investment row three, 
which stands for average investing firms has the highest or close to the highest returns 
on all size columns. The size effect reverses in this sort and period as firms in bigger 
size columns have higher average returns than firms on smaller size columns.  
Period two (table 12.b) provides more interesting results on average returns. 
Investment effect is supported once again with low investing firms having significantly 
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higher returns in all size columns on extreme investment rows. But the pattern of 
investment effect is not that straightforward. Highest returns in the second period are 
found from the investment rows three and four. Extremely low investing firms have a 
bit lower returns than firms on investment rows three and four. Highest investment 
row provides close to zero returns on all size columns turning negative on the biggest 
size column. Similar to other sorts, the size effect is once again visible in the second 
period as smaller the size column higher the return. 
Period three (table 12.c) follows to be characteristic with low return dispersion as all 
size and investment categories seem to perform pretty well. But this period three size 
and investment sorts, seem to differentiate from book-to-market and operating 
profitability sorts as investment effects are mildly visible on the first three size 
columns. Lowest investment row provides a steady return (0.061) on average, which 
beats the returns of firms on the high investing rows on the first three size columns, 
slightly losing on bigger size columns. Two lowest investment rows perform well and 
steadily as seen on the other periods too, but investment row three seems to have the 
highest returns on the three size columns out of five. 
Differences between the (01/1999 - 12/2008) and (01/2009 - 12/2018) are visible in 
the tables, although tables are closer to each other than in the other sorts when 
evaluating risk factor return patterns. Biggest size column seems to underperform in 
the second period compared to control and the last period. On period three, the biggest 
size column has taken it returns back. Strong returns of the investment row three and 
lower dispersion of average returns between differently investing firms are visible in 
the last period suggesting investment effect is not as strong on all market states similar 
to other risk factors. In period three (table 12.c) investment extreme rows, on three 
smallest size columns, low investing firms beat the high investing firms, but on the 
two biggest size columns effect reverses. Differentiation of firms with investment and 
size categories seem to work on extremes in case of small or medium-sized firms. But 
this differentiation achieves not too much as average investing (investment row three) 
firms beat those extremes nearly in every case studied here. Size effect seems to 
disappear again as we come to period three, finding support only from the second 
period from size and investment sorted portfolios. 
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5.4.2 Performance of FF5 
Table 13.a Period one: Adjusted R2 values for regression (SIZE&INV) 01/1989 - 12/1998 
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low INV 0,866 0,872 0,803 0,816 0,833 
2 0,806 0,853 0,827 0,848 0,927 
3 0,794 0,841 0,863 0,878 0,925 
4 0,838 0,899 0,894 0,885 0,932 
High INV 0,905 0,953 0,925 0,882 0,939 
      
Table 13.b Period two: Adjusted R2 values for regression (SIZE&INV) 01/1999 - 12/2008 
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low INV 0,905 0,958 0,914 0,901 0,894 
2 0,920 0,932 0,911 0,892 0,932 
3 0,913 0,950 0,921 0,909 0,925 
4 0,930 0,956 0,924 0,895 0,941 
High INV 0,908 0,961 0,938 0,918 0,959 
      
Table 13.c Period three: Adjusted R2 values for regression (SIZE&INV) 01/2009 - 12/2018 
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low INV 0,953 0,962 0,929 0,928 0,933 
2 0,952 0,968 0,952 0,947 0,945 
3 0,942 0,964 0,957 0,948 0,962 
4 0,947 0,974 0,962 0,944 0,970 
High INV 0,953 0,972 0,954 0,929 0,939 
 
Table thirteen presents the adjusted R2 values of the 25 regressions made to portfolios sorted on size measured 
as market capitalization and investments measured as change in total assets for three different 120-month time 
periods. Table a presenting the returns on the control/first period, table b presenting returns on the period two 
(before the financial crisis breakpoint) and table c presenting results on the period three (after the financial crisis). 
For a detailed description of the adjusted R2 value check the first part of chapter 4. Asset pricing models. 
FF5 performance follows similar patterns as seen before in the regressions made to 
book-to-market and operating profitability sorts. Control period (table 13.a) provides 
the worst performance with six significant intercepts and average absolute intercept of 
(0.007). Adjusted R2 average is (0.872), and dispersion is again large as (0.159) 
between the lowest and highest R2 value. Significant intercepts decrease and adjusted 
R2 increases, coming to period two (table 13.b). Performance is lower compared to the 
control period in the absolute intercept category as it rises to (0.009) on period two, 
despite a high increase in R2 values which dispersion decreases to (0.068).  
On period three (table 13.c), high performance is confirmed in size and investment 
sorts also. Period three table shows the best performance with (0.005) average absolute 
intercepts, high adjusted R2 on (0.951) on average and dispersion of R2 values only 
(0.035). What was different from the BE/ME and operating profitability sorts, there 
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were (3) significant intercepts on the period three regressions despite the high 
explanatory power of the model. Two out of three of those significant intercept values 
were found from the middle investment row, which was already pointed out on the 
average returns. Those intercept values were positive, suggesting these firms in the 
middle investment row seem to have some advantage on average returns compared to 
other categories of size and investment on this sort. 
5.4.3 Factor loadings 
Below on tables fourteen, fifteen and sixteen, the regression outcomes from tests on 
size and investments are reported.  
First, starting with joint examination. Evaluating the importance of the CMA 
(investment factor) starts with absolute average coefficients. It increases from the 
control period (0.279) with 22 significant coefficients to (0.281) into the second period 
with 23 significant coefficients. The slightly higher increase is present in the last period 
as the average absolute coefficient rises to (0.285) with 21 significant coefficients. 
Suggesting CMA factor has pretty steady explanatory power around periods in its own 
sort made by size and investments. Movements of CMA factor are not even close as 
high as the increase in the explanatory power of RMW in the sorts of size and operating 
profitability or decrease of HML on its own sort. Similar average absolute figures for 
RMW factor in this sort are following (0.131) with 21 significant coefficients in the 
period one, sharp rise to (0.170) in period two with 23 significant coefficients and 
decrease to (0.144) in period three with 20 significant coefficients.  
Average factor loadings for the market, HML, and SMB factors provide similar story 
as before, and movements of these factors seem to be robust trends as those are visible 
on all three 5x5 sorts. The market drives more returns on period three (table 16) than 
on the two first periods (table 14, 15) also in the sorts of size and investment. Market 
factor average coefficient is (0.992) in (table 14) which lowers to (0.987) in (table 15) 
and rises to (1.002) in (table 16). SMB has also a sharp increase in average absolute 
coefficients between the second and the third period. SMB average absolute coefficient 
rises from the second period (0.581) to (0.610) in the third period, which is very close 
to the control period value of (0.609). 
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  a      t(a)   
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size    Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low INV 0,003 -0,002 -0,006 -0,003 0,004  Low INV 0,576 -0,330 -0,843 -0,389 0,572 
2 0,009 0,012 0,007 -0,002 -0,001  2 1,825 2,443 1,383 -0,382 -0,291 
3 0,012 0,004 0,003 -0,007 -0,013  3 2,244 0,773 0,625 -1,429 -2,806 
4 0,006 0,006 -0,001 -0,003 0,006  4 1,136 1,299 -0,185 -0,616 1,211 
High INV -0,024 -0,010 0,004 0,006 0,017  High INV -4,895 -2,406 0,688 0,894 3,243 
  b      t(b)   
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size    Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low INV 1,004 1,132 1,218 1,059 1,090  Low INV 94,346 102,114 83,141 85,648 80,989 
2 0,798 0,920 0,900 0,926 0,973  2 80,708 98,402 90,686 94,650 119,207 
3 0,798 0,874 0,942 0,981 1,028  3 78,074 91,598 99,047 105,315 112,826 
4 0,854 0,941 1,010 1,011 0,972  4 86,515 108,113 103,913 95,720 107,287 
High INV 1,019 1,150 1,154 1,111 0,944  High INV 107,417 143,664 105,705 80,564 92,512 
  s      t(s)   
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size    Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low INV 0,987 0,963 0,745 0,353 -0,091  Low INV 66,172 61,949 36,297 20,382 -4,798 
2 0,811 0,827 0,571 0,279 -0,243  2 58,430 63,084 41,011 20,354 -21,255 
3 0,799 0,786 0,631 0,293 -0,249  3 55,744 58,716 47,305 22,453 -19,472 
4 0,848 0,866 0,691 0,307 -0,287  4 61,272 70,975 50,686 20,707 -22,565 
High INV 1,012 1,030 0,805 0,444 -0,297  High INV 76,123 91,729 52,625 22,964 -20,742 
  h      t(h)   
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size    Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low INV -0,050 0,000 0,234 0,301 -0,128  Low INV -2,325 -0,005 7,902 12,039 -4,718 
2 0,129 0,188 0,257 0,307 -0,108  2 6,457 9,960 12,840 15,539 -6,541 
3 0,192 0,283 0,332 0,374 0,095  3 9,281 14,690 17,283 19,877 5,160 
4 0,101 0,170 0,191 0,214 0,019  4 5,053 9,704 9,725 10,029 1,060 
High INV -0,036 -0,119 -0,128 -0,086 -0,108  High INV -1,860 -7,374 -5,826 -3,083 -5,255 
  r      t(r)   
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size    Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low INV -0,364 -0,196 -0,049 -0,076 -0,190  Low INV -14,515 -7,524 -1,427 -2,625 -6,013 
2 -0,051 0,122 0,040 -0,001 -0,059  2 -2,176 5,556 1,713 -0,045 -3,071 
3 0,004 0,082 0,070 -0,071 0,167  3 0,158 3,656 3,113 -3,244 7,798 
4 -0,110 -0,061 -0,124 -0,186 0,046  4 -4,717 -2,959 -5,417 -7,479 2,135 
High INV -0,268 -0,247 -0,313 -0,327 0,061  High INV -11,991 -13,132 -12,188 -10,087 2,535 
  c      t(c)   
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size    Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low INV 0,296 0,358 0,295 0,229 0,838  Low INV 12,700 14,778 9,203 8,472 28,459 
2 0,184 0,195 0,131 0,122 0,627  2 8,494 9,525 6,040 5,685 35,134 
3 0,116 -0,001 -0,081 0,001 0,173  3 5,198 -0,058 -3,890 0,048 8,662 
4 0,112 -0,131 -0,229 -0,293 -0,197  4 5,183 -6,876 -10,775 -12,656 -9,956 
High INV 0,013 -0,292 -0,540 -0,612 -0,896  High INV 0,640 -16,676 -22,625 -20,271 -40,107 
 
Table fourteen contains regression outcomes from 25 regression on 5x5 sorted portfolios by size and investments in control period of 
(01/1989 – 12/1998). Size variable increases from the left to right from small firms to big firms, size measured as market capitalization. 
Investments increase from up to bottom from low investing firms on the first quantile to the high investing firms in the last quantile. 
Investment level is estimated by percentage change in total assets. The left-hand-side variable in the regression is the excess return from 
each of the portfolios (Ri – Rf) and right-hand-side variables are the Fama-French five factors. RHS factor coefficients, interpreted as factor 
loadings are reported in the table above (a) = regression intercept, (b) = market excess return (market factor), (s) = small-minus-big (size 
factor), (h) = high-minus-low (value factor), (r) = robust-minus-weak (profitability factor), (c) = conservative-minus-aggressive (investment 
factor). For a more detailed description on LHS portfolios and factors check chapter 5.1.2 Variable construction. Regression t-values are 
reported on the right side of the table for each of the variables. Higher or (lower) value than 1.96 (-1.96) standing for statistical significance 
in a 95 % confidence interval based on simple t-test. Higher or (lower) value than 2.576 (-2.576) standing for statistical significance in a 99 
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  a      t(a)   
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size    Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low INV 0,017 -0,001 0,009 0,011 -0,009  Low INV 1,798 -0,207 0,949 1,242 -0,965 
2 0,004 -0,005 0,005 -0,001 -0,003  2 0,639 -0,705 0,688 -0,080 -0,409 
3 0,013 0,008 0,005 0,009 -0,002  3 1,809 1,264 0,635 1,170 -0,315 
4 0,004 0,005 0,014 0,023 0,002  4 0,637 0,825 1,769 2,549 0,278 
High INV -0,022 -0,016 0,007 0,027 0,005  High INV -2,578 -2,394 0,807 2,538 0,747 
  b      t(b)   
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size    Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low INV 0,926 1,156 1,044 0,996 1,016  Low INV 113,340 188,861 132,383 128,991 130,874 
2 0,836 1,014 0,968 0,979 0,978  2 139,648 160,622 139,038 131,908 171,685 
3 0,819 1,037 0,973 0,935 0,959  3 133,558 183,651 152,787 141,954 160,632 
4 0,855 1,043 1,016 1,006 1,083  4 147,980 195,928 149,311 128,637 178,218 
High INV 0,881 1,058 1,036 1,088 0,980  High INV 119,550 185,679 139,727 116,955 171,028 
  s      t(s)   
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size    Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low INV 1,005 1,077 0,577 0,183 -0,198  Low INV 64,890 92,835 38,620 12,491 -13,486 
2 0,883 0,853 0,587 0,153 -0,142  2 77,799 71,254 44,493 10,889 -13,119 
3 0,899 0,989 0,545 0,255 -0,179  3 77,313 92,399 45,132 20,428 -15,782 
4 0,916 0,961 0,622 0,328 -0,154  4 83,647 95,322 48,234 22,113 -13,348 
High INV 0,927 0,966 0,649 0,354 -0,136  High INV 66,379 89,516 46,181 20,056 -12,488 
  h      t(h)   
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size    Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low INV 0,067 0,107 0,051 0,248 -0,078  Low INV 4,272 9,171 3,399 16,806 -5,296 
2 0,280 0,217 0,244 0,217 -0,077  2 24,467 17,984 18,391 15,344 -7,038 
3 0,300 0,188 0,203 0,210 0,038  3 25,642 17,490 16,684 16,700 3,347 
4 0,267 0,241 0,053 0,087 0,100  4 24,248 23,769 4,049 5,847 8,648 
High INV 0,116 -0,021 -0,092 -0,170 -0,095  High INV 8,251 -1,889 -6,482 -9,579 -8,712 
  r      t(r)   
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size    Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low INV -0,397 -0,264 -0,341 -0,317 -0,117  Low INV -21,948 -19,466 -19,537 -18,533 -6,809 
2 0,044 0,132 -0,034 0,028 0,150  2 3,310 9,448 -2,216 1,719 11,917 
3 0,129 0,091 0,132 0,020 0,257  3 9,472 7,283 9,358 1,337 19,407 
4 0,041 0,167 0,062 0,043 0,260  4 3,236 14,171 4,085 2,509 19,303 
High INV -0,143 -0,190 -0,307 -0,486 -0,106  High INV -8,786 -15,067 -18,701 -23,576 -8,314 
  c      t(c)   
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size    Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low INV 0,360 0,341 0,332 0,476 0,998  Low INV 16,218 20,480 15,510 22,710 47,335 
2 0,158 0,206 0,238 0,415 0,553  2 9,728 11,997 12,606 20,597 35,738 
3 0,082 0,175 0,133 0,211 0,255  3 4,949 11,405 7,701 11,797 15,690 
4 0,084 -0,022 0,008 0,081 0,046  4 5,362 -1,533 0,416 3,800 2,796 
High INV -0,045 -0,195 -0,417 -0,445 -0,737  High INV -2,244 -12,597 -20,695 -17,608 -47,303 
 
Table fifteen contains regression outcomes from 25 regression on 5x5 sorted portfolios by size and investments in period two of (01/1999 
– 12/2008). Size variable increases from the left to right from small firms to big firms, size measured as market capitalization. Investments 
increase from up to bottom from low investing firms on the first quantile to the high investing firms in the last quantile. Investment level is 
estimated by percentage change in total assets. The left-hand-side variable in the regression is the excess return from each of the portfolios 
(Ri – Rf) and right-hand-side variables are the Fama-French five factors. RHS factor coefficients, interpreted as factor loadings are reported 
in the table above (a) = regression intercept, (b) = market excess return (market factor), (s) = small-minus-big (size factor), (h) = high-
minus-low (value factor), (r) = robust-minus-weak (profitability factor), (c) = conservative-minus-aggressive (investment factor). For a 
more detailed description on LHS portfolios and factors check chapter 5.1.2 Variable construction. Regression t-values are reported on the 
right side of the table for each of the variables. Higher or (lower) value than 1.96 (-1.96) standing for statistical significance in a 95 % 
confidence interval based on simple t-test. Higher or (lower) value than 2.576 (-2.576) standing for statistical significance in a 99 % 
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  a      t(a)   
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size    Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low INV 0,004 -0,004 0,000 -0,001 0,006  Low INV 0,561 -0,646 -0,020 -0,163 1,031 
2 0,011 0,002 -0,001 0,005 -0,008  2 1,793 0,377 -0,258 0,982 -1,760 
3 0,013 0,003 0,012 0,011 -0,002  3 1,932 0,571 2,298 2,126 -0,441 
4 -0,003 0,005 0,001 0,003 -0,004  4 -0,555 1,190 0,222 0,531 -1,161 
High INV -0,012 -0,003 -0,004 0,002 0,010  High INV -1,986 -0,642 -0,612 0,287 1,693 
  b      t(b)   
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size    Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low INV 0,967 1,140 1,105 1,104 1,005  Low INV 128,656 158,240 125,726 135,110 152,610 
2 0,890 1,007 1,030 1,045 0,958  2 128,925 173,342 156,958 162,890 176,832 
3 0,866 0,997 0,958 0,977 0,946  3 114,598 164,393 164,671 166,109 209,788 
4 0,869 1,000 1,026 1,027 0,998  4 121,843 193,432 176,756 158,239 232,751 
High INV 0,912 1,025 1,043 1,096 1,049  High INV 127,595 180,667 154,774 133,183 155,503 
  s      t(s)   
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size    Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low INV 1,104 1,017 0,599 0,260 -0,144  Low INV 84,152 80,895 39,065 18,218 -12,524 
2 1,044 0,944 0,593 0,243 -0,177  2 86,655 93,022 51,778 21,673 -18,670 
3 1,055 0,942 0,561 0,214 -0,149  3 79,945 88,977 55,254 20,869 -18,929 
4 1,038 0,939 0,607 0,273 -0,158  4 83,345 104,039 59,918 24,080 -21,104 
High INV 1,062 0,964 0,671 0,338 -0,152  High INV 85,129 97,343 57,014 23,548 -12,907 
  h      t(h)   
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size    Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low INV -0,018 0,023 0,019 0,019 -0,024  Low INV -1,383 1,830 1,264 1,357 -2,149 
2 0,195 0,154 0,077 0,033 -0,077  2 16,398 15,443 6,838 2,968 -8,283 
3 0,262 0,153 0,162 0,060 0,039  3 20,139 14,629 16,198 5,956 4,970 
4 0,255 0,202 0,048 -0,014 0,064  4 20,770 22,675 4,765 -1,277 8,673 
High INV -0,056 -0,136 -0,102 -0,111 -0,159  High INV -4,531 -13,911 -8,777 -7,820 -13,655 
  r      t(r)   
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size    Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low INV -0,467 -0,290 -0,195 -0,156 -0,133  Low INV -21,565 -13,988 -7,710 -6,640 -7,001 
2 -0,035 0,054 0,022 0,041 -0,008  2 -1,769 3,242 1,165 2,215 -0,502 
3 0,003 0,115 0,132 0,095 0,096  3 0,132 6,563 7,874 5,610 7,426 
4 0,017 0,136 0,084 0,065 0,100  4 0,846 9,130 5,050 3,480 8,096 
High INV -0,471 -0,341 -0,211 -0,204 -0,130  High INV -22,908 -20,859 -10,895 -8,599 -6,712 
  c      t(c)   
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size    Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low INV 0,328 0,452 0,496 0,517 0,685  Low INV 13,502 19,385 17,458 19,574 32,162 
2 0,108 0,162 0,292 0,267 0,557  2 4,830 8,614 13,735 12,847 31,792 
3 -0,061 0,061 0,047 0,160 0,139  3 -2,489 3,115 2,504 8,415 9,498 
4 -0,214 -0,170 -0,064 -0,029 -0,189  4 -9,292 -10,188 -3,400 -1,390 -13,656 
High INV -0,327 -0,400 -0,338 -0,319 -0,735  High INV -14,165 -21,801 -15,490 -11,997 -33,708 
 
Table sixteen contains regression outcomes from 25 regression on 5x5 sorted portfolios by size and investments in period three of (01/2009 
– 12/2018). Size variable increases from the left to right from small firms to big firms, size measured as market capitalization. Investments 
increase from up to bottom from low investing firms on the first quantile to the high investing firms in the last quantile. Investment level is 
estimated by percentage change in total assets. The left-hand-side variable in the regression is the excess return from each of the portfolios 
(Ri – Rf) and right-hand-side variables are the Fama-French five factors. RHS factor coefficients, interpreted as factor loadings are reported 
in the table above (a) = regression intercept, (b) = market excess return (market factor), (s) = small-minus-big (size factor), (h) = high-
minus-low (value factor), (r) = robust-minus-weak (profitability factor), (c) = conservative-minus-aggressive (investment factor). For a 
more detailed description on LHS portfolios and factors check chapter 5.1.2 Variable construction. Regression t-values are reported on the 
right side of the table for each of the variables. Higher or (lower) value than 1.96 (-1.96) standing for statistical significance in a 95 % 
confidence interval based on simple t-test. Higher or (lower) value than 2.576 (-2.576) standing for statistical significance in a 99 % 
confidence interval based on simple t-test. 
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HML factor plays a similar part as on other sorts. The decreasing trend of HML 
explanation power is also observed on these sorts of size and investment. On these 
sorts, HML has slight decrease from period one (0.166) with 22 significant coefficients 
to period two (0.151) with 24 significant coefficients. The decrease is very sharp of 
thirty-five percentages between second and the third period as average absolute 
coefficient lowers to (0.098) with 21 significant coefficients. 
Second, evaluating single coefficients and extremes. Sorts provide CMA loadings as 
expected. Firms in low investment rows have high significant coefficients that increase 
as size increases and firms on high investment rows provide similar negative 
coefficients. The only expectation is the firms on high investment rows on the smallest 
size columns on the first two periods (table 14, 15) as those firms seem to take very 
close to zero loadings to CMA factor. This expectation disappears coming to last 
period (table 16) as coefficient decreases from (-0.045) to (-0.327). Variation is seen 
between the second and third period, but none major changes are visible except for the 
smallest size column. Its CMA coefficients turn from positive or near-zero loadings to 
highly negative on period three. CMA seems to provide the same and steady 
coefficients to both extreme investment rows on absolute average terms of (0.45) what 
is different from other sorts. Thus, CMA factor is as good in explain returns of high 
and low investing firms at least in the extreme categories of investment. 
RMW coefficients seem to provide us with some explanation why the firms on middle 
rows of investment outperform investment extremes on the average return tables 
investigated before. Middle investment row firms seem to have positive coefficients 
on profitability factor as investment extremes have highly negative coefficients of both 
rows of low and high investments. This suggests that main results found in the average 
returns of size and investment sorts are not too much explained with differences in 
levels of investments, moreover those differences are explained with differences in 
operating profitability. As good performance in average returns on middle rows of 
investment on control period (table 12.a) was weaker than in the last two periods, the 
RMW coefficients are also lower in the middle rows at the control period, finding more 
support to statement. 
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5.4.4 Highlights on size and investments tests 
Return patterns in those sorts were interesting. Differences between extremely low and 
high investing firms were visible in all three periods. But not further support was given 
to investment/asset growth effect in general as middle investment rows that seem to 
be more profitable on average (based on RMW coefficients) were able to beat returns 
of extreme categories. RMW, profitability factor loadings were visible on all three 
periods, which suggest that this is the difference that mainly drives the results on 
average returns on size and investment sorts. Middle investment rows having positive 
coefficients and extreme categories of investment having negative coefficients on 
profitability. This finding suggests that main results found in the average returns of 
size and investment sorts are not too much explained with differences in levels of 
investments, moreover those differences are explained with differences in operating 
profitability. Performance statics followed the similar story as before confirming the 
robust best performance of FF5 on period three. 
CMA risk factor has pretty steady explanatory power around the different periods in 
its own sort. CMA seems to be as good explaining the returns on high and low 
investing firms and different from other factors it can generate similar explanatory 
power in both directions of extreme. Average coefficients for market factor, HML, and 
SMB factors provide similar story as before, and movements of these factors seem to 
be robust trends as those are visible on all three 5x5 sorts.  
As investments or operating profitability could not provide very strong patterns in 
period three, quality characteristics could be better in the differentiating firms in this 
period three than the other risk factors. This is supported as middle row firms seem to 
have positive coefficients on profitability and extremes having negative coefficients. 
Size effect was only visible on the second period (table 12.b), which follows the same 
results as seen in BE/ME and operating profitability tests. 
5.5 Tests on Size, Operating Profitability and Investment Portfolios 
Below in (table 17) is reported the average monthly returns for Fama-French five 
factors and the risk-free rate at the same period. This subchapter follows the same 
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structure as the previous analysis chapters, but we focus now on the monthly values 
and their relative changes on portfolios sorted on 2x4x4. Meaning that there are two 
size categories, small and big firms and four categories of operating profitability and 
investments. These sorts result in thirty-two different portfolios. 
Table 17.a Average monthly returns on Fama-French five factors and the risk-free rate on 
time period of (01/1989 – 12/1998) 
  MR – Rf  SMB HML RMW CMA Rf 
Average 1,056 -0,330 0,189 0,395 0,123 0,431 
Stand. Dev. 3,918 2,637 2,317 1,388 1,786 0,138 
Median 1,305 -0,410 0,110 0,445 -0,005 0,420 
       
Table 17.b Average monthly returns on Fama-French five factors and the risk-free rate on 
time period of (01/1999 – 12/2008) 
  MR – Rf  SMB HML RMW CMA Rf 
Average -0,217 0,604 0,437 0,516 0,501 0,264 
Stand. Dev. 4,542 3,736 3,642 3,940 2,669 0,146 
Median 0,700 0,290 0,100 0,520 0,140 0,275 
       
Table 17.c Average monthly returns on Fama-French five factors and the risk-free rate on 
time period of (01/2009 – 12/2018) 
  MR – Rf  SMB HML RMW CMA Rf 
Average 1,106 0,071 -0,163 0,107 0,024 0,026 
Stand. Dev. 4,041 2,480 2,657 1,542 1,465 0,047 
Median 1,325 0,165 -0,275 0,120 -0,020 0,010 
 
Table seventeen presents average monthly returns, median monthly returns, and standard deviation of return 
for Fama-French risk-factors and the risk-free rate for three time periods evaluated in this thesis. For detailed 
description of factors check chapter 5.1.2 Variable construction.   
Average returns on the factors are discussed on a daily basis at chapter 5.1.3 and not 
repeated here. Most important changes between the periods are in the low average of 
the risk-free rate in period three (table 17.c) that definitely has an effect on the equity 
market and actions of its participants. 
5.5.1 Return patterns 
Sorts of thirty-two portfolios provide more information about the operating 
profitability and investments effects not focusing too much on size, which should help 
in giving additional information to the analysis. The analysis focuses on extremes and 
their averages, giving a new approach to the evaluation of return patterns. A new 
approach should be beneficial as extremes on operating profitability and investment 
are larger in 2x4x4 sorts as firms are sorted in four categories instead of five. 
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Table 18.a Period one: Average monthly returns on (SIZE&OP&INV) 01/1989 - 12/1998 
  SMALL    BIG  
  Low OP 2 3 High OP  Low OP 2 3 High OP 
Low INV 0,955 1,493 1,619 1,640  1,754 1,536 1,488 1,778 
2 1,293 1,219 1,465 1,478  1,108 1,338 1,521 1,572 
3 0,580 1,328 1,367 1,441  1,658 1,307 1,445 1,861 
High INV 0,174 1,043 1,254 1,205  1,268 1,354 1,579 1,902 
          
Table 18.b Period two: Average monthly returns on (SIZE&OP&INV) 01/1999 - 12/2008 
  SMALL    BIG  
  Low OP 2 3 High OP  Low OP 2 3 High OP 
Low INV 0,680 0,933 1,065 0,913  0,189 0,605 0,334 0,139 
2 0,974 0,984 0,624 0,638  -0,290 0,355 0,629 0,271 
3 0,496 1,047 0,941 1,030  0,327 0,156 0,259 0,180 
High INV -0,307 0,527 0,737 0,811  -0,510 -0,276 -0,066 0,188 
          
Table 18.c Period three: Average monthly returns on (SIZE&OP&INV) 01/2009 - 12/2018 
  SMALL    BIG  
  Low OP 2 3 High OP  Low OP 2 3 High OP 
Low INV 1,131 1,245 1,237 1,460  0,880 1,050 1,313 1,313 
2 1,302 1,168 1,177 1,293  1,087 1,191 1,111 1,112 
3 1,261 1,241 1,120 1,165  1,046 1,179 0,944 0,785 
High INV 0,884 1,038 1,282 1,074  1,220 1,249 1,467 1,421 
 
Table eighteen presents average monthly returns for 32 portfolios sorted by size measured as market 
capitalization, operating profitability and the investments measured as change in total assets for three different 
120-month time periods. Table a presenting the returns on the control/first period, table b presenting returns on 
the period two (before the financial crisis breakpoint) and table c presenting results on the period three (after the 
financial crisis). 
In these sorts, the investment effect is not so visible as the effect can be seen only on 
two out of six sets of sixteen portfolios. On the period one (table 18.a) using the whole 
investing rows on extremes (low and high levels of investment) of each operating 
profitability columns, the high investing firms beat low investing firms in small firms’ 
category. This fact is the same for period two (table 18.b) and period three (table 18.c). 
Support to investment effect is given by big firms in periods one and two, as on these 
portfolio sets the low investing firms beat high investing firms on average. But this 
effect disappears again in period three as high investing firms beat low investing firms 
on average. Thus, support to investment effect in average returns is limited also in 
those tests of the three variate sorts.  
Operating profitability and effect of higher average returns of high operating 
profitability firms is strongly supported in these sorts. In every period and average 
returns of extreme operating profitability columns (comparing low OP and high OP 
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columns), high operating profitability firms beat the low operating profitability firms. 
The difference in average returns between low operating profitability and high 
operating profitability firms is much lower in period three, but still visible and 
supported.  
Evaluating size effect takes now a broader view only dividing firms into two quantiles 
based on the NYSE market capital breakpoints. As expected by hints on 5x5 sorts in 
the period one (table 18.a), big firms beat the small firms and small firms beat big 
firms on the period two (table 18.b) on average returns like seen on other sorts. An 
expectation to earlier findings is that in the period three (table 18.c) the small firms 
beat big firms in all extreme categories excluding the high investment category as big 
high investing firms beat small high investing firms. On other categories, small firms 
have higher returns on low investing rows, low operating profitability columns and 
high operating profitability columns. Thus, in the period three size effect is visible on 
three out of four comparisons of risk factor extremes. Another important pick is the 
very low average returns on the big size category in period two and lower returns of 
small firms in the same period. On the period three returns are less dispersed as seen 
on all sorts, but these sorts still provide some patterns in returns when using these three 
characteristics to differentiate firms.  
5.5.2 Performance of FF5 
Evaluating the performance of the FF5 model in the three-variate sort portfolios 
reveals additional information to the analysis. It needs to be noticed, that these 
regressions are made with twenty times fewer observations than regressions in the 5x5 
sorts with daily data which most surely has an effect on the FF5 performance. 
Although main differences found in the 2x4x4 sorts is the much weaker performance 
of FF5 model in explaining the big size firms than the small-sized firms. This is very 
much the opposite than the findings in the previous studies that used the monthly data. 
On previous studies, FF5 had difficulties in explaining excess returns of small firms, 
not the big firms.  
 
On three-variate sorts, period two FF5 model performance (table 19.b) lowers near to 
the control period (table 19.a) in explaining excess returns. 
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Table 19.a Period one: Adj. R2 values for regressions (SIZE&OP&INV) 01/1989 - 12/1998 
  SMALL    BIG  
  Low OP 2 3 High OP  Low OP 2 3 High OP 
Low INV 0,933 0,863 0,821 0,886  0,847 0,730 0,797 0,853 
2 0,895 0,900 0,902 0,920  0,848 0,795 0,850 0,859 
3 0,901 0,915 0,942 0,933  0,887 0,803 0,888 0,896 
High INV 0,936 0,937 0,960 0,973  0,876 0,849 0,871 0,872 
          
Table 19.b Period two: Adj. R2 values for regressions (SIZE&OP&INV) 01/1999 - 12/2008 
  SMALL    BIG  
  Low OP 2 3 High OP  Low OP 2 3 High OP 
Low INV 0,969 0,899 0,838 0,825  0,842 0,800 0,735 0,744 
2 0,941 0,917 0,878 0,881  0,714 0,790 0,806 0,713 
3 0,940 0,913 0,919 0,914  0,814 0,784 0,676 0,626 
High INV 0,964 0,921 0,930 0,934  0,916 0,838 0,793 0,830 
          
Table 19.c Period three: Adj. R2 values for regressions (SIZE&OP&INV) 01/2009 - 12/2018 
  SMALL    BIG  
  Low OP 2 3 High OP  Low OP 2 3 High OP 
Low INV 0,924 0,931 0,880 0,911  0,902 0,870 0,865 0,901 
2 0,926 0,944 0,945 0,949  0,854 0,866 0,892 0,877 
3 0,914 0,958 0,952 0,948  0,893 0,849 0,908 0,872 
High INV 0,932 0,942 0,959 0,948  0,901 0,855 0,875 0,830 
 
Table nineteen presents the adjusted R2 values of the 32 regressions made to portfolios sorted on size measured 
as market capitalization, operating profitability and investments measured as change in total assets for three 
different 120-month time periods. Table a presenting the returns on the control/first period, table b presenting 
returns on the period two (before the financial crisis breakpoint) and table c presenting results on the period three 
(after the financial crisis). For a detailed description of the adjusted R2 value check the first part of chapter 4. 
Asset pricing models. 
 
The period one has six significant intercepts, average adjusted R2 of (0.879) and 
dispersion between the lowest and highest value of R2 at (0.243). FF5 performs 
extremely well with R2 of (0.973) in the category of small firms with on high 
investments and high operating profitability, which are targeted on these sorts. In 
period two (table 19.b), the R2 dispersion increases to (0.342) and average adjusted R2 
decreases to (0.844). There are two significant intercept values with the average 
absolute intercept value of (0.169). However, a dramatic increase in R2 dispersion and 
much lower performance explaining the returns of big sized firms (average R2 on big 
firms is only 0.776) questions the performance of FF5 in explaining the average excess 
returns with low-frequency data at shorter periods. 
 
Once again, period three (table 19.c) provides the significantly highest performance of 
the model. Average absolute intercept is (0.123) in a month, with two significant 
values. Adjusted R2 increases to (0.905) on average. A most significant change 
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between the second and the third period is much lower R2 dispersion, which is only 
(0.13). FF5 is pretty steady at explaining the returns of firms with different 
characteristics in the last period. Main findings of these three-variate sorts are 
significantly lower performance of FF5 in explaining low-frequency returns of big 
firms compared to small firms. 
5.5.3 Factor loadings 
Below on tables twenty to twenty-five the regression outcomes are reported. As 
discussed before in performance evaluation, because there is much less data, these 
outcomes have much less significant coefficients which make it much more difficult 
to compare those periods in terms of single coefficients or using joint examination. 
Results on these tests should be only seen as supportive to analysis on 5x5 portfolios. 
In 2x4x4 sorts RMW seems to play important part in explanation of returns. High and 
low operating profitability columns seem provide significant results as most of the 
RMW coefficients are statistically significant in both small and big size categories. 
CMA has weak performance in case of significant coefficients in smaller size category, 
however, on big firms’ category, there is much more significant CMA coefficients 
despite the average low performance of FF5 model. In small firms’ category all market 
excess return and SMB coefficients are again significant. There are nineteen 
significant HML coefficients on the second period (table 21) and on the period three 
(table 22). On the first period (table 20) HML has only seven significant coefficients. 
On big firm’s category importance of SMB and HML factors decrease significantly.  
Using joint examination as the evaluation of absolute average slopes on these three 
periods reveals that market explanatory power on returns has varied a bit differently 
than in daily data. On small firms, average MKT coefficients have been (1.001), 
(1,030), (1,008). And a similar trend is seen on the big firms (0.996), (1,038), (1,005). 
Market captures most variation in the second period which is direct opposite from the 
daily tests as market had the lowest average coefficient on second period. But as the 
daily data has twenty times more observations conclusions can be made that MKT 
factor captures variation that is left unexplained by other factors in low frequently data 




Table 20. Period one: Small firms, regression on portfolios formed on size, operating profitability 
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SMALL SIZED FIRMS: 
 a   t(a) 
SMALL  Low OP 2 3 High OP   SMALL Low OP 2 3 High OP 
Low INV -0,061 0,138 0,245 0,201  Low INV -0,385 0,750 1,286 1,188 
2 0,217 -0,037 0,265 0,045  2 1,182 -0,298 2,271 0,359 
3 -0,563 0,134 0,169 0,145  3 -3,277 1,006 1,692 1,242 
High INV -0,548 0,004 0,035 -0,062  High INV -3,039 0,028 0,299 -0,626 
 b   t(b) 
SMALL  Low OP 2 3 High OP   SMALL Low OP 2 3 High OP 
Low INV 1,137 1,054 0,945 1,104  Low INV 24,224 19,458 16,854 22,224 
2 1,048 0,881 0,805 0,958  2 19,412 23,849 23,474 26,050 
3 1,072 0,949 0,868 0,917  3 21,228 24,242 29,604 26,683 
High INV 1,117 1,022 1,065 1,081  High INV 21,081 23,733 30,954 37,012 
 s   t(s) 
SMALL  Low OP 2 3 High OP   SMALL Low OP 2 3 High OP 
Low INV 1,205 0,985 0,872 1,001  Low INV 19,775 14,005 11,973 15,509 
2 0,990 0,668 0,671 0,837  2 14,123 13,924 15,077 17,510 
3 0,887 0,737 0,709 0,760  3 13,527 14,510 18,604 17,026 
High INV 0,949 0,956 0,958 1,055  High INV 13,785 17,092 21,443 27,828 
 h   t(h) 
SMALL  Low OP 2 3 High OP   SMALL Low OP 2 3 High OP 
Low INV -0,243 0,191 0,094 0,089  Low INV -2,602 1,765 0,844 0,902 
2 0,200 0,248 0,315 0,390  2 1,857 3,362 4,614 5,321 
3 -0,069 0,122 0,292 0,336  3 -0,683 1,558 5,002 4,907 
High INV -0,603 -0,154 0,081 0,071  High INV -5,708 -1,789 1,176 1,217 
 r   t(r) 
SMALL  Low OP 2 3 High OP   SMALL Low OP 2 3 High OP 
Low INV -0,615 0,084 0,402 0,170  Low INV -5,353 0,634 2,928 1,397 
2 -0,438 0,109 0,180 0,467  2 -3,317 1,209 2,144 5,182 
3 -0,387 -0,081 0,088 0,277  3 -3,126 -0,848 1,224 3,296 
High INV -1,148 -0,282 0,036 0,195  High INV -8,844 -2,672 0,432 2,721 
 c   t(c) 
SMALL  Low OP 2 3 High OP   SMALL Low OP 2 3 High OP 
Low INV 0,581 0,544 0,458 0,717  Low INV 3,991 3,236 2,634 4,649 
2 0,006 0,205 0,087 0,064  2 0,037 1,791 0,815 0,562 
3 0,306 0,116 -0,049 -0,211  3 1,951 0,953 -0,541 -1,975 
High INV -0,072 -0,126 -0,405 -0,384  High INV -0,439 -0,945 -3,795 -4,235 
 
Table twenty contains regression outcomes from 16 regressions on 2x4x4 sorted portfolios by size, operating 
profitability, and investments in control period of (01/1989 – 12/1998). Size variable is steady around table and 
reported at left upper corner, firms are divided to small and big firms using NYSE breakpoint for market capitalization. 
Investment level increases from top of the table to bottom, from low investing firms on the first quantile to the high 
investing firms in the last quantile. The operating profitability level increases from left to right. The left-hand-side 
variable in the regression is the excess return from each of the portfolios (Ri – Rf) and right-hand-side variables are 
the Fama-French five factors. RHS factor coefficients, interpreted as factor loadings are reported in the table above 
(a) = regression intercept, (b) = market excess return (market factor), (s) = small-minus-big (size factor), (h) = high-
minus-low (value factor), (r) = robust-minus-weak (profitability factor), (c) = conservative-minus-aggressive 
(investment factor). For a more detailed description on LHS portfolios and factors check chapter 5.1.2 Variable 
construction. Regression t-values are reported on the right side of the table for each of the variables. Higher or (lower) 
value than 1.96 (-1.96) standing for statistical significance in a 95 % confidence interval based on simple t-test. Higher 




Table 21. Period one: Big firms, regression on portfolios formed on size, operating profitability 
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BIG SIZED FIRMS: 
 a   t(a) 
BIG  Low OP 2 3 High OP  BIG Low OP 2 3 High OP 
Low INV 0,577 0,255 -0,129 0,007  Low INV 3,242 1,388 -0,747 0,041 
2 -0,124 -0,031 -0,233 -0,313  2 -0,804 -0,195 -1,334 -1,914 
3 0,274 -0,179 -0,287 0,262  3 1,774 -0,893 -1,974 1,798 
High INV -0,014 -0,111 -0,154 0,671  High INV -0,074 -0,539 -0,796 3,457 
 b   t(b) 
BIG Low OP 2 3 High OP    BIG  Low OP 2 3 High OP 
Low INV 0,985 0,827 0,985 1,061  Low INV 18,803 15,311 19,464 22,656 
2 0,904 0,831 1,088 1,081  2 19,958 17,614 21,149 22,443 
3 1,015 0,989 1,074 1,008  3 22,388 16,774 25,133 23,513 
High INV 1,061 1,042 1,137 0,852  High INV 18,884 17,266 19,962 14,918 
 s   t(s) 
BIG Low OP 2 3 High OP    BIG  Low OP 2 3 High OP 
Low INV -0,118 -0,176 -0,128 0,032  Low INV -1,735 -2,503 -1,952 0,533 
2 0,044 -0,207 -0,372 -0,022  2 0,755 -3,383 -5,565 -0,348 
3 -0,259 -0,185 -0,085 -0,179  3 -4,399 -2,420 -1,526 -3,213 
High INV 0,073 0,148 0,101 -0,255  High INV 1,001 1,887 1,367 -3,443 
 h   t(h) 
BIG Low OP 2 3 High OP  BIG Low OP 2 3 High OP 
Low INV -0,074 0,038 -0,135 -0,033  Low INV -0,705 0,353 -1,336 -0,357 
2 0,379 0,132 0,116 -0,208  2 4,191 1,399 1,131 -2,169 
3 0,271 0,297 0,066 -0,219  3 2,999 2,525 0,777 -2,560 
High INV 0,024 0,156 0,263 -0,158  High INV 0,215 1,294 2,319 -1,390 
 r   t(r) 
BIG  Low OP 2 3 High OP   BIG Low OP 2 3 High OP 
Low INV -0,847 -0,353 0,090 0,445  Low INV -6,603 -2,666 0,727 3,882 
2 -0,518 -0,122 0,017 0,694  2 -4,668 -1,058 0,135 5,882 
3 -0,552 -0,190 0,259 0,199  3 -4,971 -1,317 2,474 1,893 
High INV -0,473 0,057 0,375 -0,068  High INV -3,437 0,387 2,684 -0,488 
 c   t(c) 
BIG  Low OP 2 3 High OP   BIG Low OP 2 3 High OP 
Low INV 0,127 0,416 0,759 0,501  Low INV 0,781 2,483 4,832 3,447 
2 -0,053 0,128 0,192 0,587  2 -0,375 0,874 1,204 3,923 
3 -0,302 -0,256 0,197 0,066  3 -2,146 -1,400 1,481 0,499 
High INV -0,508 -0,569 -0,510 -1,027  High INV -2,916 -3,036 -2,881 -5,796 
 
Table twenty-one contains regression outcomes from 16 regressions on 2x4x4 sorted portfolios by size, operating 
profitability, and investments in control period of (01/1989 – 12/1998). Size variable is steady around table and 
reported at left upper corner, firms are divided to small and big firms using NYSE breakpoint for market capitalization. 
Investment level increases from top of the table to bottom, from low investing firms on the first quantile to the high 
investing firms in the last quantile. The operating profitability level increases from left to right. The left-hand-side 
variable in the regression is the excess return from each of the portfolios (Ri – Rf) and right-hand-side variables are 
the Fama-French five factors. RHS factor coefficients, interpreted as factor loadings are reported in the table above 
(a) = regression intercept, (b) = market excess return (market factor), (s) = small-minus-big (size factor), (h) = high-
minus-low (value factor), (r) = robust-minus-weak (profitability factor), (c) = conservative-minus-aggressive 
(investment factor). For a more detailed description on LHS portfolios and factors check chapter 5.1.2 Variable 
construction. Regression t-values are reported on the right side of the table for each of the variables. Higher or (lower) 
value than 1.96 (-1.96) standing for statistical significance in a 95 % confidence interval based on simple t-test. Higher 




Table 22. Period two: Small firms, regression on portfolios formed on size, operating profitability 
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SMALL SIZED FIRMS: 
 a   t(a) 
SMALL  Low OP 2 3 High OP   SMALL Low OP 2 3 High OP 
Low INV 0,227 -0,004 0,072 0,007  Low INV 1,376 -0,021 0,337 0,032 
2 0,397 0,100 -0,240 -0,315  2 2,299 0,734 -1,627 -1,987 
3 -0,062 0,198 0,075 0,163  3 -0,340 1,246 0,599 1,197 
High INV -0,203 -0,116 -0,005 0,030  High INV -1,092 -0,679 -0,035 0,199 
 b   t(b) 
SMALL  Low OP 2 3 High OP   SMALL Low OP 2 3 High OP 
Low INV 1,150 1,117 1,024 1,013  Low INV 24,498 22,879 16,929 17,389 
2 0,945 1,018 0,846 1,004  2 19,198 26,270 20,097 22,206 
3 1,099 0,847 0,905 1,008  3 21,229 18,726 25,229 26,026 
High INV 1,059 1,126 1,075 1,246  High INV 19,951 23,051 24,496 28,864 
 s   t(s) 
SMALL  Low OP 2 3 High OP   SMALL Low OP 2 3 High OP 
Low INV 1,065 0,785 0,840 0,684  Low INV 20,889 14,818 12,800 10,817 
2 0,923 0,681 0,678 0,742  2 17,270 16,209 14,842 15,135 
3 0,960 0,993 0,751 0,792  3 17,099 20,219 19,289 18,838 
High INV 0,936 0,853 0,942 0,944  High INV 16,251 16,090 19,770 20,150 
 h   t(h) 
SMALL  Low OP 2 3 High OP   SMALL Low OP 2 3 High OP 
Low INV -0,207 0,214 0,380 0,463  Low INV -2,868 2,849 4,091 5,173 
2 0,006 0,407 0,378 0,419  2 0,084 6,842 5,842 6,030 
3 -0,019 0,161 0,303 0,336  3 -0,236 2,313 5,498 5,650 
High INV -0,085 0,121 0,234 0,132  High INV -1,043 1,614 3,461 1,990 
 r   t(r) 
SMALL  Low OP 2 3 High OP   SMALL Low OP 2 3 High OP 
Low INV -0,756 0,224 0,252 0,287  Low INV -10,433 2,977 2,702 3,197 
2 -0,472 0,239 0,217 0,444  2 -6,214 3,994 3,344 6,373 
3 -0,317 0,093 0,263 0,481  3 -3,971 1,338 4,751 8,054 
High INV -0,876 0,122 0,199 0,610  High INV -10,704 1,619 2,944 9,169 
 c   t(c) 
SMALL  Low OP 2 3 High OP   SMALL Low OP 2 3 High OP 
Low INV 0,550 0,463 0,295 0,196  Low INV 6,559 5,311 2,726 1,884 
2 0,402 0,255 0,195 0,091  2 4,565 3,688 2,587 1,131 
3 0,247 0,101 0,151 -0,104  3 2,668 1,245 2,363 -1,501 
High INV -0,428 -0,015 -0,124 -0,312  High INV -4,514 -0,169 -1,578 -4,046 
 
Table twenty-two contains regression outcomes from 16 regressions on 2x4x4 sorted portfolios by size, operating 
profitability, and investments in period two of (01/1999 – 12/2008). Size variable is steady around table and reported 
at left upper corner, firms are divided to small and big firms using NYSE breakpoint for market capitalization. 
Investment level increases from top of the table to bottom, from low investing firms on the first quantile to the high 
investing firms in the last quantile. The operating profitability level increases from left to right. The left-hand-side 
variable in the regression is the excess return from each of the portfolios (Ri – Rf) and right-hand-side variables are 
the Fama-French five factors. RHS factor coefficients, interpreted as factor loadings are reported in the table above 
(a) = regression intercept, (b) = market excess return (market factor), (s) = small-minus-big (size factor), (h) = high-
minus-low (value factor), (r) = robust-minus-weak (profitability factor), (c) = conservative-minus-aggressive 
(investment factor). For a more detailed description on LHS portfolios and factors check chapter 5.1.2 Variable 
construction. Regression t-values are reported on the right side of the table for each of the variables. Higher or (lower) 
value than 1.96 (-1.96) standing for statistical significance in a 95 % confidence interval based on simple t-test. Higher 




Table 23. Period two: Big firms, regression on portfolios formed on size, operating profitability 
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BIG SIZED FIRMS: 
 a   t(a) 
BIG  Low OP 2 3 High OP  BIG Low OP 2 3 High OP 
Low INV 0,239 0,167 -0,087 -0,314  Low INV 1,025 0,851 -0,354 -1,505 
2 -0,566 0,145 0,239 0,011  2 -1,850 0,757 1,332 0,057 
3 0,393 0,066 0,102 0,038  3 1,630 0,268 0,390 0,158 
High INV 0,127 -0,095 0,231 0,366  High INV 0,597 -0,419 0,914 1,392 
 b   t(b) 
BIG Low OP 2 3 High OP    BIG  Low OP 2 3 High OP 
Low INV 1,165 1,064 1,111 1,028  Low INV 17,567 19,057 15,774 17,302 
2 1,164 0,829 1,012 0,833  2 13,348 15,165 19,815 15,326 
3 1,146 1,151 0,936 0,834  3 16,660 16,413 12,610 12,236 
High INV 0,992 1,169 0,971 1,197  High INV 16,310 18,155 13,467 15,979 
 s   t(s) 
BIG Low OP 2 3 High OP    BIG  Low OP 2 3 High OP 
Low INV -0,250 -0,110 -0,122 -0,067  Low INV -3,469 -1,820 -1,591 -1,045 
2 0,154 0,010 0,077 -0,157  2 1,630 0,176 1,395 -2,660 
3 -0,271 -0,141 -0,063 -0,275  3 -3,628 -1,857 -0,780 -3,717 
High INV -0,058 -0,239 -0,127 0,060  High INV -0,885 -3,425 -1,628 0,742 
 h   t(h) 
BIG Low OP 2 3 High OP  BIG Low OP 2 3 High OP 
Low INV 0,090 0,011 0,308 -0,059  Low INV 0,885 0,131 2,841 -0,644 
2 0,146 0,273 -0,016 0,023  2 1,087 3,251 -0,205 0,278 
3 0,211 0,318 0,322 -0,112  3 1,992 2,948 2,819 -1,067 
High INV 0,114 0,136 0,003 -0,402  High INV 1,215 1,370 0,026 -3,492 
 r   t(r) 
BIG  Low OP 2 3 High OP   BIG Low OP 2 3 High OP 
Low INV -0,400 0,160 0,219 0,367  Low INV -3,912 1,855 2,015 4,007 
2 0,024 -0,222 0,324 0,248  2 0,179 -2,632 4,113 2,959 
3 -0,260 -0,002 0,090 0,240  3 -2,447 -0,017 0,785 2,284 
High INV -0,733 0,024 0,055 0,402  High INV -7,816 0,246 0,496 3,482 
 c   t(c) 
BIG  Low OP 2 3 High OP   BIG Low OP 2 3 High OP 
Low INV 0,513 0,767 0,447 0,575  Low INV 4,329 7,686 3,549 5,420 
2 0,190 0,228 0,277 0,265  2 1,220 2,335 3,037 2,727 
3 0,247 0,045 -0,106 0,299  3 2,011 0,358 -0,798 2,455 
High INV -0,643 -0,239 -0,605 -0,501  High INV -5,918 -2,077 -4,694 -3,741 
 
Table twenty-three contains regression outcomes from 16 regressions on 2x4x4 sorted portfolios by size, operating 
profitability, and investments in period two of (01/1999 – 12/2008). Size variable is steady around table and reported 
at left upper corner, firms are divided to small and big firms using NYSE breakpoint for market capitalization. 
Investment level increases from top of the table to bottom, from low investing firms on the first quantile to the high 
investing firms in the last quantile. The operating profitability level increases from left to right. The left-hand-side 
variable in the regression is the excess return from each of the portfolios (Ri – Rf) and right-hand-side variables are 
the Fama-French five factors. RHS factor coefficients, interpreted as factor loadings are reported in the table above 
(a) = regression intercept, (b) = market excess return (market factor), (s) = small-minus-big (size factor), (h) = high-
minus-low (value factor), (r) = robust-minus-weak (profitability factor), (c) = conservative-minus-aggressive 
(investment factor). For a more detailed description on LHS portfolios and factors check chapter 5.1.2 Variable 
construction. Regression t-values are reported on the right side of the table for each of the variables. Higher or (lower) 
value than 1.96 (-1.96) standing for statistical significance in a 95 % confidence interval based on simple t-test. Higher 




Table 24. Period three: Small firms, regression on portfolios formed on size, operating 
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SMALL SIZED FIRMS: 
 a   t(a) 
SMALL  Low OP 2 3 High OP   SMALL Low OP 2 3 High OP 
Low INV -0,164 0,123 -0,122 0,157  Low INV -0,871 0,767 -0,580 0,877 
2 0,064 0,092 0,028 0,013  2 0,396 0,735 0,231 0,103 
3 0,151 0,170 0,081 -0,106  3 0,930 1,618 0,732 -0,885 
High INV -0,349 0,009 0,124 -0,174  High INV -2,037 0,073 1,114 -1,392 
 b   t(b) 
SMALL  Low OP 2 3 High OP   SMALL Low OP 2 3 High OP 
Low INV 1,133 1,017 1,103 1,069  Low INV 22,071 23,183 19,182 21,941 
2 1,054 0,933 0,960 1,080  2 23,822 27,492 29,217 30,932 
3 0,955 0,928 0,874 1,013  3 21,610 32,437 28,924 31,199 
High INV 1,086 0,897 0,988 1,034  High INV 23,297 26,591 32,554 30,440 
 s   t(s) 
SMALL  Low OP 2 3 High OP   SMALL Low OP 2 3 High OP 
Low INV 1,072 0,867 0,930 1,026  Low INV 12,941 12,249 10,024 13,053 
2 0,896 0,799 0,824 0,884  2 12,549 14,590 15,547 15,691 
3 0,906 0,799 0,920 0,933  3 12,705 17,321 18,871 17,796 
High INV 0,977 0,858 0,990 0,961  High INV 12,987 15,763 20,235 17,531 
 h   t(h) 
SMALL  Low OP 2 3 High OP   SMALL Low OP 2 3 High OP 
Low INV -0,059 0,353 -0,116 0,153  Low INV -0,645 4,498 -1,131 1,755 
2 -0,327 0,318 0,154 0,262  2 -4,131 5,239 2,618 4,196 
3 -0,071 0,184 0,343 0,083  3 -0,900 3,604 6,342 1,436 
High INV -0,508 0,159 0,233 0,189  High INV -6,087 2,632 4,290 3,111 
 r   t(r) 
SMALL  Low OP 2 3 High OP   SMALL Low OP 2 3 High OP 
Low INV -0,750 -0,349 0,053 0,352  Low INV -5,776 -3,152 0,364 2,859 
2 -0,763 0,107 0,213 0,373  2 -6,818 1,250 2,572 4,230 
3 -0,444 -0,062 0,379 0,620  3 -3,974 -0,861 4,964 7,553 
High INV -1,256 -0,159 0,158 0,459  High INV -10,661 -1,868 2,059 5,349 
 c   t(c) 
SMALL  Low OP 2 3 High OP   SMALL Low OP 2 3 High OP 
Low INV 0,404 0,187 0,922 0,360  Low INV 2,594 1,404 5,286 2,434 
2 0,391 0,097 0,225 -0,013  2 2,912 0,946 2,258 -0,125 
3 -0,057 -0,047 -0,152 0,169  3 -0,427 -0,537 -1,655 1,715 
High INV -0,531 -0,288 -0,402 -0,396  High INV -3,756 -2,815 -4,368 -3,846 
 
Table twenty-four contains regression outcomes from 16 regressions on 2x4x4 sorted portfolios by size, operating 
profitability, and investments in period three of (01/2008 – 12/2018). Size variable is steady around table and reported 
at left upper corner, firms are divided to small and big firms using NYSE breakpoint for market capitalization. 
Investment level increases from top of the table to bottom, from low investing firms on the first quantile to the high 
investing firms in the last quantile. The operating profitability level increases from left to right. The left-hand-side 
variable in the regression is the excess return from each of the portfolios (Ri – Rf) and right-hand-side variables are 
the Fama-French five factors. RHS factor coefficients, interpreted as factor loadings are reported in the table above 
(a) = regression intercept, (b) = market excess return (market factor), (s) = small-minus-big (size factor), (h) = high-
minus-low (value factor), (r) = robust-minus-weak (profitability factor), (c) = conservative-minus-aggressive 
(investment factor). For a more detailed description on LHS portfolios and factors check chapter 5.1.2 Variable 
construction. Regression t-values are reported on the right side of the table for each of the variables. Higher or (lower) 
value than 1.96 (-1.96) standing for statistical significance in a 95 % confidence interval based on simple t-test. Higher 




Table 25. Period three: Big firms, regression on portfolios formed on size, operating profitability 
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BIG SIZED FIRMS: 
 a   t(a) 
BIG  Low OP 2 3 High OP  BIG Low OP 2 3 High OP 
Low INV -0,266 -0,039 0,191 0,182  Low INV -1,762 -0,247 1,330 1,582 
2 0,001 -0,035 0,061 -0,027  2 0,006 -0,209 0,490 -0,210 
3 -0,044 0,086 -0,080 -0,318  3 -0,273 0,487 -0,728 -2,359 
High INV 0,187 0,111 0,273 0,095  High INV 1,391 0,649 1,668 0,490 
 b   t(b) 
BIG Low OP 2 3 High OP    BIG  Low OP 2 3 High OP 
Low INV 1,049 0,974 0,953 0,955  Low INV 25,486 22,881 24,377 30,503 
2 1,070 1,062 0,938 0,940  2 19,171 23,552 27,596 26,843 
3 1,036 1,015 0,903 0,943  3 23,770 21,028 30,320 25,667 
High INV 0,970 1,048 1,090 1,129  High INV 26,428 22,473 24,441 21,450 
 s   t(s) 
BIG Low OP 2 3 High OP    BIG  Low OP 2 3 High OP 
Low INV 0,010 -0,097 -0,166 -0,103  Low INV 0,150 -1,413 -2,630 -2,030 
2 0,042 0,033 -0,189 -0,036  2 0,470 0,452 -3,455 -0,632 
3 -0,003 -0,036 -0,151 -0,031  3 -0,044 -0,463 -3,150 -0,516 
High INV -0,105 -0,164 -0,083 -0,040  High INV -1,772 -2,175 -1,155 -0,470 
 h   t(h) 
BIG Low OP 2 3 High OP  BIG Low OP 2 3 High OP 
Low INV 0,043 0,128 -0,099 -0,160  Low INV 0,580 1,679 -1,421 -2,849 
2 0,382 -0,026 -0,062 -0,099  2 3,823 -0,323 -1,022 -1,580 
3 0,290 0,349 0,023 -0,087  3 3,714 4,037 0,424 -1,315 
High INV -0,127 -0,061 0,046 -0,085  High INV -1,942 -0,727 0,571 -0,901 
 r   t(r) 
BIG  Low OP 2 3 High OP   BIG Low OP 2 3 High OP 
Low INV -0,454 -0,020 0,182 0,220  Low INV -4,368 -0,181 1,845 2,776 
2 -0,535 0,084 -0,164 0,503  2 -3,791 0,739 -1,908 5,684 
3 -0,362 0,134 0,081 0,192  3 -3,288 1,097 1,077 2,067 
High INV -0,651 -0,290 -0,087 0,564  High INV -7,025 -2,463 -0,769 4,240 
 c   t(c) 
BIG  Low OP 2 3 High OP   BIG Low OP 2 3 High OP 
Low INV 0,584 0,614 0,798 0,290  Low INV 4,673 4,754 6,731 3,057 
2 -0,321 0,397 0,309 0,282  2 -1,898 2,900 2,996 2,656 
3 0,117 -0,498 0,190 0,054  3 0,883 -3,398 2,103 0,483 
High INV -0,394 -0,615 -0,668 -0,802  High INV -3,538 -4,347 -4,934 -5,022 
 
Table twenty-five contains regression outcomes from 16 regressions on 2x4x4 sorted portfolios by size, operating 
profitability, and investments in period three of (01/2008 – 12/2018). Size variable is steady around table and reported 
at left upper corner, firms are divided to small and big firms using NYSE breakpoint for market capitalization. 
Investment level increases from top of the table to bottom, from low investing firms on the first quantile to the high 
investing firms in the last quantile. The operating profitability level increases from left to right. The left-hand-side 
variable in the regression is the excess return from each of the portfolios (Ri – Rf) and right-hand-side variables are 
the Fama-French five factors. RHS factor coefficients, interpreted as factor loadings are reported in the table above 
(a) = regression intercept, (b) = market excess return (market factor), (s) = small-minus-big (size factor), (h) = high-
minus-low (value factor), (r) = robust-minus-weak (profitability factor), (c) = conservative-minus-aggressive 
(investment factor). For a more detailed description on LHS portfolios and factors check chapter 5.1.2 Variable 
construction. Regression t-values are reported on the right side of the table for each of the variables. Higher or (lower) 
value than 1.96 (-1.96) standing for statistical significance in a 95 % confidence interval based on simple t-test. Higher 
or (lower) value than 2.576 (-2.576) standing for statistical significance in a 99 % confidence interval based on t-test. 
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In joint results of small firms, SMB coefficients are high with an average value of 
(0.884) around periods. SMB increases once again coming from the second period 
(0.848) to third period (0.915) similar to trend what was seen on 5x5 sorts. On big 
firms’ category, SMB is mostly insignificant variable resulting only small and mostly 
insignificant coefficients, as average coefficient thought periods is (-0.089) turning 
closer to zero from the second period (-0.099) to the third period (-0.070). On small 
firms’ category, average absolute RMW coefficient has been increasing from the first 
period (0.310) with ten out of sixteen significant coefficients, to the second period 
(0.366) with 14 significant coefficients, and finally to (0.406) with 12 significant 
coefficients on the last period. These results are similar to what has been seen on sorts 
of size and operating profitability. Rise between periods is high and significant. 
Although it needs to be remembered, as average absolute values of all coefficients are 
used in this evaluation, and not all values were statistically significant, thus these 
results are only giving the direction of the trend, not the absolute magnitude of change. 
Same results comparing RMW coefficient on big firms differentiate a bit as average 
absolute RMW coefficient has varied from control period (0.329) with nine out of 
sixteen significant coefficients to second period (0.236) with 10 significant 
coefficients and to last period (0.283) with 9 significant coefficients. Although, 
increase at period three is visible. 
Because of a low number of significant coefficients on the whole RMW table on big 
firms, the lowest and highest operating profitability columns are also evaluated. There 
are 21 out of 24 significant RMW coefficients on extreme columns of operating 
profitability on big firms on all tables, and a similar number for small firms is 23 out 
of 24 significant coefficients on operating profitability extremes. On big firms’ 
category lowest operating profitability column shows average coefficients in the first 
period of (-0.597) to second period (-0.342) and to (-0.501) in the third period. On 
small firms’, same average coefficients are (-0.647), (-0.605), (-0.803). Highest 
operating profitability category shows average coefficients in the first period (0.317) 
to second (0.314) to last (0.370). On small firms’ same average coefficients (0.277), 
(0.456), (0.451). Based on these results on coefficients, RMW seems to be slightly 
more important in explaining the returns of small firms than large firms on average. 
RMW has much more explanatory power in the third period compared to the second 
period on operating profitability extremes. This is similar to findings on size and 
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operating profitability sorts suggesting increased importance of RMW risk-factor in 
explaining returns. 
CMA provides a bit higher absolute slopes on the third period of (0.433) with 13 
significant coefficients compared to the second period (0.372) with the same number 
of significant coefficients on big firms. On the first period at big firms’ category, the 
CMA coefficients were mostly insignificant. On small firm’s CMA seems not to play 
a big part at explaining returns on average. However, extreme quantiles from each 
characteristic of OP and INV seem to have a couple of extreme CMA coefficients in 
small firms’ category. As in (low OP, low INV) coefficients are (0.581) on first, 
(0.404) on second, and (0.404) on last. And (high OP, high INV) same coefficients (-
0.384), (-0.312), (-0.396). Most extreme value can be found from the period three 
(table 22) (low INV, 3 OP) as coefficient is high as (0.922), but this can be seen as a 
bit of an outlier comparing to other coefficients. On small firm’s CMA seems to variate 
much providing high significant coefficients or insignificant low coefficients. In 
addition to these findings, there are not much to add on single coefficient comparison 
as CMA and RMW coefficients seem to variate between the firm categories. 
5.5.4 Highlights on size, operating profitability and investment tests 
These return patterns in (table 18) give more evidence about the existence of operating 
profitability patterns in the returns showing the simple fact that more profitable firms 
have higher average returns. The lost size effect is found in the last period when using 
a broader approach to divide firms only in two size categories showing support to small 
firms having higher returns than big firms. Performance evaluation reveals the fact that 
FF5 is not as steady explaining returns in low-frequently data at shorter periods based 
on a test on size, operating profitability and investment sorts. Biggest problems in 
explaining returns are faced in different sorts of large-sized firms. This is opposite to 
previous studies (e.g. Fama & French, 2015) FF5 had difficulties in explaining the 
returns of small firms, not the big firms. 
RMW coefficient loadings show more support to the higher importance of the 
profitability factor in explaining the returns at period three compared to the second 
period and the first period. High and low operating profitability columns seem to 
84 
provide significant results as most of the RMW coefficients are statistically significant 
in both small and big size categories. Increase in absolute average coefficients seen 
coming to the present day as coefficients on extremes increases significantly between 
the second and third period. Results also reveal that RMW seems to be better 
explaining the returns of small firms than big firms on average. Findings are similar to 
the size and operating profitability 5x5 sorts suggesting increased importance of RMW 
risk factor in explaining average returns.  
Investment average return pattern is not very much supported expect for big firms on 
the first two periods. CMA seems to have a high effect on explaining some returns on 
extremes, but on average firms, it helps little to none. Tests reveal that for small firms 
CMA risk factor is mainly unimportant, but for big size firms, there are much more 
significant coefficients despite the low performance of FF5. SMB and HML 
movements follow similar trends as in 5x5 sorts, and it can be clearly seen that these 
risk factors are much more important in explaining the returns of small firms than big 
firms coming to present day as coefficients of these factor decrease significantly.   
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
The empirical part of this thesis reveals that there are significant changes in risk-factors 
after the financial crisis. The magnitude of changes is much higher than between the 
control period and period before the financial crisis. It is safe to conclude that the 
global financial crisis has affected the financial markets and major risk-factors 
significantly in the U.S. equity markets. To point out. There is a considerable decrease 
in the number of firms in the smallest size columns after the financial crisis at period 
three. On other columns the number of firms is steady. Thus, this action can be seen 
as a normal outcome of the crisis and not determining the results of this thesis.  
The third hypothesis anticipates that visible risk factor patterns in average returns 
disappear after the financial crisis. This hypothesis is accepted as we see return patterns 
disappear on period three (after the financial crisis). Average return patterns were 
strongly visible on the control period and period two (before the financial crisis). 
Period two 120-months before the breakpoint of the end 2008 seems to be “golden” 
era for risk-factors as they provide significant differentiation in average return patterns 
similar as seen in the control period, but stronger on magnitude. Returns for risk-
factors excluding the market factor were very high on the second period when 
comparing to the other two periods. The second period seems to be the only one where 
size effect on average returns is easily visible on 5x5 sorted portfolios supporting the 
strong presence of risk-factors on this period. Tests on 2x4x4 sorted portfolios revel 
side effect also in period three using broader diversification to two size groups, small 
and big firms. 
Using financial crisis and end of 2008 as a breakpoint for data we can see that risk-
factor return patterns disappear almost in all cases on 5x5 sorts at the third period of 
120-months. The single expectation was a mild pattern between extremes on 
investment effect. Return dispersion between different categories is considerably low 
in the last period. This fact shows no support to the broad diversification of firms with 
major risk factors such as value (BE/ME), operating profitability and investments in 
the period after the financial crisis on 5x5 sorts. Equity markets in the U.S. seem to be 
overcrowded as all returns are highly positive with low dispersion between firm 
characteristics in the period three making differentiation firms with these risk factors 
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not showing any previously discovered average return patterns on daily data. However, 
on 2x4x4 sorts, profitability effect was able to generate average return patterns 
between extreme categories also in period three between low and high operating 
profitability. Showing high profitability firms have higher returns on average in period 
three consistently as in earlier periods. 
More significant changes are seen on the coefficients of the risk factors. First, 
discussing their own sorts for each of the risk factors. HML (value) factor has a 
negative decrease of approximately six percent of explanation power in excess returns 
coming to period three after the financial crisis. This change is significant, as between 
period one and two value effect explanatory power was slightly increasing. The 
financial crisis and changes shifted value to lose explanatory power. RMW 
(profitability) factor gains five percentage in explanation power coming to the third 
period nearly suggesting that value and profitability have some shifts on explanatory 
power. This change on RMW is low in magnitude, as between period one and two 
profitability factor gains much more explanatory power. However, these changes signs 
of the increased importance of profitability factor in last twenty years period coming 
to the present day. CMA (investment) is pretty steady on its own sorts, suffering no 
major changes, but on other sorts than its own CMA performs very weak on period 
three. Second, evaluating different risk factors and sorts. Other risk factors show a 
similar robust story in all tests. SMB (size) increases significantly coming to period 
three and changes on the way that SMB explains returns of small firms much better 
and decreases closer to zero on big firms on period three. This is one signs of increased 
illiquidity premium on equity markets. Market factor increases also coming to the third 
period after the decrease in explanation power in the second period. HML seems to 
lose explanation power in all sorts evaluated in this thesis suggesting the lower 
presence of this factor in the equity markets to the present day. 
Third, evaluating 2x4x4 sorts that reveal additional information to results. On tests, 
RMW (profitability) coefficients show further support to the higher importance of the 
profitability factor in explaining the returns at period three compared to other periods. 
RMW has a bit higher importance on explaining the returns of small firms. Findings 
on the profitability factor are similar to 5x5 sorts. CMA (investment) factor seems to 
have a high effect on explaining some returns on extremes, but on average it helps 
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little to none on different portfolio sorts, excluding CMA factors own sort where it 
performs steadily. Explaining the returns of small firm’s CMA seems to be very 
insignificant. SMB (size) movements follow similar patterns as in 5x5 sorts revealing 
that this risk factor is much more important explaining the returns of small firms than 
big firms. Similar finding on 2x4x4 sort is made in the case of HML as it is very weak 
on explaining the returns of big firms. 
Based on all regression tests. Importance of profitability, which is one part of quality 
seems to be increased from the control period and after the financial crisis. This 
increased importance of quality is also emphasized in other recent studies on risk 
factors (e.g. Novy-Marx, Asness et al.). The empirical part of this thesis shows more 
support to the increased importance of profitability explanatory power in average 
returns at present day. Literature review and regression test show support to the fourth 
hypothesis, there is a flight to quality after the financial crisis. This fact can be seen 
from increased average absolute profitability coefficients on regression tests at the 
same time as other major risk factors (value and investments) lose explanatory power 
on regression tests. 
Evaluating the second hypothesis that is strongly related to the main research questions 
of this thesis issues the question; is the performance of the Fama-French five-factor 
model affected by different states on the market. This hypothesis is firmly accepted, 
as model performance increases significantly in period three being pretty steady 
between period one and two. Performance of FF5 is significantly highest in period 
three at all sorts and tests. Low performance of FF5 in explaining monthly returns at 
shorter periods on big firms was interesting as earlier studies have shown that (e.g. 
Fama & French, 2015) FF5 has problems in small firms, but this result can be strongly 
related to a low number of observations. Using daily data with a large number of 
observations as along with data close to the present day, FF5 works extremely well 
and using it in applications recommend based on these tests. 
Alongside with answering the research questions, this thesis provided accurate 
information on what kind of returns these factors explain with the best performance 
and what changes different market states have had on them. Market factor and SMB 
seem to capture returns that other factors are not able to capture on average. This is 
88 
shown from the difference between daily and monthly tests and mainly the second 
period (01/1999 – 12/2008) as those MKT and SMB factors are relatively low and 
other factors high. The second period can be seen as a period of a golden era for other 
factors in explaining returns as risk factors (HML, RMW, CMA) had high returns on 
average and explained on average returns better than in the control or the period three. 
 
SMB (size) explains the returns of small firms with increased performance in the last 
period. This happens in addition to SMB losing explanatory power in big size 
categories as coefficients decrease closer to zero. The result shows that the average 
returns of small firms are more driven by the size and associated illiquidity premium 
on period three. Illiquidity premium is supported as regression tests reveal that the 
profitability of small firms decreases coming to period three. Thus, other changes in 
characteristics are not good in explaining similar returns of small firms compared to 
big firms. HML (value) explains returns of high book-to-market firms better than 
returns of low book-to-market firms. Performance of HML decreases in its own sort 
coming from second to last period. In 2x4x4 sorts, HML is lacking much of 
performance on explaining the returns of big firms. RMW explains returns of small 
and big firms on a good performance, providing slightly better performance on small 
firms. Increasing coefficients on its own sort supporting increasing importance of this 
risk factor. CMA is steady at explaining the return on both sides of extreme investing 
activities with similar explanatory power. However, CMA lack explaining middle 
categories of investment and those categories seem to have higher returns on average 
than extremes. High returns of middle investment categories are explained with 
negative RMW coefficients on extremes and positive RMW coefficients on the middle. 
Suggesting profitability drives more of returns than investments itself on those sorts 
of size and investments.  
The size effect is visible on all sorts on period two and otherwise invisible, expect for 
2x4x4 sorts where size effect is visible between small and big firms. Different risk 
factors seem to capture and explain differences in average returns between small and 
big firms differently. In most cases, risk factor presence increases as firm size decrease. 
Suggesting there is size effect, but it is not directly related to firm size, moreover to 
other characteristics that small firms have compared to big firms. Asness et al. (2018) 
find that size matters if quality or junk characteristics are controlled. Yes, but is this 
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more of a quality factor than size factor if the effect is not visible without controlling 
for quality? Small firms have higher coefficients and are more explanatory in other 
risk factors too. Asness et al. point out that small quality firms outperform large quality 
firms, but they did not control for other risk factors which variate along with firms’ 
size. Illiquidity was controlled in their tests, which revealed a much smaller magnitude 
size effect, and this illiquidity seems to be the driver behind size effect mostly. It is 
concentrated on small firms, which is seen from the SMB coefficient loadings on 
regression tests. This thesis finds more support to size being unimportant on other than 
returns of small firms. As regressions tests reveal that characteristics, risk factors 
variate with the firm size, moreover, supporting the fact that the size factor overlaps 
the other risk-factors. Asness et al. paper reveals the importance of size association 
with changes in other firm characteristics than characteristics directly linked to size, 
not supporting size as a strong risk factor in average returns. 
In simple terms, results show that some risk factors such as profitability are more 
important in explaining returns on the present-day as some factors lose their power 
(value, BE/ME). The investor should focus more on these characteristics of firms on 
the present-day than other less important characteristics from the historical periods on 
equity markets. Although, it is good to remember that differences in average returns 
were very small in period three suggesting the task of differentiating firms with risk 
factors studied in this thesis is not easy, and some other factors could do a better job. 
For future studies, it would be interesting to create quality factor or sorts based on 
quality. Quality is pointed out in many empirical studies on risk-factors, including this 
thesis. Including quality into asset pricing models and defining common consensus 
what quality means is still in progress. Future research about the different common 
characteristics that characterise quality firms would be demanded. Those results would 
allow us to differentiate firms from quality to low quality, and I strongly believe that 
it would allow us to see much higher dispersion in average returns than on sorts used 
in this thesis. Creating a common quality factor would be a good addition to asset 
pricing models. Also, a similar study as this thesis made to European stock market 
would be interesting and could provide stronger and supporting results of changes as 
Europe suffered more from the global financial crisis as did the U.S. economy.  
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APPENDIX 
APPENDIX 1. AVERAGE NUMBER OF FIRMS ON SORTED PORTFOLIOS 
 
a. (SIZE & B/M) Period one: 5135 firms on average (01/1989 – 12/1998) 
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low B/M 795 238 154 110 106 
2 460 162 103 81 72 
3 417 153 94 73 61 
4 481 133 78 66 54 
High B/M 1014 110 54 40 25 
      
b. (SIZE & B/M) Period two: 4660 firms on average (01/1999 – 12/2008) 
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low B/M 497 180 145 132 157 
2 359 143 114 94 74 
3 422 143 96 69 53 
4 594 136 76 52 39 
High B/M 902 90 43 33 19 
      
c. (SIZE & B/M) Period three: 3335 firms on average (01/2009 – 12/2018) 
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low B/M 266 141 99 112 113 
2 203 113 93 81 76 
3 244 121 76 63 51 
4 338 122 73 48 42 
High B/M 660 87 49 37 29 
 
d. (SIZE & OP) Period one: 5263 firms on average (01/1989 – 12/1998) 
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low OP 1671 209 85 47 27 
2 501 155 94 67 41 
3 372 152 99 80 62 
4 309 143 114 96 91 
High OP 417 148 102 84 98 
      
e. (SIZE & OP) Period two: 4755 firms on average (01/1999 – 12/2008) 
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low OP 1523 229 118 76 47 
2 494 142 88 64 51 
3 355 133 102 77 62 
4 258 107 95 89 89 
High OP 209 93 80 80 95 
      
f. (Size & OP) Period three: 3389 firms on average (01/2009 – 12/2008) 
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low OP 954 174 79 51 28 
2 314 135 91 66 47 
3 218 118 88 67 61 
4 137 85 69 75 90 
91 
High OP 122 81 69 86 86 
 
g. (SIZE & INV) Period one: 5206 firms on average (01/1989 – 12/1998) 
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low INV 957 118 54 48 33 
2 416 114 79 70 69 
3 388 119 93 79 76 
4 449 160 109 85 76 
High INV 1008 287 157 95 66 
      
h. (SIZE & INV) Period two: 4905 firms on average (01/1999 – 12/2008) 
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low INV 884 123 77 60 45 
2 412 106 71 67 63 
3 431 123 87 74 73 
4 460 145 103 84 77 
High INV 747 233 162 111 88 
      
i. (Size & INV) Period three: 3550 firms on average (01/2009 – 12/2008) 
  Small Size 2 3 4 Big Size 
Low INV 591 107 62 49 38 
2 285 97 74 62 65 
3 236 100 74 72 75 
4 279 123 89 84 77 
High INV 459 192 109 85 66 
 
j. (Size & OP & INV) Period one: 4057 small firms and 905 big firms on average           
(01/1989 – 12/1998) 
  SMALL    BIG  
  Low OP 2 3 High OP  Low OP 2 3 High OP 
Low INV 636 119 73 106  58 46 45 41 
2 276 193 160 148  53 57 52 42 
3 206 213 230 204  51 57 62 55 
High INV 533 264 293 402  69 53 75 88 
          
k. (Size & OP & INV) Period two: 3739 small firms and 945 big firms on average         
(01/1999 – 12/2008) 
  SMALL    BIG  
  Low OP 2 3 High OP  Low OP 2 3 High OP 
Low INV 691 114 80 96  77 46 39 46 
2 274 172 153 107  56 53 50 45 
3 231 219 232 168  48 59 64 53 
High INV 507 220 236 240  106 65 71 65 
          
l. (Size & OP & INV) Period three: 2529 small firms and 840 big firms on average       
(01/2009 – 12/2008) 
  SMALL    BIG  
  Low OP 2 3 High OP  Low OP 2 3 High OP 
Low INV 411 85 60 75  65 40 37 51 
2 189 148 116 91  46 48 49 47 
3 141 179 160 94  42 58 53 51 
High INV 314 168 152 144  76 61 60 57 
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